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Preface
This book deals with some aspects of Japanese labor markets. It is not about 
Japanese management practices or about the "Japan-As-Number-One" syn 
drome. Nor does it aim to be a comprehensive treatment of Japanese labor 
market phenomena; instead, it presents an economic analysis of certain aspects 
of Japanese labor markets. As such, most empirical materials are examined 
from a particular analytical perspective. To formulate the analytical framework, 
I incorporate ideas from transaction-cost economics into the human capital 
theory. This approach, it will be argued, can potentially accommodate the 
analysis of how cultural and traditional factors interact with the influences of 
economic growth. This aspect of the theory is especially attractive for study 
ing labor market institutions in Japan, because, in my view, such interactions 
likely helped shape many of the Japanese labor market practices during the 
country©s economic development.
For institutional materials and data, I will rely heavily on existing studies, 
many of which are in English. Much of the quantitative evidence has been 
developed specifically for this project, though I draw on research findings 
reported in my previous works either alone or with John Raisian. Although 
the focus is on the Japanese scene, I will try as much as possible to place the 
analysis in a comparative perspective with the United States.
I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to some of 
the many individuals who have influenced the intellectual orientation of this 
book: my teachers, Gary S. Becker and Jacob Mincer, who encouraged me 
to analyze Japanese labor markets; Yoram Barzel, Steven N.S. Cheung, Levis 
Kochin, and Keith B. Leffler, who taught me what transaction-cost economics 
is about; Ben T. Yu, who collaborated with me on a paper which set the direc 
tion for this research; Masatoshi Kuratani, who, through his Ph.D. disserta 
tion in the early 1970s and through subsequent contacts, sparked my interest 
in applying human capital theory to Japan; and John Raisian, my co-author 
on many of the papers on Japan-U.S. labor market comparisons, for many 
years of productive work together and for letting me use in this book some 
of the material we developed together.
Some of the related materials were presented to the conferences held in Santa 
Clara (1986), West Berlin (1986), Yokohama (1986), Brussels (1988), 
Washington, D.C. (1989), Madison (1989), and New York (1990). I would 
like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers and commentators of these 
conferences: Ernst W. Stromsdorfer, Peter T. Chinloy, and Duane E. Leigh 
(Santa Clara); Robert A Hart, John P. Martin, and Peter McGregor (West 
Berlin and Brussels); Kazutoshi Koshiro, Fumio Ohtake, Akira Ono, and Yoko
Sano (Yokohama); Robert E. Litan, Alan S. Blinder, and Richard B. Freeman 
(Washington, D.C.); Jozef M.M. Ritzen and Michael Feuer (Madison); and 
David E. Bloom, Linda N. Edwards, and Aloysius Siow (New York) for hav 
ing provided me with the opportunity to present my research findings and to 
benefit from their useful comments and suggestions. Seminar and workshop 
participants at the Meiji Gakuin University, The Ohio State University, 
Yokohama National University, the University of Cincinnati, the Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research, the University of Chicago, and the Univer 
sity of Costa Rica offered many useful comments.
At about the time this manuscript was being edited, I began investigating 
the training and employment practices at the Japanese automobile transplants 
in the U.S. Midwest. By mid-August, 19901 had visited and interviewed the 
key personnel at two companies Subaru-Isuzu Automotive Inc. (SIA) and 
Diamond-Star Motors (DSM) and made a preliminary visit to Honda of 
America Manufacturing (HAM), as well. I have incorporated some of what 
I learned from these visits into the relevant discussions, especially in chapter 
5. I wish to thank these companies for agreeing to participate in my study.
Many people read portions of this manuscript and related papers and of 
fered useful comments and discussions. I wish to thank Yoram Barzel, Gary 
S. Becker, Barbara L. Brugman, Linda N. Edwards, Yoshio Higuchi, H. Allan 
Hunt, Susan N. Houseman, Todd L. Idson, Fuchun Jin, Jacob Mincer, Ha- 
jime Miyazaki, Alice Nakamura, Donald O. Parsons, Robert G. Spiegelman, 
and Ben T. Yu. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for reading the 
entire manuscript and offering many constructive comments. I relied on Reiko 
Aoki and Tatsuro Ichiishi for mathematical advice and Paul Evans for advice 
on time-series analysis, all of whom graciously offered their help on the spot. 
I wish to acknowledge the competent research assistance by Apurva Mathur 
and Fuchun Jin. Since I refer to some of the evidence developed in my previous 
works, it is appropriate to acknowledge the funding received from the U.S. 
Department of Labor (Office of Assistant Secretary) and the Hoover Institu 
tion (National Fellowship) to help finance them. The Ohio State University 
also provided partial summer research support in 1987, 1988, and 1990.1 also 
wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Katharine G. Abraham, Yoshio Higuchi, 
Takatoshi Ito, Kazutoshi Koshiro, Machiko Osawa, and Haruo Shimada for 
facilitating my collection of materials. Judith K. Gentry©s conscientious editorial 
supervision is gratefully acknowledged. My sons, Barry Masanori and Jef 
frey Masayuki, helped uplift my spirits, and my wife, Barbara Brugman, not 
only offered emotional support and encouragement throughout this project, 
but also served as precious advisor. Finally, to those who helped me along 
the way but whose names I may have neglected to mention, I offer my sincere 
apologies along with gratitude.
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SUMMARY
This book develops a unified understanding of some of the notable Japanese 
labor market features in a comparative perspective with the United States. In 
Japan, as compared to the United States, for example, levels of employment 
tenure are high, employer-employee attachment strong, and earnings-tenure 
profiles steeply sloped. Layoffs and dismissals are used much less frequently 
in Japan than in the United States, with adjustments in hours of work and in 
ventories assuming a greater importance. Industrial relations in Japan contain 
some unique institutions, such as joint consultation and consensus-based deci- 
sionmaking, and work organization exhibits a great deal of flexibility. Not 
to be overlooked is the phenomenon of Japanese employers and employees 
spending a great deal of informal time together after work hours. This expen 
diture of time is viewed here as an investment in the employment relation 
ship, and reflects the overall greater investment in the employment relation 
ship in Japan than in the United States. This investment difference results in 
a stronger employer-employee attachment in Japan than in the U.S., as evidenc 
ed by the considerably smaller number of days lost in labor disputes in Japan.
To bring together these phenomena in a single conceptual framework, a 
theory is formulated which incorporates transaction-cost considerations into 
human capital theory. Transaction costs in this analysis denote costs of com 
municating information between the employer and the employee as well as 
among the employees, including the costs of convincing the other party of the 
information©s veracity. The theory draws the distinction between two types 
of investments: investments in firm-specific technical skills and investments 
in the reliability of information exchanged between the employer and employees 
and among employees. It is this latter type of investment that takes place in 
the Japanese joint consultation system, quality control circles, and consensus- 
based decisionmaking, as well as in the time spent with co-workers in 
restaurants and bars.
This book hypothesizes that there are more investments in Japan than in 
America because, for various reasons, the investment costs are lower in Japan. 
An autonomous increase in the investment in information reliability is found 
to encourage the investment in technical skills. Similarly, an autonomous in 
crease in the investment in technical skills stimulates the investment in infor 
mation reliability. Most important, the investments in both technical skills and 
in information reliability may be stimulated by technological progress, and 
the stimulation is greater the more elastic are the cost functions underlying 
these investments. It is argued that the cost function associated with the in 
vestment in information reliability is more elastic in a lower transaction-cost 
environment.
vn
Based on the above results, the book argues that cultural-traditional in 
fluences, which shape the transaction-cost environment, likely interacted with 
technological progress in shaping many of the uniquely Japanese labor market 
phenomena. In particular, the productivity enhancement campaign (seisansei 
undo) that began with the establishment of the Japan Productivity Center in 
1955 encouraged rapid technological progress, which in turn stimulated the 
investment in firm-specific technical skills. The increased investment in 
technical skills encouraged the investment in information reliability, and this 
whole process was boosted by the low-transaction cost environment that prevail 
ed in Japan. The increased information reliability further stimulated the in 
vestment in technical skills. As a result, the employer-employee attachment 
became strengthened, and it became manifest in such labor market institutions 
as joint consultations, consensus-based decisionmaking, and enterprise unions, 
all of which became widespread in Japan after the late 1950s.
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Introduction
Japan and the United States today represent the two most successful free 
market economies in the world. These two economies share many 
similarities: both operate in highly competitive and open markets; both 
have enjoyed strong positions in manufacturing and high technology 
industries; and both have experienced significant sectoral shifts in 
employment since the early 1970s. These and other similarities, how 
ever, should not make one overlook important differences between the 
two economies. It is these contrasts that offer fertile bases for new 
insights. Whether the differences are due to cultural, traditional, or 
economic factors, it seems undeniable that they ultimately manifest 
themselves in the conduct of employers and employees, and in the labor 
market institutions.
Many of the differences have already been noted in the literature. 
They include the following:
1. In Japan, long-term employment is more prevalent, employer- 
employee attachment is stronger, and employee tenure in a firm has a 
more substantial effect on worker earnings when compared to the United 
States (Hashimoto and Raisian 1985, 1989; Mincer and Higuchi 1988). 
The labor-management relationship is evidently more cooperative in 
Japan than in the United States turnover rates are considerably lower, 
and the number of days lost in labor disputes much smaller. !
2. The Japanese and U.S. economies differ in the ways that employ 
ment, hours of work, and inventories adjust over the business cycle. 
Layoffs and dismissals are extremely rare in Japan. Instead, adjustments 
in hours of work, wages, and inventories assume a relatively greater role 
over the business cycle in that country than in the United States (Gordon 
1982; Hashimoto and Raisian 1987, 1988; Abraham and Houseman 
1989). 2
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3. The two economies have typically coped differently with declining 
manufacturing industries. Since the 1970s, workforce reductions in 
Japan were achieved with less reliance on outright dismissals than in the 
United States.
4. In the Japanese wage system, workers typically receive a signifi 
cant portion of earnings in bonuses, whereas bonuses received by U.S. 
workers are rarely significant (Hashimoto 1979; Freeman and 
Weitzman 1987). In addition, wage bargaining in Japan is synchronized 
to the annual spring offensive (shuntd)— an arrangement that helps make 
wages more flexible there than in the United States (Gordon 1982; 
Taylor 1989).
5. Japanese labor contracts are brief, leaving much room for continu 
ous adjustment by mutual consent of the parties involved (Hanami 
1981). Labor and management engage frequently in joint consultations, 
and major decisions are arrived at after an extensive sharing of informa 
tion and the consensus-building procedure called nemawashi. 3
6. Unions in Japan are enterprise-based. Although most unions be 
long to national-level federations, the basic issues of wages, working 
conditions, and like factors are negotiated at a firm level. Unlike the 
local of an American industrial union, the Japanese enterprise union, 
which typically includes white-collar nonsupervisory employees as well 
as blue-collar workers, is not merely an administrative unit of a national 
union. 4
The book argues that many of the differences in labor market practices 
between the two countries or for that matter among any countries  
reflect contrasts in the investment made in the employment relationship. 
What factors determine the investment differences? To answer this ques 
tion, one might expect the theories of employment contracts, which have 
been the focus of many recent theoretical studies, to offer some guidance. 5 
As they now stand, unfortunately, employment contract theories in the 
literature are not particularly suited for cross-country studies, as most 
were motivated by labor market phenomena in the United States.
For example, the main prediction from the implicit contract theories, 
first introduced by Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974), and Gordon (1974), 
and subsequently elaborated on by a number of researchers, is that in the
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long-term employment relationship wages will be rigid, with workers 
facing a positive probability of layoff during economic downturns. This 
prediction seems to conform to the tendencies toward wage rigidity and 
the frequent use of layoffs that characterize the U.S. labor market. 6 It is 
not consistent, however, with the experience of Japan, known for its 
long-term employment relationships. There, workers in the shushin 
koyo (permanent employment) system rarely experience U.S.-type 
layoffs, and their wages are quite flexible, as they contain semi-annual 
bonuses and are renegotiated every year. The implicit contract theories 
may have the potential to accommodate Japanese phenomena, but such 
an extension is not obvious.
Clearly, a theory is needed that can help achieve a unified understand 
ing of such labor market phenomena as labor turnover, earnings, and the 
strength of the employer-employee attachment. An important aim of 
such a theory should be to explain contrasts among labor market 
practices in different countries. Implicit contract theories, however, not 
having been designed to address the turnover issue, would have diffi 
culty in achieving this aim. For example, one may assert, as the implicit 
contract theories do, that a typical firm has the incentive to offer a long- 
term employment contract, but what is there to prevent workers from 
leaving for another job during the life of the contract?
In fact, many U.S. workers do change jobs frequently, though job 
separations decline with years of tenure, typical Japanese workers 
appear more reluctant than their U.S. counterparts to separate for the 
purpose of taking another job. 7 Clearly, it is desirable for a theory of 
employment contract to treat the separation incentives of the employer 
and the employee as they relate to earnings and other characteristics of 
the employment relationship. In this vein, the potential usefulness of the 
theory of firm-specific human capital seems obvious, as it can account 
for how turnover and earnings change with tenure in the firm. 8 As Rosen 
(1985) stated, "some consideration for differences in firm-specific 
human capital, labor mobility, and quasi-fixed factor ideas are required 
to fully account for international differences in labor market phe 
nomena" (p. 1165).
It will be argued that cultural/traditional influences likely interacted
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with technological progress in shaping many of the uniquely Japanese 
labor market phenomena. To analyze this interaction, chapter 2 dis 
cusses a theory that combines transaction-cost considerations with 
human capital theory. Transaction costs in this theory refer to the costs of 
communicating and verifying relevant information between employer 
and employees, and they are viewed as playing a central role in shaping 
many of the labor market institutions. Since culture and tradition can be 
interpreted as influencing transaction costs, the proposed theory offers a 
way of bringing these noneconomic factors into economic analysis.
In previous works, I have argued that positive transaction costs are the 
key factor in the sharing theorem of the human capital theory, and 
proposed that wage flexibility enhances the value of contracts involving 
firm-specific human capital (Hashimoto 1979,1981; Hashimoto and Yu 
1980). Here, I extend those analyses and offer a conceptual framework 
for a comparative study of Japanese and American labor markets. I 
postulate that the employer and employee invest in the employment 
relationship in order to enhance their mutual well-being. I distinguish 
between two types of investments: investment in the employee©s tech 
nical skills and investment in the reliability of all types of information 
exchanged within the firm. The effect of investing in the employee©s 
technical skills on productivity is obvious. The investment in the relia 
bility of information reduces mistrust, disputes, and inefficient deci 
sions, and thereby promotes cooperative industrial relations and pro 
ductivity. In my framework, the usual term training, or firm-specific 
human capital, refers to the package of these investments. The greater 
these investments the more productive the employment relationship.
An increased investment in technical skills stimulates the investment 
in information reliability and vice versa. The independent variables are 
the costs associated with these investments and the worker propensity 
for mobility. The cost of investing in technical skills is a function of 
how well the formal education system prepares students for training by 
imparting positive attitudes for learning as well as by teaching basic 
skills. The cost of investing in information reliability reflects the 
transaction-cost environment, which in turn is affected by the degree of 
cultural heterogeneity of the workforce, the attitudes of the management
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and workers, and the workers© abilities to function cooperatively as a 
group. Finally, a high worker propensity for mobility reduces the 
returns to these investments and so discourages training.
I hypothesize that there are more investments in Japan than in the 
United States because, for various reasons, the investment costs and the 
mobility propensity are lower in Japan. One of the theorems that 
emerges is that economic growth and technological progress can stimu 
late both types of investment and that each type, in turn, reinforces the 
other. Japanese investments in employment relations became pro 
nounced in the 1960s, coinciding with that economy©s rapid tech 
nological change and accelerated economic growth.
It might be said also that to fully understand labor market differences 
between countries, one would have to pay attention to differences in the 
laws regulating the labor markets and in the institutions of industrial 
relations. But laws and institutions are themselves endogenous, and a 
complete investigation must go even further by analyzing the manner in 
which they are shaped by exogenous factors such as culture and tradi 
tion. It is hoped that this study makes a contribution to future investiga 
tions by suggesting how influences of culture and tradition may be 
incorporated into an economic analysis.
Economists tend to shun invoking the influences of culture and 
tradition in explaining real-world phenomena, but it would seem inap 
propriate to deny the influence of these factors altogether, especially in 
cross-country comparisons. At the same time, an explanation based on 
culture and tradition alone would seem unsatisfactory, especially if it 
suggests unchanging persistence over time in labor market features. A 
more productive approach would be to investigate how traditional and 
cultural factors shape labor market characteristics in response to chang 
ing circumstances.
In studying Japanese-U.S. differences in labor markets, one hesitates 
in appealing solely to culture and tradition, because some of the labor 
market differences appear to have emerged rather recently. For exam 
ple, (1) Japanese labor turnover appears to have been quite high from the 
early 1900s through the early 1950s (Taira 1970; Shimada 1983; Gor 
don 1985); (2) the often-noted wage rigidity in the United States appears
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to have emerged after the end of World War II, when a drastic decline in 
the responsiveness of wages to economic conditions took place (Gordon 
1982); and (3) the Japanese style of industrial relations became preva 
lent after the late 1950s when the rate of economic growth began to 
accelerate as a result, in my opinion, of the productivity enhancement 
campaign (seisansei undo) launched in 1955.
Although labor market flexibility has been a topic of considerable 
recent interest, there have been only a few analyses of the underlying 
causes of differential flexibility across countries. 9 It is hoped that the 
theory presented in this book will contribute to closing this gap. Also, 
the existing literature on transaction costs lacks an explicit model of how 
transaction costs affect behavior, though many of the discussions are 
thoughtful and provocative (e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; 
Williamson 1975, 1985). An important contribution of this book is to 
incorporate transaction costs explicitly into the theory of firm-specific 
human capital. 10
Employment Categories in Japan
Let me end this chapter by discussing the definitions of employment 
categories in Japan. The Japanese labor force includes persons 15 years 
of age or older, in contrast to the U.S. labor force for which the youngest 
age is 16 years. Employed persons in Japan are classified into those at 
work and those not at work (kyugyoshd). This latter category consists of 
persons who are not currently working but are kept on payroll and 
counted as employed persons. 11 Some of the workers in this category 
may, in fact, be on temporary layoff (Hashimoto 1990c). If so, they 
would be classified as being unemployed rather than employed were 
they in the United States.
Whether at work or not, employed persons are categorized by 
employers as self-employed workers, family workers, and/or employ 
ees (see dotted line in table 1.1). The employee category, in turn, con 
sists of regular workers, temporary employees, or day workers. Self- 
employment has the same meaning as the U.S. definition, and family
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workers those who work in an unincorporated enterprise operated by a 
member of the family may be paid or unpaid.
In 1988, self-employed and family workers amounted to about 18.8 
percent of all nonagricultural employment, a much larger proportion 
than the U.S. figure of about 8 percent. 12 Japanese women are more 
likely to be family workers than are men. In 1988, 13 percent of 
employed females in the nonagricultural sector belonged to the family- 
worker category, as compared to 1.9 percent for males. The proportion 
for self-employment in the nonagricultural sector was 11.2 percent for 
females and 13.5 percent for males.
Much of what one reads about the uniqueness of the Japanese labor 
market refers to regular workers. Regular workers are under employ 
ment contracts with an unspecified length of employment duration, and 
many of them, especially in large firms, are in the shushin koyo (lifetime 
employment) system with nenko (tenure-based) wage schedules. 13 
Their earnings consist of regular wages and the famous twice-yearly 
bonuses, which sometimes amount to about 30 percent of their total 
receipts. 14 Among male nonagricultural employees, 94.6 percent were 
regular workers in 1988, as compared to 80.6 percent of the females. 
Male regular workers have been a significant human resource in Japan, 
at least in the marketplace, with the employment practices for this 
category of worker serving as models for other workers in Japan.
Temporary workers have contracts with a period of employment 
lasting more than a month but less than one year, and day laborers with 
an employment period lasting less than a month. These contracts are 
renewable. Casual observations suggest that temporary workers in 
Japan tend to work for the same employers. 15 Many of these workers in 
effect may have more than transitory attachments to their employers. It 
is difficult to make a similar distinction in the U.S. data. A student hired 
for a summer job, for example, is indistinguishable from a young 
household head with a permanent job. 16
Employed Japanese women are more likely than men to be family 
workers, temporary workers, or day laborers. Also, almost 29 percent 
of female employees in the nonagricultural sector, as compared to 6.2 
percent of males, worked fewer than 35 hours per week in 1988. Thus,
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Table 1.1 Employment Categories in Japan 
(1,000 persons in 1988)
At Work 
(59,290)
Labor Force (15 years and older) 
(98,490)
^ /
/^ 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
\ ^v\ \
\
\
\
\\
\
\
Family Workers 
(5,430)
Not in Labor Force 
(36,350)
Totally Unemployed 
(1,550)
Not At Work (Kyugyoshd) 
(810)
Regular Workers 
(40,530)
Temporary Workers 
(3,600)
SOURCE: Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1990, p. 
238.
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Japanese women do appear to have a weaker attachment to the labor 
market than men. 17 It should be noted, however, that the proportion of 
females who are family workers has been declining in Japan. In 1965, 
the proportion stood at 36.8 percent, but by 1975 it had declined to 25.7 
percent. In 1986, it was 19.4 percent. This decline is one of the key 
factors behind the decline in female labor force participation in Japan 
that took place in spite of rising female wages during the postwar years 
(Hill 1983; Shimada and Higuchi 1985; Osawa 1988). According to 
these authors, participation of females in paid sectors experienced an 
upward trend, as expected, throughout most of the postwar years. It is 
the declining importance of family workers that contributed to the 
lowering of the overall participation rate for Japanese women.
NOTES
1 The two countries have been diverging from each other in the number of days lost due to labor 
disputes. The days lost in Japan started to follow a downward trend around 1960, but in the United 
States the trend has been moderately upwards during most of the postwar years. See chapter 3.
2 The weaker reliance on outright dismissals for workforce reductions undoubtedly is a factor 
in the lower unemployment rates in Japan as compared to those in the United States (Ito 1984).
3 Nemawashi literally means digging around the roots of a tree and trimming them in advance 
to ensure a successful transplant or to promote the bearing of abundant fruits. Its figurative meaning 
is to take every necessary step by communicating with individuals who are involved to bring about a 
desired outcome. Joint consultation is the primary channel through which management and labor 
deal with such issues as recruitment, dismissal, transfer and promotion, changes in production 
techniques and in management policies, plant closings, and industrial safety. Expediting commu 
nication and promoting harmonious relationships are the major objectives of this approach. Both 
the nemawashi and joint-consultation practices prevail throughout the economy, not just in the 
unionized sector. See chapter 3 for additional discussions.
4 The reader is warned against drawing any conclusions about which of the two countries 
is the odd man on the block. Many European countries, for example, have works councils 
(Betriebsr&te) whose operations resemble Japan©s joint consultation, and these countries appear to 
have more harmonious labor-management relations than the United States. Also, bonus payments 
exist in such countries as Belgium, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to a greater extent than 
in the United States, though on average the proportion of bonus to total compensation is only about 
10 percent in those countries about half as large as in Japan. See chapter 3 for more details.
5 For informative surveys of many of the recent developments in this literature, see Rosen 
(1985) and Parsons (1986).
6 Note, however, that Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) criticize implicit contract theories by 
demonstrating that they do not adequately explain layoff unemployment, as the proponents of these 
theories claimed. Also, just how rigid U.S. wages are seems to be controversial. Recent findings by
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Stockman (1983), Bils (1985), and Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b) suggest that U.S. wages may 
not be as rigid as some have claimed. In contrast, there is little controversy surrounding the 
flexibility of Japanese wages.
7 Nothing remains the same forever. There is evidence that job mobility may increase in Japan 
in the near future. See "Japan Cuts the Middle-Management Fat," The Wall Street Journal, 
8 August 1989.
8 Firm-specific human capital refers to factors such as technical know-how, skills, and 
organizational knowledge, which raise worker productivity in a particular firm more than in others. 
The concept was first formalized by Becker (1962). See also Hashimoto (1981) for an extension of 
the analysis.
9 See, for example, Chinloy and Stromsdorfer (1987); OECD (1986); Freeman (1987); 
Koshiro (1986); Hart (1988); and Tachibanaki (1986).
10 The transaction-cost literature stresses the importance of contract-specific capital mostly 
physical capital in generating ex post opportunistic behavior. Obviously, the same considerations 
apply to firm-specific human capital.
11 The Labor Standards Law specifies that those who became kyugyosha through fault of their 
employer must be paid at least 60 percent of their usual pay (Japan Labor Standards Bureau 1988). 
The official description simply states that these are (1) workers who are absent from work but who 
received, or are to receive, wages or salary for time off, and (2) self-employed workers whose 
absence from work has not exceeded 30 days. See Japan Statistics Bureau, Management and 
Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey (1988), 196. According to table 
27 of that publication, in 1988 fully 89 percent of these workers were in nonagricultural industries. 
Among those, the highest proportion were in services (28 percent), followed by manufacturing (22 
percent), trade and eating and drinking establishments (22 percent), and construction (14 percent). 
The remaining workers were distributed thinly among fisheries, electric and gas supply, transporta 
tion and communication, and government. Almost 75 percent of kyugyosha in nonagricultural jobs, 
and over 81 percent in manufacturing, were employees rather than self-employed persons. Slightly 
more than 58 percent in nonagricultural pursuits and 50 percent in manufacturing were males. It 
appears, therefore, that most of these workers are bonafide members of the employed class in 
nonagricultural sectors. See Hashimoto (1990c) for related discussions.
12 The Japanese data for the discussion of the employment categories are from Japan Statistics 
Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey 
(1988), tables 26, 27; and the U.S. data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of 
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2340 (1989), table 21.
13 Employment contracts lasting for more than a year are illegal in Japan. Exceptions occur in 
cases where a project is known to end in, say, three years and craftsmen are hired for that duration, 
or when employers obtain special permission from their prefectural authority to put workers in on- 
the-job training programs.
14 See Hashimoto (1979) and Freeman and Weitzman (1987) for analyses of Japanese bonuses.
15 For example, the president of a medium-sized Japanese manufacturing firm told me that the 
same farmers from a certain farming region return to his firm year after year during off-seasons as 
temporary employees.
16 There is, however, a growing temporary help industry in the United States. This industry is 
made up of establishments supplying temporary help to businesses, and currently accounts for 
about 1 percent of total nonagricultural employment. Also, the U.S. data categorize employment 
into part-time and full-time components. In 1988, 82 percent of nonagricultural wage and salary 
workers (16 years or older) worked at full-time jobs, though an additional 1.6 percent, who usually
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work full time, worked at part-time jobs for economic reasons. In Japan, about 12 percent of 
employment consists of part-time workers, in contrast to the U.S. magnitude of 17 to 19 percent. 
17 In 1988, the labor force participation rate in Japan was 48.9 percent for women and 77.1 
percent for men (for those 15 years and older). In the United States, the comparable rates were 56.6 
percent and 76.6 percent, respectively, for women and men. The Japanese data are from the Japan 
Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force 
Survey (1988), table 1; andtheU.S. figures, fromtheU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbookof 
Labor Statistics (1989), table 1.

A Theory of Investments in the 
Employment Relationship
Labor markets in Japan exhibit characteristics that are quite different 
from those in the United States. Three observations about the Japanese 
features motivate the theory discussed in this chapter. First, many of the 
Japanese labor market traits became pronounced only after the late 
1950s when the Japanese economic growth began to accelerate. 1 The 
influences of tradition and culture alone, therefore, would seem to be 
insufficient for explaining why these features became consolidated and 
widespread at that particular time. Second, the same characteristics 
have not emerged in other countries that have experienced rapid eco 
nomic growth. Obviously, economic growth alone cannot explain the 
postwar emergence of these Japanese features either. Third, the appar 
ently cooperative character of Japanese industrial relations is not 
costlessly achieved, as management and labor spend a great deal of 
time, mental energy, and money on smoothing out relationships with 
each other. 2 Since this phenomenon has persisted for some time in 
many Japanese firms, the gains presumably justify the transaction 
expenditures.
This chapter presents a theory for bringing the various labor market 
features into a unifying framework of analysis. Figure 2.1 summarizes 
the hypothesized relationships. The theory discussed in this chapter 
concerns the relationships shown in the shaded area. I argue that many 
of the observed labor market phenomena in Japan, indicated at the top of 
figure 2.1, reflect investments in the employment relationship or in what 
is known as firm-specific human capital, undertaken by its labor force. 
This investment consists of two separate parts, one in technical skills 
and the other in information reliability. Symbols are used in the text to 
represent various quantities, and they are shown in figure 2.1: the
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amounts of capital created by the investments are indicated as h and z, 
and the returns from these investments by M and R, respectively. The 
variables h,z,M, and R are endogenous in the analysis; in other words, 
they are determined in the model. The effect on productivity of investing 
in the employee©s technical skills is straightforward. The investment in 
the reliability of information promotes cooperative industrial relations 
by reducing mistrust, disputes, and inefficient decisions. An important 
result of the analysis is to demonstrate that the two investment compo 
nents interact with each other: an increased information reliability 
stimulates the investment in technical skills, and vice versa.
Exogenous variables variables determined outside the model are 
the costs associated with the two investment activities. The cost of 
investing in technical skills is determined primarily by how well the 
formal education system prepares students for on-the-job training by 
instilling positive attitudes for learning and by teaching basic skills. 
The cost of investing in information reliability is determined by the 
transaction-cost environment, which in turn reflects the influences of 
tradition and culture, ethnic homogeneity, effectiveness of education in 
fostering workers© abilities to function cooperatively as a group, and 
worker propensity to change jobs.
Of particular focus in this study is the transaction-cost environment. 
Transaction costs are costs that Robinson Crusoe would not have in 
curred before he met Friday. 3 Transaction costs here connote the diffi 
culty of communicating all sorts of information between employer and 
employees, and among employees themselves. These include the costs 
of convincing the relevant parties of the information©s veracity. With low 
transaction costs, parties can respond flexibly to changing circum 
stances without having to undertake a costly verification of information. 
In contrast, high transaction costs reduce the reliability of information 
exchanged, discourage quick responses, and cause a dissipation of the 
gains from working together. Figure 2.1 indicates that the transaction- 
cost environment is shaped by, among other things, ethnic homogeneity. 
Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that the relative homogeneity of the 
Japanese population explains how firms are organized in that country
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Figure 2.1 Hypothesis: Japanese Labor Market Phenomena
Flexible Contracts (joint consultations, nemawashi) 
Cooperative Employment Relations (low rate of labor disputes)
Enterprise Unions 
Long-Term Employment (shushin koyo)
Rare Use of Layoffs
Seniority-Based Earnings Profiles (nenko joretsu) 
Bonuses
Investment in , 
Technical Skills (/z) 
[Returns=M;|
l&loirwlioa Reliability.{«)
Basic Education ! Transaction-Cost Environment
Tradition and Culture, Ethnic 
Homogeneity, Education
Endogenous 
Variables
J" ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 Exogenous 
i _ _ _ _ j Variables
h ji Observable I    I 
II H Consequences I____I
NOTE: The shaded area denotes the domain of the analysis in this chapter, and the symbols h, z, M, 
and R indicate the notations used for the respective magnitudes in the text. The (+) and ( ) signs 
indicate, respectively, positive and negative influences.
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(Aoki 1988, chap. 2). The theory discussed below suggests that this 
claim may have some validity.
Returns to and Scale of Investment in Technical Skills
Let us begin by laying out the building blocks necessary to construct 
the theoretical relationships in this model concerning the investment in 
technical skills. To develop the returns function associated with the 
investment in technical skills, it is necessary to discuss contract flexibil 
ity. The term refers to the degree to which contracts permit adjustments 
to newly emerging conditions. The ideal contract, completely flexible, 
would stipulate that all of the relevant new developments be incorpo 
rated immediately into contractual arrangements without rewriting the 
contract. The fixed, or rigid, contract would stipulate that none of the 
new developments be incorporated until the contract comes up for 
renewal. Between these extremes is the flexible contract, in which some 
adjustments to new developments are made automatically during the life 
of the contract.
For simplicity, let us assume that there are two periods in an employ 
ment relationship. In the first period, the employer and the employee 
decide how much to invest in the employment relationship and how to 
share the benefits of such investment. The sharing decision determines 
the employee©s wage in the second period. 4 Investments are made with 
respect to firm-specific technical skills and to information reliability. At 
the beginning of the second period, relevant productivity information is 
revealed, and the parties decide to stay together or to separate.
A key aspect of the model is that in the second period there is a 
potential wealth loss caused by postcontractual (or ex post) oppor 
tunistic behavior. As Williamson has noted, the value of a transaction 
that is subject to ex post opportunism will be enhanced by devising ex 
ante appropriate safeguards (Williamson 1985, 48). In this model, the 
safeguards are the investment made in the reliability of information and 
the sharing arrangement for the benefit and costs of investments. 5
Postcontractual opportunistic behavior may occur at the second pe-
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riod because the values of the worker in the firm and outside inevitably 
are subject to information asymmetry: the employer is likely to be better 
informed about the value of the employee in the firm and the employee is 
better informed about his or her value outside the firm. As a result, the 
parties may have incentives to misrepresent their information. In partic 
ular, if the contract calls for sharing the realized value of the investment, 
the employer will have the incentive to understate the value of the 
employee©s contribution, and the employee to overstate his or her outside 
productivity. As a result, the parties may engage in haggling and may 
even end up separating, even though they would be jointly better off not 
separating. Such separations are clearly inefficient.
The parties have the incentive to reduce the likelihood of wasteful 
haggling and of inefficient separations by optimally sharing the benefit 
of the relationship. 6 The parties make relevant decisions in the first 
period by comparing what they expect to be the value of the contract. 
They are assumed to have no difficulty in the first period agreeing on the 
probability distributions of the productivity outcomes: they share com 
mon knowledge about the past influences of business cycles and other 
sources of economic fluctuations. To characterize the contractual solu 
tions chosen by the parties in an effort to minimize the adverse effects of 
information asymmetry, the model will be formulated in terms of wage 
flexibility. The analysis of flexibility along other dimensions, such as 
task assignments, promotions, and related personnel matters, will be 
similar in spirit, however.
We are now ready to discuss the relationships that underlie the 
investments in technical skills and in information reliability. The discus 
sion will be kept to a nontechnical level, but a judicious use of symbols to 
represent the key building blocks of the theory will add concreteness to 
the argument. 7
The building blocks are represented by the following symbols:
M*: value of the ideal contract to the parties 
Ml : value of the fixed-wage contract to the parties 
M2 : value of the flexible-wage contract to the parties 
a : errors associated with the agreements about the productivities (a is 
the parameter indicating the maximum amount of errors)
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M: marginal returns to the investment in technical skills
h: quantity of technical skills
z: quantity of information reliability
R: total returns on the investment in information reliability
Suppose that the parties could freely agree on the realized productiv 
ity values. This situation would be as if the parties were a single 
individual, and there would be no transaction-cost-related problems. In 
particular, the ideal wage contract would be feasible, because each 
party©s separation decision would follow exactly the efficient separation 
criterion, namely, that a separation takes place only when the employee©s 
value elsewhere exceeded his or her value with the current employer. 8 
Therefore, the distinction between layoffs (dismissals) and quits would 
be meaningless, as all separations would be mutually desired. 9 Let us 
denote the value of the employment relationship under the ideal contract 
by M*. This value can be computed as the weighted average of the 
expected value of entering into an employment relationship that would 
accrue if the parties were not to separate and the expected value that 
would accrue if they were to separate, where the weights are the 
probabilities of not separating and of separating. 10
If information is asymmetric, and if transactions are costly between 
the employee and the employer, the ideal wage contract will not be 
feasible. As noted above, the problem is that neither party may have the 
incentive to reveal his or her respective information truthfully to the 
other. To illustrate, suppose that the employer knows only the realized 
value of the inside productivity, and the employee only the realized value 
of the outside productivity. The parties in this case may face difficulties 
in communicating to each other their respective productivity values to 
determine the division of the gains from the relationship. Difficulties 
arise precisely because each party may have an incentive to misrepresent 
what he or she knows in order to increase his or her gains at the expense 
of the other.
Even with this difficulty, it is in the parties© interest to reach an 
agreement, however imprecise it may be. Employers want employees to 
accept their claims of employees© productivity; in turn, employees want
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to persuade employers of the value of their outside productivity. Each, in 
turn, wants to verify the other©s claim. Persuasion and verification take 
time and energy and are therefore costly. An agreement, however, will 
confer some gains by enabling the parties to respond to changing 
circumstances and, thereby, reduce the chances of making inefficient 
decisions. The gains from reaching an agreement may be large enough 
to justify incurring the cost of reaching such an agreement.
At one extreme, of course, an agreement may not be cost-effective: 
employer and employee may foresee that they will never be able to 
accept each other©s claims of realized productivities. In this case, the 
natural thing to do is to agree in advance that the second-period wage 
will be determined solely in terms of the expected, or average, values of 
the productivities. The result is a fixed-wage contract, because the 
second-period wage is independent of the realized values of 
productivities.
In the fixed-wage contract, each party follows his or her own separa 
tion criterion, each being different from the criterion for an efficient 
separation. As a result, some inefficient separations inevitably occur. It 
should be noted, however, that, in this model setup, when a separation is 
efficient it will always take place. 1 1 The problem is that a separation may 
take place even when it is inefficient. The resulting efficiency loss 
reduces the value of this employment contract, and thereby reduces 
the incentive to invest in the relationship. Let us denote the value of 
the employment relationship under the fixed-wage contract by Ml . 12 
Clearly, M*, the value of the employment relationship under the ideal 
contract, is greater than M15 since there are no inefficient separations 
associated with M* (Hashimoto 1990b).
The parties could reduce the loss from inefficient separations if they 
were to agree on at least the approximate values of the realized pro 
ductivities. 13 Whatever agreements they reach would be imperfect be 
cause the agreed-upon values would deviate from the true values the 
deviations are referred to as errors of measurement, or just errors. The 
extent of the errors, denoted by a in this model, would be greater the 
higher the transaction costs. 14 A contract that uses such agreements is a 
flexible-wage contract, and the value of the employment relationship is
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denoted by M2 . 15 The value, M2 , turns out to have the following 
important relationship:
M2 =M*-/(a),/(a)>0 (1)
which indicates that M2 is smaller than M*, the value of the ideal 
contract, by the quantity/(a). The preceding discussion suggests that 
the quantity/(a) is zero if the errors, a, associated with the agreement 
are zero, and increases if a increases. 16 This last relationship is intu 
itively obvious: the larger a, the higher the frequency of inefficient 
separations and therefore the greater the efficiency loss. Put another 
way, a reduction of a, if that were possible, would increase M2 .
We now have the basic building blocks to construct the returns to the 
investment in technical skills. Assuming that the ideal contract is in- 
feasible, the parties choose between the fixed-wage and the flexible- 
wage contracts by comparing the associated contract values. This 
choice problem can be expressed as:
M=Max(Ml5 M2), (2)
which states that the value of entering into an employment relation, M, 
is either Mt or M2 , whichever is larger. The resulting value of M 
constitutes the returns to investing in technical skills.
Consider the decision on how much to invest in technical skills. The 
quantity of technical skills created by the investment is denoted by h. 
The value per unit of h is M. Therefore, the optimum scale of h is 
determined by equating M with the marginal cost of producing h.
Marginal returns (M)=Marginal cost, (3)
where the marginal cost of investment is assumed to increase with h. 
This cost is incurred at the time the contract is signed.
Figure 2.2 portrays the optimum decision: the optimum quantity of 
investment is determined to be h*, where the marginal cost curve 
crosses the marginal return curve, M. Clearly, the optimum h will 
increase if either the value of employment relations increases so that M 
shifts upward or the marginal cost curve shifts downward, or both. In 
particular, suppose that a flexible-wage contract were chosen so that M
13
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Figure 2.2 Optimum Investment in Technical Skills (h)
Marginal Cost
Marginal Returns
h* 
Investment (h)
equals M2 . A reduction of errors, a, would increase M, causing it to shift 
upwards in figure 2.2. As a result, the optimum h would rise. If a fixed- 
wage contract were chosen instead, so that M equals Ml , a reduction in a 
would not affect M, and so the optimum h would not be affected either. 
To summarize, optimum decisionmaking can be illustrated by the 
following scenario. Assume for the moment that the errors, a, are 
exogenously given. First, given a, the contract type and the associated 
value, M, are chosen by using equations (1) and (2). Then in figure 2.2, 
M is equated with the marginal cost to obtain the optimum h.
Investment in Information Reliability (Reduction in Inaccuracy)
In the analysis above, the reliability of information exchanged was 
assumed to be exogenous. Clearly, the parties may take steps to increase
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information reliability by reducing the errors, a. To achieve this goal, 
resources must be spent on screening job candidates, reducing the 
asymmetry of information, and, more generally, improving the quality 
of communication among employees and between management and 
workers. To incorporate these considerations into the model, it is neces 
sary to treat a as endogenous.
The parties are assumed to spend resources to reduce a. I will refer to 
this activity as an investment in information reliability. The quantity of 
this investment is denoted by z, defined as:
z=a-a, 0<z<a, (4)
where a is the fixed parameter denoting the value of a that would prevail 
if no resources were spent on reducing it. Equation (4) makes clear that 
an increase in z is equivalent to a reduction in a. In other words, the 
larger the z the greater the reliability of information. The variable, z, is 
bound between zero and a: the smallest value of z is zero, which obtains 
when no resource is spent on reducing a, i.e., a is equal to a, and the 
largest attainable value of z is a, which occurs when a is reduced to zero. 
The total returns from investing in z is given by:
R=R(z, h)=Mh-(cost of/z), (5)
where R is the total return from investing in z, and Mh may be thought of 
as the total value (unit value, M, times the quantity h) of the employment 
relationship. Equation (5) states that R depends on z and h, with the term 
Mh revealing that z affects R via M because a affects M. The preceding 
discussions make clear that R increases when z increases (i.e., a de 
creases). 17 Finally, as in the case for the investment in technical skills, 
the parties face a cost function of investing in z.
The parties choose the optimum values of a and h by maximizing the 
following objective function:
TT=R(z, h) - (cost of z). (6a) 
By substituting equation (5) into (6a), one obtains:
ir=Mh- [(cost of h) + (cost of z)]. (6b)
The optimum values of h and z are determined from equation (6b) by 
satisfying the following two relations:
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Marginal returns from h=Marginal cost of h, (7a) 
Marginal returns from z=Marginal cost of z. (7b)
The optimum amount of h is determined from equation (7a) in the 
same manner as indicated in figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 illustrates how 
optimal z is obtained from equation (7b). To simplify, the marginal 
returns function for z is assumed to be linear. 18 The marginal returns 
become zero once z reaches the maximum value of the errors, a: there 
are no more returns to be had from investing in z once the errors are 
reduced completely. Two outcomes are depicted in figure 2.3, depending 
on the location of the marginal cost function. If the marginal cost is 
MCa , the parties reduce a entirely (i.e., z=o) and adopt the ideal 
contract. If the marginal cost is either MCb or MCb', the errors are 
reduced by z*. (The difference between these marginal cost curves will 
be discussed in the next section.)
In a competitive equilibrium, the investment costs as well as the 
returns are shared between the parties to make the respective profit zero 
in the long run. Employees may pay for their share of the cost either by 
accepting a lower wage than their productivity warrants in the first 
period, or by paying an entrance fee at the time of employment. 19
Discussion
The implications of the above model are straightforward. Other 
things being equal, lowering the marginal cost of investing in informa 
tion reliability increases the investment in information reliability and, 
therefore, increases contract flexibility. An autonomous increase in 
technical skills stimulates the investment in information reliability as 
well as affects the choice of contract. 20 In particular, lowering the 
marginal cost of investment in technical skills, other things being equal, 
not only will increase the investment in technical skills but also the 
investment in information reliability by shifting upwards the marginal 
returns function in figure 2.3. Thus, it is possible for a fixed-wage 
contract to be chosen initially, but for a flexible-wage contract to be 
chosen later in response to an increased investment in technical skills.
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Figure 2.3 Optimum Investment in Information Reliability (z)
Marginal Cost = MCb Marginal Cost =
-1
Investment (z)
This theory argues that the cost function associated with the invest 
ment in information reliability is shaped by the transaction-cost environ 
ment. In a lower transaction-cost environment one incurs lower mar 
ginal cost in increasing the reliability of information exchanged among 
team members. As a result, more is invested in information reliability 
and in technical skills. These investments promote cooperative indus 
trial relations. I hypothesize that the transaction-cost environment in 
Japan has been more favorable to investing in information reliability 
than it has in the United States, and that this difference has played a role 
in many of the Japanese-American differences in labor market 
arrangements.
An interesting implication of the theory concerns the effects of
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technological progress on the incentive to invest in the employment 
relationship. The effects of technological progress on Japanese invest 
ments in firm-specific human capital and earnings have received some 
attention in the literature (Tan 1987; Mincer and Higuchi 1988). Here, I 
identify the channel through which technological progress stimulates 
investments in human capital. A uniform productivity increase, wide 
spread throughout the economy, may increase the incentive to invest in 
both technical skills and information reliability, as well as raise the 
likelihood that a flexible-wage contract is chosen. This possibility is best 
illustrated with a simple case of a neutral technological progress, by 
which the productivities of all activities rise in equal proportion 
throughout the economy. 21 In this case, it can be shown that the marginal 
returns functions in figures 2.2 and 2.3 shift upward. Costs of invest 
ments remain unaffected, as both the productivities and input prices rise 
in the same proportion. 22 As a result, investments in both technical 
skills and information reliability are increased, raising the likelihood 
that a flexible-wage contract dominates a fixed-wage contract.
An important point to note is that an increase in the investment caused 
by an upward shift of the marginal returns function is greater the more 
elastic flatter— the cost function. In figure 2.3, for example, MCb' is 
more elastic than MCb . Clearly an upward shift of the marginal returns 
function would increase z more if the marginal cost were MCb' than if it 
were MCb . A similar argument can be made for the marginal cost 
function in figure 2.2. In a lower transaction-cost environment, the 
marginal cost function for investing in information reliability is likely 
not only to be lower in figure 2.3, but also to be more elastic. The greater 
cost elasticity in a lower transaction-cost environment underscores the 
fact that the parties could expand investment without incurring a sharp 
increase in the cost. What this analysis shows, then, is that an improve 
ment in the returns stimulates the investment in information reliability 
more in a lower transaction-cost environment. In other words, an 
improvement in the returns interacts with the transaction-cost environ 
ment in affecting the investment.
It was noted elsewhere that low transaction costs alone cannot explain 
Japanese labor market phenomena, if only because labor turnover was
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high in the early 1900s and early 1950s (Hashimoto and Raisian 1988). 
One naturally wonders why low transaction costs were not operating to 
reduce turnover during those years. We suggested then that a compre 
hensive understanding of Japanese labor markets may require an analy 
sis of the interaction of economic growth and transaction costs rather 
than of their separate effects. The discussion above suggests that tech 
nological progress that accompanied economic growth may have inter 
acted with the low transaction costs in bringing about many of the 
Japanese labor market phenomena.
In particular, the post-World War II prevalence of these phenomena in 
Japan can be interpreted as having been stimulated by the rapid eco 
nomic growth and the technological progress that took place after the 
late 1950s. Such Japanese practices as joint consultation, consensus- 
based decisionmaking, and enterprise unionism became widespread 
after that period. This development coincided with the launch of a 
campaign to raise productivity and international competitiveness by 
importing modern technologies from the United States and Europe 
(Hashimoto 1990a). 23 The effort was coordinated by the Japan Produc 
tivity Center, established in March 1955.
Labor unions and leftist politicians initially opposed the campaign 
vigorously, fearing that modern technologies would displace labor and 
cause high unemployment. The drive eventually gained support from 
unions and politicians based on three principles: (1) to prevent unem 
ployment of workers whose jobs would be made redundant by new 
technologies (the principle of job security); (2) to promote joint con 
sultations between management and labor concerning the introduction 
of new technologies and related matters; and (3) to promote fair shar 
ing of the gains of new technologies among employers, workers, and 
consumers.
Clearly, the prevention of unemployment and joint consultations have 
become firmly entrenched in the Japanese industrial relations system. 
The campaign helped guide private industries to acquire modern West 
ern technologies, thereby contributing to the double-digit growth rate of 
the country©s economy during the 1960s. 24 Given the historical back 
ground of the campaign, it is reasonable to view the economic growth
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and technological change of the late 1950s as exogenous for my model, 
though the employment relations system eventually must have had 
feedback effects on economic growth subsequently.
The theory developed in this chapter may offer the key to understand 
ing some of the Japanese industrial relations practices within the frame 
work of the present theory. Japanese workers, on average, invest more in 
the employment relationship, and they have more flexible contracts, 
than American workers (Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a,b and 1988; 
Mincer and Higuchi 1988). Also, work organization and industrial 
relations in Japan are more flexible than in most other developed coun 
tries. 25 Flexible work organization is supported by the job-rotation 
system, whereby a typical worker is rotated among different tasks 
during his or her career so that he or she may acquire a wide range of 
skills (Koike 1984; Aoki 1988, chap. 2, 1989). The result is that 
workers become proficient in a multitude of tasks, a characteristic which 
facilitates a quick and flexible response to changes in work requirements 
and enables them to understand and correct the conditions giving rise to 
defective products and mechanical failure (Aoki 1988, 35-37). This 
way, the job-rotation system helps promote the zero-, or low-defect 
production process. The prevalance of these practices can be viewed as 
resulting from the low costs of investing in both technical skills and 
information reliability.
Large Japanese investments in information reliability are indicated by 
such time-consuming measures as joint consultation and consensus- 
based decisionmaking. The Japanese educational system instills in 
pupils skills and attitudes that promote effective group functioning and 
continuous learning as well as preparing them for such basic general 
skills as reading, writing, and arithmetic. As a result, the costs of 
investment in the employment relationship are likely to be lower in 
Japan than in the United States.
The relatively homogeneous labor force in Japan, along with an 
absence of the attitude of individualism, has been cited as being respon 
sible for the cooperative industrial relations there. 26 Our theory would 
have to be extended to permit a comprehensive examination of this issue. 
Let me indicate how such an extension might proceed.
28 A Theory of Investments in the Employment Relationships
As is clear by now, investment in firm-specific human capital is a key 
factor behind cooperative industrial relations. Suppose that the degree 
of employee homogeneity refers to how similar the cost functions are 
among job applicants. Although our theory has been formulated in 
terms of a one-on-one employment contract, in reality an employer must 
negotiate with numerous employees. If employees were homogeneous, 
the employer could invest in technical skills and information reliability 
on the same scale for all employees. If the employees were heteroge 
neous, the employer might want to take into account individual differ 
ences and adopt different investment policies for different employees.
If the heterogeneity were large, however, it might be too costly to 
devise different investment policies for each and every employee. 27 In 
that case, a fixed-wage contract fixed with respect to the realized 
productivity values and individual differences in them might be chosen 
for all employees. Since such a contract inevitably reduces the gains 
from the employment relationship, the investment in firm-specific 
human capital would be discouraged. An extension along this line must 
also take into account the adverse selection problem as well. Employers 
would have to devise a mechanism by which job applicants sort them 
selves according to the costs functions. 28
The Japanese employer typically screens job applicants with much 
care, a phenomenon that can be viewed as reflecting the attempt to 
homogenize the workforce. 29 A homogeneous workforce facilitates the 
adoption of a single investment policy. In this connection, it is interest 
ing to note that quality control circles usually consist of homogeneous 
membership. 30
Finally, the relevance of my theory at first glance may appear limited 
to the male career workforce in Japan the so-called male regular 
workers, who typically have lifetime employment. 31 The theory is much 
more generally applicable than what such appearance would suggest, 
however. As pointed out in chapter 1, male regular workers have been a 
significant human resource in Japan, as regards the marketplace. More 
over, employment practices associated with this category of worker have 
served as models for other workers in Japan. For example, smaller firms 
in Japan try to emulate the industrial relations practices of large firms: 
investments in employment relations evidently occur among smaller
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firms judging by the significant length of employment tenure among 
workers in small Japanese firms. 32 Therefore, knowledge about the 
employment relationship for male regular workers is crucial in under 
standing the performance of the Japanese industrial relations system. 
Also, temporary workers in Japan tend to work year after year for the 
same employers (see chapter 1). These workers in effect may have more 
than casual attachments to their employers. If so, they and their employ 
ers will have the incentive to invest in their employment relationships, 
though surely on a smaller scale than in the case of regular workers.
To test the theory presented in this chapter, it would be useful to have 
some direct evidence on the magnitude of transaction costs in Japan and 
the United States, but transaction costs are difficult to measure directly. 
As a result, the skeptical reader may be inclined to discredit any 
evidence offered in support of the proposition that transaction costs are 
lower in one country than in the other. The problem of not being able to 
observe certain variables in a model is not new. Indeed, the theory of 
human capital shares the same attribute in that such capital, or the gains 
and costs in the underlying investment decisions, is not directly observ 
able. Human capital theory has proven highly useful in spite of this 
attribute because it has generated many testable propositions about labor 
market arrangements and offered a unified understanding of such phe 
nomena as tenure-earnings profiles, labor turnover, and unemployment.
A useful theory is one that yields testable propositions, those that can 
potentially be rejected on the basis of observable phenomena. Viewed 
this way, the fact that transaction costs themselves are not directly 
observable is not a serious flaw of the theory developed in this chapter. 
The real issue is how useful this theory is in promoting an understanding 
of the labor market differences between Japan and the United States. The 
next two chapters examine the evidence that bears on the transaction- 
cost difference between Japan and the United States, as well as the 
cultural and economic conditions that are assumed by the theoretical 
argument just presented.
NOTES
1 As will be seen in chapter 3, before World War II many of the contemporary features of the 
Japanese labor markets, such as long-term employment, bonus payments, and enterprise unions,
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were not prevalent. An excellent glimpse into some aspects of the prewar labor market in Japan is 
contained in Taira (1970), Gordon (1985) and Odaka (1984).
2 For example, it is well-known that workers of various ranks often spend several hours 
together during evenings, drinking and eating. These gatherings are designed to promote mutual 
understanding and to develop a consensus. The nemawashi procedure, whereby a consensus 
decision is slowly developed, also consumes time and energy.
3 In this definition, information and transportation costs are not necessarily transaction costs. 
Steven Cheung offered me this informative definition of transaction costs several years ago. See also 
Cheung (1969).
4 Thus, the issue under analysis is the determination of the second-period wage, which 
amounts to the same thing as deciding on the division of the returns to the investments. The first- 
period wage is determined in a straightforward fashion once the second-period wage is known from 
the zero-profit condition for a competitive equilibrium. See the discussion on competitive equi 
librium later in this chapter.
5 The determination of the sharing ratio was analyzed previously (Hashimoto 1979; 1981; 
Hashimoto and Yu 1980).
6 This result is the famous sharing theorem in the human capital literature (Becker 1962; 
Hashimoto 1981). Inefficient separations occur when the parties separate from each other even 
though both taken together are better off not separating.
7 The technical formulation can be found in my working paper (Hashimoto 1990b).
8 In this model, the only source of inefficiency is the separation decision. An earlier discussion 
on this point appears in Hashimoto (1981).
9 This proposition suggests a test of this theory. See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of such a 
test.
10 See the appendix, available upon request, for an explicit mathematical form for M*.
11 See Hashimoto (1990b) for technical details.
12 M, can be computed as the weighted average of the expected values under the three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive outcomes: no separation; no quits but separation; and dismissal, where 
the weights are the respective probabilities.
13 The parties also may reduce the loss from inefficient separations by deciding on the optimum 
sharing of the returns to the investments. For an earlier discussion on this point, see Hashimoto and 
Yu (1980).
14 For simplicity, errors associated with the agreements for inside and the outside productivities 
are assumed to be the same. This assumption is made only to simplify the expression without loss of 
generality. This assumption implies that the parties share equally in the returns to the investments. 
The derivation for this result is available from the author upon request.
15 See Hashimoto (1990b) for the mathematical expression for M2 .
16 In other words,/(0)=0 and df/da>0.
17 Hashimoto (1990b) contains technical details.
18 The assumption that the marginal returns function is linear turns out to be innocuous. See 
Hashimoto (1990b) for technical details on this point.
19 The zero profit theorem states that both the worker©s and employer©s profits be zero. This is the 
familiar sharing theorem in firm-specific human capital (e.g., Becker 1962; Kuratani 1973; 
Hashimoto 1981).
20 It can be demonstrated mathematically that the marginal revenue schedule in figure 2.3 shifts
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upward as a result (Hashimoto 19905). Thus, if a has not already been reduced to zero, an increase 
in h will lead to a further reduction in a.
21 It seems innocuous to focus on a neutral technological progress, since one does not know 
which bias, if any, the actual technological changes contained.
22 This argument is strictly correct if time is the only input in these activities. If nontime inputs 
are involved, and if their prices remain unchanged or even fall, costs will decrease, thereby 
reinforcing the positive effects on investments. The argument here is basically the same as the one 
advanced by Becker (1962) and later elaborated on by Welch (1970) regarding the effects of neutral 
technological progress on the incentive to invest in human capital.
23 An extensive treatment on the history of this campaign appears in a report issued by Japan 
Productivity Center (1988). I am grateful to Haruo Shimada for bringing my attention to this 
publication, which is unavailable to the general public, and sending me a copy of it.
24 The activities of the campaign included conferences and seminars in which top-level indus 
trialists, bankers, scholars, and bureaucrats participated; numerous visits by Japanese managers 
and unionists to the United States and Europe, as well as visits by Western specialists to Japan; and 
active information dissemination. Between 1955 and 1956, for example, 42 missions, involving 
481 members, were sent to observe various U.S. industries. See Japan Productivity Center (1988, 
chap. 4).
25 Tachibanaki (1986) contains a useful comparison of labor market flexibility in Japan, the 
United States, and Europe.
26 Japan is remarkably homogeneous in race, ethnicity, religion, and culture. Cole (1980, 25) 
argues that Japanese managers view the average worker as not so different from themselves and that 
this attitude is critical in understanding the willingness of these employers to invest in the training 
of, the provide responsibility for, blue-collar employees. Aoki (1988, chap. 2) notes that the ethnic 
homogeneity of Japanese workers may have been a crucial factor in the development of the typical 
Japanese organization of firms.
27 One way to mitigate the problem of employee heterogeneity is to screen job candidates. 
Japanese employers, particularly those in large firms, are known for the care with which they 
screen new hires. The screening device includes extensive background checks and exclusive 
reliance on selected schools from which to recruit. Shimada (1988, chap. 2) reports that American 
workers who were hired at Honda in Ohio also reported having gone through lengthy interviews in 
the presence of executives and vice presidents. As will be discussed in chapter 5, my preliminary 
research also has revealed that some of the Japanese automobile transplants engage in a much more 
intensive screening of job applicants than do their parent companies. (See Business Week, October 
3, 1989, for similar evidence on an intensive screening at Mazda in Michigan and Diamond-Star [a 
joint venture between Chrysler and Mitsubishi] in Illinois.) Sorting employees into subgroups may 
be another way of reducing the number of different policies that must be devised. Sorting is costly, 
however. A full analysis of this consideration would take us into the issues of hierarchical structure 
in firms and the optimum number of departments within organizations.
28 Such an analysis might follow the approach by Miyazaki (1977) on the structure of wage 
contracts offered to heterogeneous workers.
29 Some Japanese automobile transplants in the U.S. Midwest tend to emphasize the screening 
of job applicants much more than do their parent companies. This tendency is understandable, 
given the greater heterogeneity of the American than Japanese labor force. See chapter 5 for a 
related discussion on the Japanese transplants.
30 See chapter 3 for quality control circles. It should be noted that population heterogeneity per 
se doesn©t lower transaction costs. Rather, the homogeneity in work attitudes, willingness to learn
32 A Theory of Investments in the Employment Relationships
skills, and ability to function cooperatively in a group are what matter. See chapter 5 for a related 
discussion.
31 In 1988, male regular workers constituted 59.8 percent of all employees, and 94.6 percent of 
all male employees, in the nonagricultural sector. (The comparable figures for females were 29.7 
percent and 80.6 percent, respectively.) Although the data are not available, the value of output 
produced by male regular workers is certain to be large in Japan.
32 According to Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), median years of tenure among workers in small 
firms (one to 9 employees in Japan and one to 25 employees in the United States) are eight and two 
years, respectively, for the two countries.
Macroeconomic and Institutional 
Conditions
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the evidence that bears on the theory presented 
in chapter 2. This chapter focuses on macroeconomic and institutional 
conditions that provide the background for the theoretical argument in 
chapter 2, and the next chapter addresses the theory©s implications.
This chapter discusses some facts regarding differences in labor 
market behavior between Japan and the United States, and emphasizes 
features regarded as unique in Japanese industrial relations. Rather than 
being an exhaustive treatment, the discussion concentrates on the eco 
nomic and cultural conditions that underlie the book©s theme, i.e., the 
interaction of tradition and culture with economic growth in shaping 
labor market institutions. 1
After examining the historical origins of some of Japan©s labor market 
features, the chapter concludes that an explanation based on historical 
continuity in the institutions of Japanese industrial relations is an in 
complete one for the country©s postwar labor market. Japanese employ 
ment and wage systems as we know them today were not prevalent 
before World War II. It was not until the early 1960s that such systems 
became widespread throughout the economy. This and other related 
considerations suggest that the influences of culture and tradition alone 
are not responsible for the Japanese employment and wage systems. 
Instead, a plausible explanation suggests that culture and tradition 
interacted with economic growth in shaping these systems.
Macroeconomic Comparisons
Let us begin by comparing the recent macroeconomic performances 
of Japan and the United States, focusing on productivity growth rates
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and unemployment rates. It will be made clear that, measured by these 
indicators, Japan has been experiencing greater improvement in eco 
nomic performance than the United States in recent decades.
Output and Productivity Levels and Growth Rates
One might easily get the impression from the popular press that the 
Japanese economy is far more productive than the American. Such an 
impression is not accurate: as of the mid-1980s, the United States 
enjoyed an overall advantage in productivity levels. Consider that, in 
1985, the gross national product per labor force member was a shade 
below $34,000 for the United States and a little over $22,000 for Japan, a 
difference of about 51 percent. The average hourly earnings for a 
production worker in manufacturing in 1985 were $9.52 in the United 
States and $6.03 in Japan, a difference of almost 58 percent. 2 Needless 
to say, such crude aggregate measures conceal productivity differences 
among sectors. According to Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990), in 1985, of 
the 28 industrial sectors studied, 16 showed productivity gaps in Amer 
ica©s favor, 10 in Japan©s favor, and 2 showed the two countries to be about 
equal. 3
There are, of course, some industries in which Japan excels. Drucker 
(1990) notes that Japanese automobile plants of Honda, Nissan, and 
Toyota turn out 2 to 3 times more cars per worker than comparable 
American or European plants. 4 Abegglen and Stalk (1985) note that 
high Japanese productivity is limited to certain types of manufacturing 
processes. In general, they note, the Japanese labor productivity advan 
tage is enormous in high-volume assembly processes where a huge 
number of interdependent steps must be coordinated, but in simpler 
processes, the Japanese advantage is small. 5 They go on to state:
. . .despite all that is said about management style and organiza 
tional effectiveness, Japanese organization in such fields as services 
and distribution have low levels of productivity (p. 65).
The above remark is particularly noteworthy since the relative impor 
tance of the service sector is growing in the economies of both countries.
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This development by itself portends a widening gap in the productivity 
level between the two countries in favor of the United States.
What is striking is not the difference in the level of productivity 
between the countries, but rather the difference in the growth in produc 
tivity in Japan©s favor during the post-World War II years. Consider, for 
example, the contrasts in the output growth rate in the manufacturing 
sector. Japanese real output in that sector grew at an average annual rate 
of a little over 10 percent during the period from 1950 to 1988, while the 
U.S. real output grew only at about 3.5 percent. Figure 3.1 portrays the 
movement in the growth rate of output-per-hour a standard measure of 
productivity in manufacturing between 1950 and 1986. Clearly, pro 
ductivity growth in manufacturing was greater on average in Japan than 
in the United States. 6
There has been a narrowing of the differential in productivity growth 
rates between the two countries in recent years. As is well-known, the 
growth rate of Japanese real GNP fell from double-digit levels during 
the 1960s to a rate of around 5 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
contrast, GNP for the United States has grown at an annual rate of only 
about 3 percent throughout the same three decades. As a result, the 
differential in the growth rates between the two countries narrowed 
considerably during the 1970s and 1980s. In manufacturing, the output 
growth rate has become rather similar in the two countries. 7 The fall in 
the growth rate in Japan reflects the rather low growth rates experienced 
during the 1985-87 period caused by the rising value of the yen.
According to Jorgenson et al. (1987), Japan©s higher rates of growth in 
capital and intermediate inputs were largely responsible for the greater 
growth in the country©s output between 1960 and 1979. Growth in these 
inputs, in turn, must have raised labor productivity. In fact, differential 
growth in labor productivity rather than in labor supply appears to have 
been the key factor in the difference in output growth between the two 
countries. For example, the civilian labor force grew steadily in Japan 
after 1960 at an annual rate of about 1.2 percent, well below the 
corresponding U.S. figure of 2.2 percent. As of the early 1980s, the 
growth in real GNP per labor force member (a measure of productivity) 
was about 4 percent in Japan and 1 percent in the United States. In
Figure 3.1 Annual Growth in Output-Per-Hour (%) 
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manufacturing, the growth in real output-per-hour held steady in the 
United States at about 2.6 percent per year, while in Japan it declined 
from about 10 percent in the 1950s to about 7.5 percent in the early 
1980s. Even with the declining trend, the growth rate of Japanese labor 
productivity remains higher than the U.S. growth rate. 8
How closely is the difference in output growth related to the differ 
ence in the growth of labor productivity? To shed light on this question, 
figure 3.2 presents a scatter diagram relating Japanese-American con 
trasts in productivity growth (vertical axis) and output growth (horizon 
tal axis) during the period from 1951 to 1988. This figure clearly shows 
a positive association between the two difference measures, and the 
correlation coefficient of 0.42 indicates the strength of this association. 
This correlation coefficient suggests that over 17 percent (square of 
0.42) of the contrast in the growth rate of manufacturing output is 
accounted for by the difference in the growth rate of productivity 
between the two countries.
The discussion above is based on a simple correlation derived from 
figure 3.1. A fuller analysis would require a multivariate technique. 
Towards this end, I used the data for 28 manufacturing industries 
reported in Jorgenson et al. (1987, table 2) to estimate a regression of the 
output-growth difference between Japan and the United States on growth 
contrasts in labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. The results indicate 
that growth differences in capital and intermediate inputs had statis 
tically significant influences on output-growth difference, but that the 
growth contrast in labor inputs did not. This finding amounts to indirect 
evidence that growth difference in labor productivity has had a signifi 
cant influence on growth difference in output between the two 
countries. 9
Finally, it should be remembered that the conventional measure of 
output may not reflect the true measure. For example, the hypothesis of 
this book implies that Japanese workers spend more hours on job-related 
activities than reported hours of work would indicate. This implication 
in turn might be used to infer that the measured productivity, i.e., 
output-per-hour, overstates the true productivity. Such an inference must 
be drawn with caution, however, since the data on output are imperfect.
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Figure 3.2 Japan-United States Differences (1951-88) in 
Manufacturing Performance
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The investment of time by Japanese workers must pay off in terms of a 
more comprehensive measure of output, for example, including the 
quality dimension; otherwise, the country wouldn©t be so successful in 
the international marketplace. The question remains open, however, as 
to whether or not Japanese workers have been investing too much of 
their time. Perhaps, it will become possible to deal with this question in 
the near future as we observe the effects of the country©s recent move 
ment to shorten work hours.
Unemployment Rates
We now turn to the comparison of unemployment rates as indicators 
of labor market performance. As is well-known by now, unemployment
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rates are higher in the United States than in Japan. As figure 3.3 
indicates, unemployment rates in both countries trended upwards 
through the mid-1980s. Why are unemployment rates so persistently 
low in Japan? Let me outline some of the major factors responsible for 
the unemployment rate difference between the two countries. An ex 
haustive analysis of this question, which would require the construction 
of an unemployment series for Japan on a comparable basis with the 
U.S. series, is beyond the scope of this book. 10
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports Japanese unemployment 
rates modified to conform to the U.S. definition. n In particular, unpaid 
family workers working fewer than 15 hours per week are excluded 
from the employed category for Japan, just as they are in the U.S. 
definition. 12 Even with the BLS modifications, the adjusted and the 
original Japanese unemployment rates differed little for the 1959-88 
period. 13 The similarity between the original and modified series sug 
gests that the adjustment procedure, for whatever reasons, ignored 
many of the important conceptual and labor market differences between 
the two countries. Below are some of the relevant factors that the 
adjustment evidently did not take into account.
An important reason for the unemployment rate difference, in my 
opinion, is that separations are much fewer in Japan than in the United 
States. In Japan, employers try to avoid outright dismissals or disciplin 
ary dismissals. 14 Employers dismissing workers for reasons of poor 
economic conditions potentially face high costs of doing so. Should the 
dismissed workers sue, the courts determine the validity of dismissals 
for economic reasons by examining how grave the firm©s financial 
situation was, and whether the employer made serious efforts to avoid 
dismissals by using other means. 15 Perhaps for this reason, the separa 
tions that do take place tend to be quits or retirements rather than layoffs 
or dismissals. Figures 3.4 through 3.6 indicate that the rate of separa 
tions is lower and that the ratio of quits to dismissals higher in Japan than 
in the United States. 16
The two countries also differ in the treatment of laid-off persons and 
the job search period stipulated in the unemployment definition. In 
Japan, persons on layoff awaiting recall (ichiji, or temporary, kyug-
IO"E§
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Figure 3.4 Rate of Separation: Manufacturing
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SOURCES: The Japanese rate of separations are annual averages of monthly labor turnover data 
from the Maigetsu Kinro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labor Survey), as reported in Japan Policy 
Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various 
years. The U.S. data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, various 
years, and are also annual averages of monthly labor tunover data. The data are available only for 
manufacturing. The U.S. series was discontinued as of 1981.
yoshd) are classified as employed, while in the United States they are 
counted as unemployed. Even if laid-off persons were to be counted as 
unemployed in Japan, however, unemployment rates would be increased 
by only about 10 percent, and this would not alter the substantial 
difference in unemployment rates between the two countries. 17 The 
main reason layoffs fail to narrow the gap more is that they typically 
amount to only about 0.2 percent of the labor force, as compared to 
about 1.0 percent in the United States. 18 Layoff is simply not as common 
a practice in Japan. 19 Ito (1984, table 2) also found that the differential
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SOURCES: The Japanese data are from the Koyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Employment Trend), as 
reported in Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics, various years, and refer to employees separated during the year, cross-classified 
by reasons for separation. The U.S. data for all industries are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1985), table 32, and pertain to unemployed persons by 
reason for unemployment (job-losers vs. job-leavers). For manufacturing, the U.S. data are the 
ratio of the quit and layoff rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings, various years, figure 5. U.S. data collection for manufacturing turnover was discon 
tinued as of 1981 for budgetary reasons.
incidence of temporary layoffs accounts for about 25 percent of the 
unemployment rate differences between the two countries in recent 
years.
Another difference relates to the duration of job search activity used 
to define the state of unemployment. In the United States, anyone who 
has searched for a job during the four-week period preceding the survey 
date is counted as unemployed, but in Japan only those who have looked
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of Quits to Dismissals (Layoffs) 
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SOURCES: The Japanese data are from the Koyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Employment Trend), as 
reported in Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics, various years, and refer to employees separated during the year, cross-classified 
by reasons for separation. The U.S. data for all industries are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, (1985), table 32, and pertain to unemployed persons by 
reason for unemployment (job-losers vs. job-leavers). For manufacturing, the U.S. data are the 
ratio of the quit and layoff rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings, various years. U.S. data collection for manufacturing turnover was discontinued as of 
1981 for budgetary reasons.
for jobs during a single reference week qualify as unemployed. As a 
result, the Japanese definition excludes from the unemployed category 
those who engage in job search activity infrequently, whereas such 
persons are more likely to be counted as unemployed in the United 
States. According to Hamada and Kurosaka (1984, table 2), an adjust 
ment for this definition difference would raise the Japanese unemploy 
ment rate only a little for males but by about 55 percent for females,
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presumably because females are more likely to engage in discontinuous 
search activity.
There are notable differences between the countries in unemployment 
and labor force activity for youths those younger than 25 years of age. 
As Raisian and I have found, not only are there twice as many youths in 
the labor force in the United States as in Japan, but they are also more 
likely to be unemployed than their Japanese counterparts (Hashimoto 
and Raisian 1988). As a result, the U.S. unemployment rate for adults, 
excluding youths, was only about twice as high as the rate in Japan in 
1979, but the overall U.S. unemployment rate was three times higher 
than the Japanese rate. 20
To summarize, the evidence on productivity growth and unemploy 
ment indicates that Japan indeed has experienced a relatively high level 
of economic performance in recent decades. The growth rate in produc 
tivity remains higher in that country, though the difference with the 
United States has narrowed in recent years. As for unemployment rates, 
a significant contrast persists between the two countries even after 
adjusting for differences in layoffs, length of job search, and labor force 
composition, or even after counting all of the kyugyoshas as unem 
ployed persons. The unemployment rate difference narrowed in the late 
1980s, when Japan experienced rising unemployment rates caused by 
the strengthening of the yen as the United States enjoyed falling unem 
ployment rates.
Labor Market Institutions and Practices
There are many interesting labor market institutions and practices in 
Japan that bear on the theory developed in chapter 2. This section will 
focus on mandatory retirement practices, industrial relations practices, 
unionism, and the importance of labor disputes, as well as on the 
historical and cultural background of some of the Japanese labor market 
practices.
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Table 3.1 Private Sector Firms with Mandatory Retirement Systems
in Japan
(1) (2) (3) 
Firms with
(4) (5) (6) 
Uniform Retirement Arrangements*
Percent of Percent with Retirement Age of: 
Year All Firms Percent** Age 55 Age 56-59 Age 60 Age > 60
All Firm Sizes (30 or More Employees)
1967
1974
1980
1989
-
66.6
82.2
88.5
-
65.7
73.0
93.0
63.2 14.2 20.6
52.0 12.3 32.4
39.5 20.1 36.5
20.7 17.0 57.6
1.5
3.0
3.2
4.3
Giant Firms (5,000 or More Employees)
1964
1974
1980
1989
1964
1974
1980
1989
 
100.0
99.5
99.1
 
99.0
99.9
99.8
 
69.9
79.4
94.2
Large Firms (1,
 
55.8
70.6
95.9
74.5 21.7 2.8
38.0 51.0 11.0
35.3 37.1 27.6
4.9 8.7 86.4
000-4,999 Employees)
80.0 14.7 5.4
42.7 37.4 19.2
38.9 36.5 22.8
10.4 14.5 74.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
1.7
1.1
Medium-Sized Firms (300-999 Employees)
1964
1974
1980
1989
 
94.3
98.3
99.6
 
60.9
70.5
93.3
77.7 11.0 10.3
49.5 27.7 22.1
45.1 28.6 25.1
15.6 19.0 62.8
0.6
0.7
1.0
2.6
Moderate-Sized Firms (100-299 Employees)
1964
1974
1980
1989
1964
1974
1980
1989
 
90.4
93.7
96.2
 
55.0
76.5
84.8
-
59.8
70.3
92.4
Small Firms
 
70.1
74.5
93.0
71.7 7.0 18.1
53.4 17.0 26.9
44.4 22.3 30.8
20.0 18.5 57.9
(30-99 Employees)
75.0 4.8 18.9
52.3 6.4 37.3
37.1 17.7 40.4
21.8 16.3 56.4
1.3
2.6
2.4
3.4
1.2
3.7
3.7
4.8
SOURCES: Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1990; 
Sangyo Rodo Chosa Sho (Research Agency for Industrial Labor) Chingin Choki Keirei 50 Nen 
(The 50-Year Long-Term Wage Series) 1988.
* Firms without any discriminatory (by sex, for example) retirement systems. 
** Firms with uniform retirement system relative to all firms with mandatory retirement systems.
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Mandatory Retirement and Labor Force 
Participation of Older Workers
Unlike the case in the United States, mandatory retirement has been 
gaining popularity in Japan (table 3.1, column (2)). Larger firms use 
mandatory retirement more frequently. Column (3) shows that Japanese 
firms in increasing proportion have moved away from discriminatory 
(by sex, for example) retirement practices. 21 Thus, the proportion of 
firms with a uniform retirement system, in the population of all com 
panies using the mandatory retirement system, has risen for firms of all 
sizes. Most mandatory retirement used to take place at around age 55, 
but the retirement age has been advancing: by the late 1980s, the 
majority of firms with uniform mandatory retirement systems retired 
workers at age 60 or older (columns (4) through (6)). Interestingly, the 
proportion of firms retiring workers at ages greater than 60, conditional 
on companies having mandatory retirement, tends to be higher in 
smaller firms (column (6)). An inspection of columns (4) through (6) 
reveals that this tendency may be a reflection of smaller companies 
having a greater dispersion in the distribution of the mandatory retire 
ment age.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. mandatory retirement age of 65 years in 
the recent past is higher than the average Japanese retirement age of 
approximately 60. 22 This difference would appear contrary to the pat 
tern predicted by the argument that Japanese workers invest more in 
firm-specific human capital than U.S. workers: one would expect work 
ers with more firm-specific human capital to stay longer with their firms. 
The determination of the retirement age reflects many factors, including 
longevity and worker productivity, so that a comparison of the age level 
may not be meaningful. For example, life expectancy was lower in 
Japan than in the United States in the 1950s when the retirement age of 
55 years became prevalent. 23 The fact that the age of mandatory retire 
ment has been increasing in Japan may reflect the increasing life expec 
tancy, among other factors, but it is also consistent with the human 
capital hypothesis if firm-specific human capital has been increasing 
there. 24
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Why is there a mandatory retirement system in Japan, and why has 
the typical mandatory retirement age been increasing? One finds three 
explanations in the literature for the mandatory retirement practice. The 
first argument hinges on the idea that senior workers near retirement 
receive wages higher than their current productivities. For example, in 
Lazear©s (1979, 1981) work-effort model, senior workers are overpaid 
relative to their current productivity to compensate for their having been 
underpaid when they were junior workers. Such a payment scheme is 
designed to reduce shirking and other unproductive behaviors. In effect, 
workers post bond in earlier years, receive the interest payments over 
the years as part of their wages, and reclaim the bond at the time of 
retirement.
Senior workers may also be overpaid as part of the promotion-ladder 
scheme to reduce inefficient separation of workers who receive training 
in firm-specific human capital (Carmichael 1983a). In this scheme, 
sometime after the training is completed, workers are promoted to 
wages that exceed their current productivities on the basis simply of 
seniority. This arrangement eliminates the employer©s incentive to dis 
miss a trained worker prematurely: the employer does not gain from 
such action because another trained worker will fill the vacated slot on 
the basis of seniority. Eventually, there comes a time when it is efficient 
to separate, either because worker productivities have fallen or the 
values of their leisure time have risen to make it inefficient for them to 
remain employed. In both Lazear©s and Carmichael©s models, the work 
ers have the incentive to continue being employed, since their wages are 
higher than their productivities. Thus, mandatory retirement must be 
imposed to effect efficient separations.
The second argument, the productivity-dispersion hypothesis, argues 
that the dispersion in individual productivities increases with age for 
health reasons (Oi and Raisian 1985). Measuring, sorting, and reassign 
ing become unprofitable for older workers, who decline in productivity 
and whose remaining working lives are short. Therefore, it becomes 
economical to retire all workers when they reach a certain age rather 
than to ascertain which of these workers are worth keeping.
The third argument for a mandatory retirement system hinges on the
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heterogeneity in the age of hire (Parsons 1988). Parsons claims that 
mandatory retirement is designed for those who are hired late in life. 
Because of cost considerations, employers and incumbent workers may 
be unable to prevent those newly hired old workers from sharing in the 
rents wages that exceed worker productivity which typically accrue 
to those with seniority. Mandatory retirement is a way of limiting the 
newly hired old workers from sharing in the rents, according to Parsons.
For young new hires, Parsons argues, mandatory retirement is unnec 
essary because age-based pension plans can be designed to induce them 
to retire at an optimum wage. He finds evidence that in the early 1970s 
U.S. workers with low tenure in late middle age, who presumably had 
been hired late in life, had stronger desire for working beyond the 
mandatory retirement age of 65. Parson©s hypothesis may explain why 
mandatory retirement is more prevalent in larger firms. 25 The prediction 
of this hypothesis appears to conflict with the situation in Japan, how 
ever, where the age of hire tends to be homogeneous but mandatory 
retirement takes place nevertheless, and it, in fact, has become in 
creasingly popular.
Let me note three possible factors behind the rise in mandatory 
retirement age in Japan. First, as mentioned above, an increased invest 
ment in firm-specific human capital may apply. Second, an environment 
of rapid technological change where skills become obsolete quickly, 
thereby necessitating retraining may lower the optimum mandatory 
retirement age. It may not be profitable to keep retraining older workers 
whose remaining working life is short. 26 This argument may be relevant 
for explaining why the mandatory retirement age has risen in Japan, as 
that country©s pace of economic growth and technological change has 
slowed in the 1970s and 1980s. The technological factor may also be 
relevant for the Japanese-American contrast if technological progress 
has slowed more in America than in Japan. The elimination of man 
datory retirement in the United States effectively raised the mandatory 
retirement age infinitely. Third, a demographic trend may apply. The 
rapid aging of the labor force in recent years surely must have exerted 
pressures to accommodate aging workers by extending their working 
years. 27 Note that the demographic pressure has been greater in Japan.
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In the United States, those over 60 years amounted to a little under 16 
percent of the total population in 1980, but by 1988 their proportion had 
grown by 6.5 percent. In Japan, the comparable proportion grew by 
nearly 27 percent, from 13 percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1988. 28 The 
question that remains unanswered, therefore, is why more Japanese 
firms are adopting the mandatory retirement system in the first place, 
rather than doing away with it in response to the demographic pressure. 
An interesting topic for future research is why mandatory retirement has 
been gaining popularity in Japan, with the retirement age steadily rising, 
while it has been eliminated in the United States albeit by legislation.
A related issue is the Japanese redundancy practice, whereby many 
Japanese firms tend to separate senior and trained workers through 
discharge and early retirement when demand declines. 29 This practice 
has raised the concern that experienced and productive workers are 
being forced out of employment, causing a large loss to the economy 
(Koike 1987). This practice, however, may be an employer©s rational 
response to a demand decline.
Carmichael (1983b) shows that it is less costly to lay off older, 
experienced workers than young workers who are in the process of 
receiving training. The reason is straightforward: a layoff does not 
shorten the time required for training, but it does reduce the total 
working lifetime of a worker. Thus, the productivity loss is always from 
an experienced worker whose lost output is evaluated at the current 
depressed product price. For a young worker in training, his or her lost 
output is evaluated at a price averaged over good and bad times. As a 
result, the expected value of a young worker©s training is less sensitive to 
current economic conditions than the actual value of an experienced 
worker©s training. 30 Thus, while not ruling out the possibility of waste 
caused by the redundancy practice, Carmichael©s argument does suggest 
that this practice may be a rational one.
Even with the prevalence of mandatory retirement, the labor force 
participation rates of older workers remain higher in Japan than in the 
United States (table 3.2). For example, almost 36 percent of Japanese 
males who are 65 years of age or older were in the labor force in 1988, 
while only about 17 percent of U.S. white males in the same age group
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Table 3.2 Labor Force Participation Rates
for Older Workers in Japan and the United States
(1988)
Age Males (%) Females (%)
Japan
50-54
55-59
60-64
65 and older
United States (Whites)
55-64
65 and older
96.0
91.3
71.1
35.8
67.9
16.7
63.3
50.9
38.6
15.7
43.6
7.7
SOURCES: Japan Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on 
the Labour Force Survey (1988), table 2; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor 
Statistics, Bulletin 2340, (August 1989), table 5.
were in the labor force. Japanese women often enter the labor force after 
their husbands retire. Table 3.2 indicates that almost 16 percent of 
Japanese females who are 65 years or older, in contrast to the less than 8 
percent for comparable U.S. white females, were in the labor force in 
1988.
Many of Japan©s retired male workers continue to work in the same 
firm at reduced pay, or they may find employment in subsidiary and 
subcontracting firms. In 1988, 89.5 percent of nonagricultural male 
employed workers, 65 years or older, were engaged mainly at gainful 
work; the proportion for males 70 years or older was 85.2 percent. The 
remaining workers were attending schools, and/or doing housework in 
addition to working, or were leading the life of kyugyosha. 31 For 
females, the comparable figures were 43.9 percent for those 65 years or 
older and 41.7 percent for those 70 years or older. 32
Flexibility in Work Organization
This section discusses some of the salient features of the Japanese 
industrial relations system: how management and labor in Japan com-
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municate with each other; how they resolve differences and disputes; 
how effective these practices are; and how the Japanese practices com 
pare with those in the United States. The purpose of the discussion is to 
examine how these features bear on the transaction-cost differences 
between the two countries.
One notable feature in Japan is said to be the flexibility in work 
organization and industrial relations. Flexible work organization is 
facilitated by the job-rotation system whereby typical workers are 
rotated among different tasks so that they may acquire a wide range of 
skills (Koike 1984; Aoki 1988, chap. 2). Aoki notes, for example, that
[T]he multifunctionality of workers fostered by a wide range of job 
experience (and job rotation in particular) may enable each shop to 
adjust job assignments flexibly in response to the requirements of 
the downstream operation.. . .Further, workers trained in a wide 
range of skills can better understand why more defective products 
are being produced and how to cope with the situation as well as 
prevent it from recurring... (pp. 36-37).
To be sure, flexible job structures based on cross-training have existed in 
U.S. firms as well. For example, Jacoby (1989) views such practices 
prevailing in the late 1920s among some large firms as a key part of their 
attempts to stabilize employment. As Aoki (1988) notes, however, U.S. 
companies in the postwar years have tended to emphasize fine-task 
specialization and sharp job demarcation, and these are the charac 
teristics that make it difficult to train workers to be multifunctional. In 
contrast, Japanese firms encourage workers© sharing of knowledge and 
tasks on the shop floor, thereby enabling them to cope with local 
emergencies effectively. 33
Not to be overlooked, of course, is the likelihood that workers trained 
for a multitude of tasks are less resistant to an introduction of a labor 
saving technology. Unless the new technology reduces the demand for 
labor in all tasks, a worker is unlikely to suffer unemployment.
Industrial relations in Japan exhibit considerable flexibility along 
many dimensions, more so than in most other developed countries (e.g., 
Aoki 1989; Koshiro 1986; Morishima 1982, 132; OECD 1986, chap.
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3). Aoki (1989) notes, for example, that "at the Japanese factory, 
emerging contingencies are often coped with on site by operating 
workers without authority and/or expert interventions, and the essence 
of workers© incentive package is to nurture their capabilities to do so..." 
(p. 7). He notes further (1988) that for this procedure to work smoothly,
... operating jobs and emergent tasks (such as spotting, fixing, and 
preventing the recurrence of, problems) have to be integrated. 
However, strong property ownership over jobs, as observed under 
American "job control unionism," hinders such flexible and fluid job 
assignments (Chap. 2).
It is noteworthy that the Japanese automobile transplants in the U.S. 
Midwest also insist on having flexibility over job assignments, produc 
tion plans, etc., even at UAW-organized Diamond-Star Motors and 
Mazda Motor Manufacturing. (See chapter 5 for a related discussion.) 
Another manifestation of flexibility is in Japanese collective agree 
ments, which tend to be short, abstract, and often obscure (Hanami 
1981, chap. 2). The brevity of contracts underscores their flexibility: 
there must be an implicit understanding among the parties involved that 
contract terms can be changed easily in response to newly emerging 
circumstances, thereby making detailed stipulations unnecessary. Con 
tract flexibility in Japan is not limited to industrial relations. Rather it 
underlies most economic and other relationships, as Hanami points out:
... Westerners consider it important to describe in as precise and 
detailed a manner as possible the standards which are to be applied 
in every possible disagreement. They feel that there is no way to 
settle conflicts without reference to a complete description of the 
rights and obligations of both parties. Japanese think it is both 
impossible and unnecessary to provide such an extensive written 
description and make provisions for every possible eventuality. They 
believe that no matter how detailed the clauses of a contract may be, 
some unanticipated developments are bound to occur, and that it is 
more important to establish mutual understanding and trust.. . 
Since economic deals in Japan are affected by emotional and senti 
mental factors, the parties to a contract always expect some flexibil-
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ity in implementation. The detailed enumeration of specific contract 
provisions would be fatal to this flexibility (p. 53).
Although the description above refers to contracts in general, its ap 
plicability to employment contracts seems obvious. 34
Unionism, Labor Disputes, and 
Industrial Relations Practices
The aspect of industrial relations that is particularly indicative of low 
transaction costs is enterprise unionism and its function. Unions in Japan 
are often referred to as enterprise unions. 35 The enterprise union is by 
far the dominant form of union organization in Japan. In 1985, the latest 
year for which the relevant data are available, there were almost 12.5 
million union members (about 23.4 percent of the total labor force), of 
which more than 91 percent were in enterprise unions. 36 Although most 
unions belong to national level federations, the basic issues of wages, 
working conditions, and like factors are negotiated at the company 
level. 37
An enterprise union acts independently in bargaining with manage 
ment. It differs from the locals of U.S. industrial unions in that it is not 
merely an administrative unit of a national union. Indeed, unlike the 
case in the United States, Japanese workers must become employees of a 
firm before they can join the union, and a typical union includes white- 
collar nonsupervisory employees as well as blue-collar workers. 38 An 
enterprise union is not a company union, but is a bonafide trade union. It 
engages in collective bargaining and has the legal right to strike and to 
engage in other job actions. 39
Japanese unions also engage in collective bargaining, but unlike in the 
United States, a major collective bargaining takes place at a specific time 
of the year that is known to everyone, i.e., spring offensive or shunto. 
The spring offensive confers economies of scale in information gather 
ing and transacting, so both sides can concentrate on collecting, ex 
changing, and verifying information at that time. 40 A noteworthy aspect 
of Japanese collective bargaining is that details are worked out at the
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enterprise level rather than at the level of national union federations, as 
in the United States. Because of the simultaneous wage adjustments that 
take place annually, shunto has been viewed as being responsible for the 
prevalent wage flexibility in Japan (Gordon 1982; Hashimoto and Rais- 
ian 1987a,b; Taylor 1989).
An interpretation suggested by the theory outlined in chapter 2 is that 
the Japanese style of unionism is an institutionalized mechanism 
through which employer and employees invest in information reliability. 
Viewed this way, the enterprise union is an endogenous phenomenon, 
which became consolidated about the time that other Japanese labor 
market phenomena were becoming prevalent.
Employer and employee share common interests to a greater extent in 
an enterprise union system than in industrial or craft unions. As Taira 
(1970) put it, "The Japanese type of collective bargaining necessarily 
makes the union so conscious of the business conditions of the firm that 
the enterprise union is, for all practical purposes, just another manage 
ment in the firm" (Taira 1970, p. 169). The enterprise union controls 
members© shirking and malfeasance as well as guards against employers© 
actions that are harmful to workers. The union has the incentive to 
monitor its members within an enterprise to uphold the reputation of its 
members as well as protect their interests from being deflected by the 
employer. These monitoring functions may be served more effectively 
by a union organized within firms rather than across firms. To promote 
mutual well-being, major decisions are made after close consultations 
between management and unions.
All this is not to say that labor and management seldom disagree in 
Japan, but disagreements seem to be less frequent in Japan than in the 
United States. As an indication, consider the extent of industrial dis 
putes. The number of labor cases reaching public dispute settlement 
procedures, e.g., labor relations commissions or courts, is much 
smaller in Japan than in other industrialized countries (Hanami 1984). 
In 1976, for example, 0.407 cases per 1,000 labor force members were 
brought to the U.S. National Labor Relations Board for settlement, but 
in Japan the comparable figure was only 0.079 cases brought before 
either the Labor Relations Commission or the courts (Hanami 1984,
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table 9). 41 Even the courts tend to rely heavily on compromise and 
conciliation rather than on issuing decisions.
Also, the two countries differ a great deal in the speed with which 
disputes are resolved. Typically, there are fewer cases of labor dispute  
and the resulting productivity loss is smaller in Japan than in the 
United States. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 indicate the extent of resource loss, as 
measured by the number of days lost, caused by labor disputes in each 
country. Noting the difference in the scale on the vertical axis between 
the two countries, one is easily struck by the much greater resource loss 
in the United States.
In 1981, for example, there were 955 labor disputes in Japan involv 
ing 247,000 workers. These disputes resulted in 554,000 working days 
lost, or 220 days per 100 affected employees, or 14 days lost per 1,000 
employees economywide. In the United States there were 2,568 disputes 
involving 1,080,000 workers, resulting in 24,700,000 working days 
lost. The U.S. experience translates to 2,290 days lost per 100 affected 
employees or 276 days lost per 1,000 employees economywide, much 
higher figures than for Japan. 42
Note that in figure 3.7 the number of days lost in Japan were rather 
high in the 1950s, with the declining trend setting in only after 1960. In 
contrast, figure 3.8 indicates an upward trend in the number of days lost 
in the United States. The Japanese pattern coincides remarkably with the 
spread of enterprise unionism starting in the late 1950s. Obviously, 
cooperative industrial relations in Japan are a rather recent phe 
nomenon. This observation will be referred to shortly with the discus 
sion regarding the interaction of the influences of culture and traditions 
with economic forces.
One of the reasons that Japanese strikes are so short-lived is that they 
often occur at an early stage in the bargaining process, whether or not 
negotiations are deadlocked. Thus, strikes or other acts of dispute 
simply demonstrate that the unions disagree with the management 
(Matsuda 1983, 193-195). Indeed, a distinguishing feature of the men 
tality of Japanese workers is said to be their reluctance to cause any 
serious damage to the firm in which they work (Shirai 1983, 135-140).
Finally, it should be noted that in Japan, as in the United States, the
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Figure 3.7 Days Lost by Labor Disputes in Japan
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1983), table 147. 
NOTES: The Japanese data exclude agricultural strikes, political strikes, and workers indirectly 
affected by a dispute in their own establishment, or by disputes lasting less than four hours.
rate of unionization has been on the decline. The proportion of union 
members in nonagricultural employment stood at 35 percent in 1970, 
but by 1985-86 it had fallen to 28 percent (Freeman 1989, exhibit 1). 
The reasons for the decline are not well-understood, though two expla 
nations have dominated the literature. According to Freeman (1989), 
this decline is due partly to the fact that an increasing number of newly 
established firms do not have unions. Freeman hypothesizes that the 
Japanese decline, as the similar American decline, was caused largely 
by the increased management opposition to unionism. 43 The other
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Figure 3.8 Days Lost by Labor Disputes in U.S.A.
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1983), table 147. 
NOTES: The U.S. data exclude disputes involving fewer than six workers or lasting less than a full 
day or shift. After 1981, the United States no longer collected data for disputes involving fewer than 
1,000 workers, and as a result, U.S. data are not suitable for international comparisons.
explanation is offered by Neumann and Rissman (1984), who argue that, 
increasingly, government actions and policies have offered benefits 
which were traditionally the domain of the unions and that this trend has 
reduced the attractiveness of unionization. They present evidence indi 
cating that state legislation, ensuring that discharges occur only for just 
cause, as well as increased social welfare expenditures have contributed 
to the decline of unionization. Whether this latter explanation is valid for 
the Japanese experience or not, or which of the two explanations is more 
relevant for Japan, is a subject for future study.
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Dispute Settlement, Joint Consultations, and Nemawashi
As discussed above, the number of days lost due to labor disputes an 
indicator of transaction costs is low in Japan and started to trend down 
in the early 1960s, when enterprise unionism became prevalent. In the 
United States, however, not only are labor disputes numerous but the 
trend, if anything, has been upwards during much of the post-World War 
II period. Unions and management appear to work closely with one 
another in Japan. For example, they have a strong tendency to settle 
legal disputes through negotiation or mutual understanding. At the same 
time, grievances with no legal basis are handled by superiors in an 
informal way. 44 As noted above, the number of labor cases reaching the 
public office for dispute settlement is considerably smaller in Japan than 
in other industrialized countries. Even for cases reaching that stage, 
there is a heavy reliance on compromise and conciliation rather than on 
formal decisions. Compromise and conciliation obviously are more 
easily reached the lower the transaction costs.
Management and labor in many firms consult with each other 
throughout the year via the joint consultation system and, to a lesser 
extent, during grievance settlement procedures. Although grievance 
settlement procedures exist outside Japan, the joint consultation system 
is often thought to be unique to Japanese employment relations. 45 The 
meetings take place according to regularly set schedules for some firms, 
and as needs arise for others. It is noteworthy that this system exists even 
in nonunionized sectors, though it is more prevalent in the unionized 
sector. 46
Table 3.3 reports the frequency of joint consultations and grievance 
settlement procedures, from a 1984 survey. The last row of column (2) 
indicates that of 1,802 unions, 1,068 (or 59 percent) had joint consulta 
tions. Among unions in large firms (1,000 or more employees), the 
proportion of unions using joint consultation was 71 percent. Even 
among very small firms (29 or fewer employees), the proportion was 34 
percent.
Joint consultation is the primary channel through which the manage 
ment and the union deal with problems unsuitable for bargaining 
Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions 59
Table 3.3 Number of Enterprise Unions with Joint Consultations and 
Grievance Settlement Procedures: Japan 1984
Total
Grievance 
Joint Consultations Procedures
Exist
Firm Size
(Employment)
1,000+
100-999
30-99
29 or less
All Groups
(1)
545
(100)
689
(100)
414
(100)
154
(100)
1,802
(100)
(2)
All
384
(71)
[100]
434
(63)
[100]
198
(48)
[100]
52
(34)
[100]
1,068
(59)
[100]
(3)
Griev.
Proc.
Exist
262
[68]
257
[59]
79
[40]
26
[50]
624
[58]
Do Not Exist
(4)
All
161
(30)
[100]
25,5
(37)
[100]
216
(52)
[100]
102
(66)
[100]
734
(41)
[100]
(5)
Griev.
Proc.
Exist
29
[18]
29
[11]
22
[10]
6
[6]
86
[12]
Exist
(6)
291
(53)
286
(41)
101
(24)
32
(21)
710
(39)
SOURCE: Calculated from Japan Ministry of Labour, Saishin Rodo Kyoyaku No Jitsujo (The 
Latest Status of Labor Agreements) 1984, table 6-1. 
NOTES: Magnitudes in () and [ ] are percentages.
recruitment, dismissal, transfer and promotion, changes in production 
techniques and in management policies, plant closings, industrial safety, 
and the like (Shirai 1983; Hanami 1984; Sugeno and Koshiro 1987). 47 
More important, however, is the raison d'etre of this system. In the 
survey underlying table 3.3, 86 percent of the unions listed expediting 
communication, and 83 percent listed promotion of harmonious rela 
tionships as the major objectives of joint consultations. 48
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Another notable phenomenon in Japan is consensus-based decision- 
making, whereby important decisions are made only after a consensus 
has been achieved through an extensive sharing of information and the 
practice known as nemawashi. As discussed in chapter 1 (note 3) this 
practice refers to the procedure of digging around the roots of a plant 
and trimming excessive roots in order to successfully transplant a tree 
later or to promote the bearing of abundant fruits. The term has come to 
mean taking every necessary step to realize an objective. This phe 
nomenon is said to prevail throughout the economy and not just in the 
unionized sector. It would not be an exaggeration to state that joint 
consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking are two of the unique 
features of the Japanese industrial relations system.
Interestingly, the proportion of Japanese unions with formal grievance 
settlement procedures is lower than that for joint consultations, perhaps 
underscoring the preference of the Japanese to solve disputes informally. 
Thus, according to the last row of column (6) in table 3.3, 39 percent of 
unions, regardless of firm size, had such procedures. The proportion for 
large firms was 53 percent, and that for very small firms, 21 percent. 
These statistics are indicative of the minor role played by grievance 
procedures in Japanese industrial relations. In fact, this evidence can be 
viewed as indicating the effectiveness of joint consultations in reducing 
the number of disputes. 49
In contrast, grievance procedures appear to be used widely in the 
United States. An overwhelming proportion of major U.S. labor agree 
ments contain their own grievance and arbitration procedures designed 
to resolve disputes over contract interpretations (St. Antoine 1984, 
253). It should be kept in mind, however, that in both countries, many 
grievances are resolved among the parties involved rather than by 
reliance on third parties. 50
Grievances that are not resolved by the parties are referred to a third 
party, notably the Labor Relations Commission in Japan and arbitrators 
in the United States. American arbitrators are selected by the parties 
involved or are referred by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (FMCS) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA). De 
cisions by the arbitrators are binding. In Japan, there are no counterparts
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to FMCS or AAA for providing these services. 51 Instead, the Labor 
Relations Commission usually acts as the third party. 52 Even if a dispute 
ends up with the Commission, most cases 92 percent in 1981 are 
resolved through reconciliation. 53 In 1980, U.S. arbitrators referred by 
FMCS issued 7,539 decisions (Sloan and Whitney 1988,246). It can be 
stated with confidence that at least an equal number of decisions were 
issued by arbitrators referred by AAA and by those selected by the 
parties involved. 54 The sheer magnitude of the U.S. settlements dwarfs 
the Japanese experience of fewer than 2,000 cases settled, both between 
the parties and with the help of third parties, in 1980.
The frequencies of grievance settlement procedures and joint con 
sultations appear to be correlated in Japan. A comparison of columns (2) 
and (4) in table 3.3 makes it clear that the proportion of unions with 
grievance settlement procedures is decidedly larger for unions with, 
than for unions without, joint consultations. This evidence does not 
necessarily contradict the implication of the above argument that they 
are substitutes for each other. Rather, it may reflect the influence of a 
third factor lower transaction costs on both. In other words, these 
practices, together, reflect the phenomenon of low transaction costs in 
Japanese industrial relations.
Quality Control Circles
Another institution reflective of low transaction costs in Japan is the 
celebrated quality control (QC) circle. The Japanese quality circles 
were adopted from the concept of statistical quality control pioneered in 
the United States in the 1950s by W. Edwards Deming. 55 The practice 
spread widely after the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers 
began publication of the magazine Genba to QC (Quality Control for 
Foremen) in 1962, and by the early 1980s there were about a million 
circles there (Cole 1979, chap. 5; Blair and Ramsing 1983). Quality 
control circles in Japan are not limited to manufacturing: they exist 
among department stores, railways, retail shops, auto and television 
repair services, airlines, hotels, and even among municipal govern-
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ments (Juran 1975). This practice has been imported to the United States 
since the mid-1970s with mixed results (see chapter 5 in this book).
The quality control circle is conceptually similar to joint consulta 
tion, but in practice there are important differences. In a QC circle only 
a handful of production workers doing related work directly participate. 
Rather than meeting in response to specific problems, a quality circle is 
a continuous-study process involving the issues of quality and produc 
tivity (Cole 1980, 26). In contrast, joint consultations involve both 
white- and blue-collar workers, not all of them doing related work, and 
deal with a much broader range of subjects than do quality circles.
Usually, there is more than one quality circle within a firm, and each 
deals with productivity issues specific to a particular stage of produc 
tion. However, any worker not belonging to a circle can contribute to 
improved productivity by passing on his or her suggestions. Blair and 
Ramsing (1983, 492) note that "group cohesion and capacity for self- 
control is encouraged through team building exercises, limiting group 
size (3 to 10), and usually choosing homogeneous membership. The 
group derives status through the quality and value of its output." Re 
wards to participating in the quality circle are largely nonfinancial, 
being stated in terms of contribution to the company and self- 
development (Cole 1979, chap. 5). Such rewards, undoubtedly, are 
more effective where a longer-term employer-employee attachment 
exists.
It should be noted, however, that quality control circles in Japan have 
not always been successful. Many firms experienced problems with 
them for a few years after their introduction. In some firms workers felt 
that they were coerced into quality circles, and in others the emphasis on 
productivity made the participants doubt the value of the circles to 
themselves personally, with the result that their participation may have 
been a mere ritualistic behavior (Cole 1980). Moreover, whether or not 
quality control circles have had direct effects on productivity and quality 
remains an unanswered question: many firms already had the reputation 
for high quality by the time they adopted quality control circles (Hayes 
1981).
How do these Japanese institutions fit into the theory developed in
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chapter 2? I hypothesize that these institutions are the reflections of the 
investments that employers and employees make in the industrial rela 
tions system. These investments are encouraged by the underlying 
environment of low transaction cost a low cost of investing in informa 
tion reliability in Japan. For example, the smooth functioning of joint 
consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking would seem impossi 
ble unless transactions between labor and management could take place 
at low cost. Viewed this way, it might be argued that transaction costs are 
high in the United States, as industrial relations there tend to be adver 
sarial, and neither joint consultation nor consensus-based decisionmak 
ing has been their central feature. Heavy reliance on formal grievance 
settlement procedures and on the well-developed institution of arbitra 
tion in the United States reflect the adversarial industrial relations there.
Cultural-Traditional Factors and Economics
Japan differs from the United States in many labor market charac 
teristics. As will be seen in the next chapter, Japan has a greater 
prevalance of long-term employment and a more steeply sloped earn 
ings-tenure profile. The country also has exhibited greater wage flexibil 
ity and less reliance on layoffs, greater use of bonus payments, and 
smaller resource loss from industrial disputes. These and other labor 
market contrasts underscore the unique characteristics of the Japanese 
wage and employment systems.
To what extent are the influences of culture and traditions responsible 
for the uniqueness of these labor market practices? This is an important 
but difficult question, which has consumed the energy of many scholars 
studying Japan. 56 For the purpose of the present analysis, one may 
search for clues to this question in the historical roots of the key 
institutions of Japanese industrial relations, and ask what evidence there 
is of continuity in the notable characteristics of the country©s wage and 
employment systems. The literature on the history of the labor markets 
following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is an obvious place to look. 57
The history of the Japanese employment system points to the conclu-
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sion that the forces of culture and tradition alone are not responsible for 
the prevalance of the unique features of the country©s industrial relations 
system. Data on employment tenure and turnover indicate that long- 
term employment was much less prevalent in early years of moderniza 
tion. For example, Gordon (1985, chap. 3) discusses various measures 
that firms in heavy industries adopted bonuses to reward seniority, 
regular pay raises, etc.  to cope with the prevailing high labor turnover 
on the eve of World War I. According to Taira (1970, chap. 6, table 19), 
the proportion of employees in manufacturing with employment tenure 
of 10 years or more increased from around 3.7 percent in 1918 to 16.2 
percent in 1924 and 23.8 percent in 1933, but dropped to 9.3 percent in 
1939. These magnitudes contrast sharply with the almost 50-percent 
figure for 1980. Similarly, the rate of separation averaged 5.6 percent 
between 1916 and 1925, a shade below 4.3 percent between 1926 and 
1933, and 3.9 percent during 1934-36. In contrast, as figure 3.4 
indicates, the rate of separation during the post-World War II years was 
well below 3 percent. Finally, Saxonhouse (1976) reports that the 
average length of service of a female worker in the Japanese cotton- 
spinning industry was considerably shorter in the pre-World War II 
period (less than 44 months) than in the postwar period (63 months). He 
attributes the increased employment tenure in the postwar period to the 
spread of industrial training during that time.
The practice of lifetime employment (shusin koyo) began to appear, 
albeit sporadically, during the early years of industrialization, when a 
reduction of employment turnover, particularly of skilled workers, 
became the primary concern among employers. This practice became 
widespread during the high growth era of the late 1950s perhaps for the 
same reasons as in the prewar years. 58 The prevalance of this practice 
varied over the course of Japanese economic development, suggesting a 
rejection of the proposition that it was influenced primarily by culture 
and tradition.
Enterprise unionism is another Japanese phenomenon that is rela 
tively new in history. In fact, trade unions were not recognized in law  
though not outlawed either until the Supreme Command for Allied 
Powers (SCAP) decreed their existence at the end of the Second World
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War. 59 There were labor movements, and unions did exist, to be sure, 
before World War II, but they were neither strong nor extensive, accord 
ing to Taira (1970, 163). In 1936, when trade-union membership 
reached its peak, for example, collective bargaining was nearly absent 
except for seamen and workers in marine transport industries (Taira 
1970, 147).
Some enterprise unions that did emerge in the early 1920s were 
mostly among large firms in state-owned and private industries. 60 And 
membership grew steadily until the demise of unions in 1938, when they 
were forced to dissolve and to be organized into Sampo, a wartime 
patriotic labor organization dedicated to the promotion of workers© 
devotion to the war effort. 61 Unlike their postwar unions, however, 
prewar enterprise unions were confined to blue-collar workers (Shirai 
1983, 124). In the early post-World War II years, unions began appear 
ing at the factory level, but the tendency was for them to be formed 
separately for blue- and white-collar workers (Gordon 1985, chap. 9). 
During post-World War II years and throughout the 1950s, as noted 
earlier in figure 3.7, resource loss from industrial disputes was high, 
and only after the early 1960s did cooperative industrial relations 
emerge in Japan.
Similar histories can be told regarding the seniority wage (nenko 
joretsu) system and the practice of bonus payments. Both of these 
practices emerged after the process of industrialization was well on its 
way. In the early years of industrialization, seniority wages were limited 
to management level workers, while in modern Japan wages for even 
blue-collar workers follow the nenko pattern. Interestingly, bonuses, 
when they existed, had significant incentive elements in early years. For 
example, they were paid to individuals or groups of individuals who 
worked without absence for a whole month or other meritorious 
achievements. 62 In the modern Japanese corporate sector, bonus pay 
ments don©t appear to be incentive payments, at least directly, as their 
magnitudes relative to the base pay do not appear to vary from indi 
vidual to individual (Hashimoto 1979). Also, typical employment con 
tracts do not specify the determinants of the magnitude of bonus pay 
ments, contrary to what one would expect if bonuses were incentive
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payments. 63 It is clear that the nature of bonus payments is quite 
different in the modern Japanese economy from that of the early years of 
industrialization.
To summarize, prototypes of lifetime employment, seniority wages, 
and bonus payments were all developed in order to meet the need for 
stabilizing the employment of skilled workers as the process of indus 
trialization accelerated and acute labor shortages, accompanied by high 
turnover, developed (Nakamura 1971, chap. 4; Taira 1970, chap. 5). 
Even as late as the interwar years, however, lifetime employment was far 
from being the reality in industrial relations. To be sure, large firms did 
develop a complex internal labor market during that period, with the 
prototype of the nenkojoretsu system of wage payments (Shirai 1983, 
124). 64 But the Japanese employment and wage systems, as we know 
them today, were not prevalent phenomena before World War II. 65 In 
fact, it was not until 10 to 15 years after the end of the Second World War 
that many of these features became widespread throughout the Japanese 
economy. 66
The preceding discussions suggest that many of what appear to be 
uniquely Japanese features of industrial relations are, as Dore (1962) put 
it, "in fact fairly recent innovations, supported by traditional values to be 
sure, but consciously designed for good profit-maximizing reasons" (p. 
120). Most of these features certainly don©t appear to have been carried 
over from feudal Japan. One might insist on historical continuity and 
argue that the development after the late 1950s reflects a consolidation 
of the practices that had roots from the early years of industrialization 
(Gordon 1985, chap. 9). Even then, one is left with the question of what 
factors prompted the consolidation at that particular time. An answer to 
this question is suggested by the theme of this book: the rapid pace of 
economic growth interacted with cultural and traditional factors in 
shaping the labor market institutions in postwar Japan. 67
Let me end this chapter by discussing the key assumption of the 
present theory: transaction costs have been lower in Japan than in the 
United States. It goes without saying that it would be useful to have 
direct evidence on the magnitude of transaction costs in both countries, 
but transaction costs are difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly,
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and one would have to rely on circumstantial evidence. For example, a 
difference between Japan and the United States in a worker©s typical 
response to a foreman©s request that the rivet be placed from the left side 
rather than from the right is suggestive of the transaction-cost differ 
ence. Japanese workers are said to comply with such a request without 
argument, but American workers, who typically demonstrate strong 
individualism, tend to resist it out of a sheer stubbornness. 68 As dis 
cussed in chapter 2, however, it is not a fatal flaw of the theory that 
transaction costs are not directly observable.
Although the task of assembling such anecdotal evidence is left for a 
future study, it is worth pondering the important question of why 
transaction costs may be lower in one country than in the other. This 
question inevitably would involve the influences of culture and tradition. 
What kinds of traditional and cultural factors might one consider in light 
of the theory presented in chapter 2? Let me mention two phenomena in 
Japan, both related to agriculture, that may bear on this question.
Traditional agriculture appears to have influenced the shape of mod 
ern Japanese society along many dimensions. One is the sharing of 
decisionmaking. It seems reasonable to view such an approach as a low 
transaction-cost phenomenon. Aoki (1983, 25-26) traces the Japanese 
affinity for shared decisionmaking to the rice agriculture. Japanese 
terrain is mountainous, and rain water quickly flows away to the ocean 
unless steps are taken to conserve it. This situation led to the necessity 
for controlling and sharing irrigation water among rice farmers. As 
agriculture developed and the number of farmers sharing the water 
increased, it became necessary to devise "simple and egalitarian con 
ventions" to economize on transaction costs. According to Aoki, these 
conventions became deep-rooted and were carried over to modern 
Japan.
The Japanese agricultural legacy also bears on the importance of 
family relationships based on the household, or the ie. One view holds 
that the resource base is essential to understanding the ie system in 
agriculture. 69 The ie system was the basis not only of agricultural 
activities but also of many commercial and manufacturing firms (Fruin 
1983). In this system, even non-kin members were accepted as members
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of this family. Even now, employment relationships in Japan share the 
characteristics of family relationships more than in the United States 
(Hanami 1981). Japanese workers, for example, tend to identify 
strongly with their employers, to the point that they expect their superi 
ors to be involved even in their personal matters. It is telling that 
Takezawa and Whitehall (1981, 119) found that only 5 percent of 
Japanese, but 74 percent of American workers surveyed thought that 
their superiors should not be involved in their decisions about marriage. 
Their survey indicated, moreover, that 80 percent of Japanese, but only 
15 percent of American respondents thought that their superiors should 
offer personal advice if requested. It seems reasonable that costs of 
communicating and transacting are lower in family-style relationships 
than in other types.
Undoubtedly one may identify more phenomena relating to the trans 
action-cost issue. Whatever they may be, I believe that an explanation 
based on the transaction-cost consideration opens a way of incorporat 
ing many of the influences of tradition and culture into a choice-theoretic 
framework of economic analysis.
NOTES
1 Some of the material presented in this chapter, although developed in my previous research 
with John Raisian, has been updated. For further discussions on the Japanese macroeconomy, the 
reader may consult Nakamura (1981); Uchino (1983); and Minami (1986), all in English.
2 These magnitudes were calculated from the data contained in Japan Productivity Center 
Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1987, table 1-7, and 1988, table 1-6. Ellenberger 
(1982) claimed the American productivity advantage over Japan in the 1970s to be at 30 percent.
3 Industries in which America enjoyed a productivity advantage are agriculture-forestry- 
fisheries, construction, food and kindred products, textile mill products, printing-publishing-and 
allied products, petroleum refining and coal products, fabricated metal, furniture and fixtures, 
rubber and miscellaneous plastic products, stone-clay-glass products, motor vehicles and equip 
ment, transportation equipment, apparel and other fabricated textiles, service, finance-insurance- 
real estate, and electric utility and gas supply. Industries in which Japan had the productivity 
advantage are mining, lumber and wood products, paper and allied products, chemical and allied 
products, leather and leather products, primary metal products, electric machinery, precision 
instruments, miscellaneous manufacturing, and transportation and communication. The two 
countries are tied in machinery and wholesale and retail trade. See Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990, 
table 5).
4 Curiously, Drucker©s claim appears to be in conflict with the finding by Jorgenson and Kuroda
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(1990) that the U. S. motor vehicle industry enjoyed a productivity advantage over its counterpart in 
Japan in 1985 and that the gap is likely to grow in the future.
5 According to these authors, in automobile manufacturing, Japanese workers in stamping and 
assembly plants are twice as productive as U.S. workers; in engine and transmission manufacture, 
they are 50 percent more productive; and in iron foundries, 20 percent more productive. They note, 
however, that higher labor productivity in complex manufacturing has been achieved only since the 
late 1970s by Japanese firms (Abegglen and Stalk 1985, 61-62).
6 The coefficient of variation (the standard deviation as percent of the mean) is 0.81 for the 
United States and 0.64 for Japan for the entire 1950-88 period. This finding does not agree with our 
earlier finding that productivity is more cyclically variable in Japan than in the United States 
(Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a). The present finding, which includes the data for most of the 1980s, 
suggests an opposite conclusion.
7 By the period 1985-88, the Japanese growth rate in manufacturing output fell to about 3.3 
percent per year, somewhat lower than the U.S. growth rate of 3.9 percent. However, if we extend 
the period back by one year, i.e., 1984-88, the Japanese growth rate turns out to be 5.4 percent, and 
the U.S. growth rate, 5.1 percent. These are the geometric averages of output growth rates 
calculated from the data in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 
(1989), table 146.
8 Jorgenson et al. (1987) also found that differences in the growth rates of labor input were not 
pronounced between the two countries during the post-World War II years.
9 See Hashimoto 1990a for details.
10 For further discussions on Japanese and American unemployment rates, see Moy and 
Sorrentino (1981); Taira (1983b); Tominomori (1985); Sorrentino (1976, 1981, 1984); Ito (1984); 
and Hamada and Kurosaka (1984, 1986).
11 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2217 (June 
1985), table 126, published both reported and modified Japanese unemployment rates. The last 
year for which the data are reported is 1983. The next and most recent edition of the Handbook, 
Bulletin 2340 (August 1989), table 143 only reports modified unemployment rates. Reported 
unemployment rates for Japan continue to be available in Japanese publications, however.
12 This adjustment raised Japanese unemployment rates by, at most, one-tenth of a percentage 
point in the early 1980s.
13 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) adjustment procedure evidently had little impact on the 
Japanese unemployment series. During the 30-year span between 1959 and 1988, the modified and 
the official series differed from each other during only 10 of these years. Curiously, all of these 
differences amounted to one-tenth of one percentage point.
14 The major grounds for dismissal are misrepresentation by employees of educational back 
ground or previous employment experiences, markedly poor records of performance, outright 
insubordination, serious misconduct relating to duties, and criminal conduct in private life (Sugeno 
andKoshiro 1987, 135).
15 Sugeno and Koshiro (1987, 135) report that in 1983 there were 1,270 suits filed by workers 
involving employment relations. Almost half of them were initiated to challenge employment 
termination.
16 For the economy as a whole and for manufacturing, the ratio of quits to dismissals (or layoffs) 
is typically more than twice as large in Japan as in the United States. Total separations, quits plus 
dismissals (or layoffs), tend to be unrelated to economic conditions in both Japan and the United 
States. The reason for this phenomenon is different in the two countries, however. In Japan neither
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quits nor dismissals are related to economic conditions. In the United States, quits rise, but layoffs 
fall, during upswings, and as a result total separations exhibit unclear movements (Hashimoto 
1990b). As is well-known, the distinction between quits and dismissals (or layoifs) may not be 
clearcut. Still, the contrast between the two countries is revealing.
17 See Hashimoto (1990c) for details. See also Moy and Sorrentino (1981) and Hamada and 
Kurosaka (1986) for informative discussions on this issue. Comparing unemployment rates 
between Japan and the United States entails all sorts of difficulties. For example, according to Taira 
(1983b), Japanese unemployment rates would rise by 80 percent if they were made consistent with 
U.S. definitions. He reaches this conclusion by using specially tabulated series, which are available 
only for the late 1970s. Sorrentino (1984) disagrees with Taira and argues that he should not count 
as unemployed persons who are without jobs and waiting to report to new jobs within 30 days. In the 
United States such persons are counted as unemployed only if they are available to begin work 
immediately. To the extent Taira could not distinguish those who could begin work at once, he might 
have overestimated the unemployed pool in Japan. See Hashimoto (1990c) for a discussion on 
kyugyosha and the calculation showing that the Japanese-American unemployment rate difference 
would not narrow substantially even if all of the kyugyosha workers were to be counted as 
unemployed persons.
18 This phenomenon may be due in part to the Japanese unemployment insurance law. There, 
unemployment compensation is available to workers on short-time schedules, but in the United 
States such workers are not eligible for compensation (Sorrentino 1976, 22). Thus, there should be 
a greater incentive in Japan to use short-time rather than layoffs during downturns.
19 It should be noted, however, that some U.S. labor contracts restrict the use of layoffs to meet a 
decline in labor demand. For example, a U.S. Steel Corporation agreement in the early 1970s 
specified that layoffs would not be used until hours of work fell below 32 per week. The United Auto 
Workers had a similar provision stating that layoffs could be used only after hours of work were 
maintained at less than 32 per week for four weeks or more (Koike 1977, 81 and 100; Akiyama et 
al. 1984).
20 According to Ito (1984), the low teenage unemployment in Japan accounts for 20 to 25 
percent of the Japanese-American difference in unemployment rates.
21 The 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law prohibits sex discrimination in vocational 
training, fringe benefits, retirement, and dismissal. For an informative discussion on this law, see 
Edwards (1988).
22 Mandatory retirement has been eliminated by the age discrimination law in the United States.
23 The remaining life expectancy at age 20 for a Japanese male was 48.47 (52.25 for females) in 
1955 in contrast to 50.1 (55.8 for females) for white persons in the United States. In 1987, a 
Japanese male who had lived to age 20 could expect to live an additional 55.74 years (61.20 years 
for females), and a comparable U.S. white male could expect to live an additional 53.3 years (59.8 
years for females).
24 Carmichael©s (1983a) model potentially addresses this issue, but the effect of a greater 
amount of firm-specific human capital on the retirement age is not clear in his model. As will be 
discussed shortly, the rising retirement age in Japan may also reflect the rapid aging of the 
population.
25 Presumably, it is more costly for larger firms to differentiate the wage scheme between those 
who were hired early and those who were hired late in life. Mandatory retirement may be the least 
costly method of preventing those late arrivals from extracting the rents.
26 This point was suggested by Jacob Mincer in a private conversation.
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27 As evidence of the demographic pressure, note the repeated attempts by the Japanese 
government to alleviate the budgetary burden by raising the eligibility age for the social security 
program from 60 to 65. As of summer 1990, the opposition has succeeded in blocking the 
implementation of this change. I thank Machiko Osawa for providing me with information on the 
current debate on this issue in the government.
28 The U.S. magnitudes were calculated from the data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 1990, table 13, and the Japanese magnitudes from Japan Statistics 
Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1989, table 2-9.
29 Koike (1987,84-92) reports that large Japanese firms have tended to resort to the redundancy 
measure after two years of continuous losses.
30 Note that an implicit assumption in Carmichael©s argument is that there is a prospect of 
recovery in the future. Without such a prospect, it may not make sense to continue training a 
worker.
31 These magnitudes are only slightly less than the 98.7 percent figure for male nonagricultural 
employees, 40-54 years old. These data are from Japan Statistics Bureau, Management and 
Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey (1988, table 14).
32 The comparable magnitude for females 40-54 years old is 58.9 percent.
33 See chapter 4 for an additional discussion on Japanese training practices.
34 Thus, Hanami (1981) goes on to say, "The reluctance to have one©s rights and obligations 
clearly defined is to be found not only in the individual relationship between an employee and his 
employer but also in the relationship between unions and employers. The situation in industrial 
relations does not differ markedly from the description of personal or business contracts..." (p. 
53). For a comprehensive treatment on Japanese labor relations, see also Sugeno and Koshiro 
(1987).
35 Industrial or craft unions are rare in Japan. The only significant craft union is the Zen Nihon 
Kaiin Kumiai (All Japan Seaman©s Union).
36 The remaining members were divided primarily between craft unions (1.3 percent) and 
industrial unions (5.5 percent). As is true for the United States, unionism is more prevalent in larger 
Japanese firms. In 1989, for example, over 52 percent of union members worked in firms with 
1,000 or more employees and only about 5 percent were in firms with 100 or fewer employees. 
These magnitudes were calculated from the data contained in Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo 
Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1990, 168-169.
37 Japanese enterprise unions resemble works councils (Betriebsrdte) in West Germany. For 
example, both use joint consultation along with collective bargaining. There are important 
differences between the two, however. For example, Betriebsrdte is required by law and is financed 
by employers. Japanese unions are not required by law, but are voluntary associations of workers, 
and are not financed by employers. Betriebsrdte cannot strike and engage in other job actions as 
Japanese unions do. For more details, see Shirai (1983) and Koshiro (1983a,b), which contain 
excellent discussions of Japanese enterprise unions.
38 Enterprise unionism began to appear during the interwar years among large firms. Pre-World 
War II unions consisted largely of blue-collar employees. Also, unlike the case in Japanese 
enterprise unions, a foreman in a U.S. factory is not a member of the local (Koike 1977, 38-40).
39 Enterprise unions belong to industrial federations, which in turn belong to national con 
federations. The main functions of federations and confederations are collection and dissemination 
of information and involvement in political activities. Until November 20, 1987, there were three 
major confederations: the left-oriented Sohyo (General Council of Labor Unions), founded in
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1955, with close to 4.1 million members in 1987; the right-oriented Domei (Japanese Confedera 
tion of Labor), founded in 1964, with over 2.1 million members in 1987; and Churitsuroren 
(Independent Confederation of Unions), founded in 1956, with over 1.6 million members in 1987. 
Both Domei and Churitsuroren were disbanded on November 20, 1987, when Rengo (Japanese 
Private Sector Trade Union Confederation), with almost 5.6 million members, was inaugurated. 
Sohyo, too, merged with Rengo in late 1989. Rengo now includes both private- and public-sector 
employees. These data were gathered from Hanami (1981); The Japan Times, 5 December 1987, 
Weekly Overseas Edition, and Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor 
Statistics) 1988, 161.
40 The spring offensive was first launched in 1956 by Sohyo (General Council of Labor Unions) 
in order to develop a common labor front on wage bargaining. Spring was chosen presumably 
because that is the time when new employees are hired and wage increases implemented, and when 
the new fiscal year begins on April 1. See Seike (1986) for an interesting analysis of the effects of the 
1986 shunto on wage increases.
41 In West Germany, the comparable figure is over 15 cases brought before the labor courts. 
Japan does not have a German-style system of labor courts.
42 The same general conclusion obviously holds for other years as well, as indicated in figures 
3.7 and 3.8. After 1981, the U. S. data on labor disputes refer only to membership larger than 1,000 
workers and are not comparable to the Japanese data. One word of caution is in order when 
interpreting the Japanese data: the information on disputes used here does not include more subtle 
forms of work stoppages, such as "go-slow" or "work-to-rule" methods. These informal practices 
are believed to be more widely used in Japan than in the United States. Indeed, these practices are 
unpopular in the United States. (See, for example, Hanami and Blanpain 1984, part IV by Hanami 
and part V by St. Antoine.)
43 A piece of anecdotal evidence for his hypothesis was offered by a Japanese president of a mid 
sized firm (about 800 employees), who told me that he started a friendship club in his firm to 
promote the exchange of information between management and labor, hoping to forestall unioniza 
tion of his workforce. See also Machiko Osawa (1988a) for an interesting discussion on the recently 
emerging issues of Japanese industrial relations.
44 It is interesting to note that union and management representatives at Chevrolet and Fleet- 
wood once emphasized that one of the best signs of a healthy employment relationship is the 
willingness to resolve disputes through informal oral discussions rather than by resorting to official 
written grievances. (See St. Antoine 1984, 312-313.)
45 As pointed out in chapter 1, works councils (Betriebsrate) in West Germany also use joint 
consultations.
46 According to a survey taken by the Ministry of Labor in 1977, almost 83 percent of unionized 
establishments and slightly over 40 percent of nonunionized establishments had joint consultations 
(Shirai 1983,143). For informative discussions of joint consultations, see also Koshiro(1983a) and 
Sugeno and Koshiro (1987).
47 According to Sugeno and Koshiro (1987), joint consultation provides the parties with 
"channels for intimate communication with the result that many matters which might otherwise 
develop into shop floor disputes are agreed upon in advance and peacefully implemented" (p. 143).
48 Other objectives mentioned are the maintenance and improvement of working conditions (77 
percent), improvement in productivity (63 percent), participation in management activities (38 
percent), and other (20 percent). This information is from Japan Ministry of Labour, Saishin Rodo 
Kyoyaku NoJitsujo (The Latest Status of Labor Agreements) 1984, table 5-3. A case study may be 
an effective way of appreciating the workings of joint consultations and grievance procedures. An
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interested reader is referred to an illuminating case study of the Japan Steel Corporation and the 
Postal Service by Sugeno and Koshiro (1987).
49 Sugeno and Koshiro (1987, 137-140) present additional evidence that in Japan grievance 
procedures are much less prevalent than joint consultations. In fact, they state that joint consulta 
tions reduce the number of grievances.
50 This point is easily established for Japan from published sources. In 1981, for example, over 
87 percent of the disputes that were actually settled were between the parties involved (Hanami 
1984, table 1). Comparable data for the United States could not be found. The author©s conversation 
with an experienced arbitrator suggests that the U.S. proportion may also be high.
51 This absence presumably reflects Japanese aversion to reliance on outsiders to make deci 
sions affecting their well-being. In contrast, the United States has experienced an increased use of 
arbitration in the settlement of labor disputes (St. Antoine 1984, 267).
52 In 1981, of 261 settlements handled by third parties, 249 were decided by the Labor 
Relations Commission (Hanami 1984, table 1).
53 Japan may not be unique in having mediation and conciliation as the major channels of 
dispute settlement. Although comparable data could not be found for the United States, St. Antoine 
states that mediation and conciliation are the first steps to conflict resolution by the arbitrator (St. 
Antoine 1984, 262).
34 This information was received during a private conversation with an experienced arbitrator in 
the United States.
55 See Cole (1979,1980), and Blair and Ramsing (1983) for additional details on the history and 
practices of quality circles in Japan. In chapter 5, I briefly discuss quality circles in the United 
States.
56 See, for example, Dore (1962) and, more recently, Hamilton and Biggart (1988).
57 After 1639, Japan pursued a policy of isolationism, shunning foreign contacts except with 
Holland, which, on the grounds that it was Protestant rather than Catholic, was permitted to engage 
in trade under strict control on the island of Deshima in Nagasaki. Isolationism ended 220 years 
later in 1859, when the feudal Tokugawa government opened the ports of Kanagawa, Nagasaki, and 
Hakodate to Russia, Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States (Morishima 1982, 57- 
59). With the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan formally abandoned the feudal system and returned 
to the imperial system. The Meiji Restoration is a momentous juncture in Japanese history because 
"it laid the foundation for the building of a modern state on the Western model" (Morishima 1982, 
chap. 2). Japan experienced a period of severe inflation after the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), which 
resulted in the so-called Matsukata deflation (1881-84), establishing a new monetary system. The 
gold standard was adopted in 1897. It was during the period from 1886 to 1900 that modern 
industries became firmly established in Japan. For further details, see Minami (1986); Morishima 
(1982); Nakamura (1971, 1981); Nishikawa (1980); and Taira (1970), all in English.
58 An established opinion among Japanese scholars is that Japan entered the period of "excess 
demand for labor" in the beginning of the 1960s (Nakamura 1981, 158). Interestingly, this time 
period more or less coincides with the period in which long-term employment became increasingly 
prevalant (Hashimoto and Raisian 1985).
59 The government often suppressed labor movements using the Public Peace Police Law 
(1900) as a legal basis. In 1926, this law was modified to weaken the government©s power against the 
labor movement, but a new law, the Peace Maintenance Law, instituted at the same time, was 
designed to suppress communistic movements. The government used this law to continue suppress 
ing unionism. Garon (1987) contains informative discussions of the history of Japan©s social policy 
and labor movement.
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60 State-owned industries with enterprise unions included arsenals, naval shipyards, the tobacco 
monopoly, and municipal street railways. Private industries included mining, steel, machinery, 
engineering, shipbuilding, copper refining, textile, and electricity and gas supply (Shirai 1983, 
124). See Gordon (1985) for an illuminating discussion on union movements in Japanese heavy 
industries during early years of modernization.
61 According to Shirai (1983, 124), membership in enterprise unions grew during the 1920s to 
reach the point where, by early 1930s, nearly half of all union members were in enterprise unions.
62 "The bonus sometimes took the form of exemption from boarding charges for workers" or "a 
remittance of additional cash directly to the homes of the workers in the hope that parents might 
become instrumental in encouraging their children to cultivate regular work habits" (Taira 1970, 
120-21). Gordon (1985, 101) states that in the early 1920s bonuses were "part of the continuing 
effort to control work more directly, tighten discipline, and encourage efficiency. Only men 
considered models of conduct were eligible and in many cases a good rate of attendance was a 
prerequisite."
63 The magnitude of bonus payments is a subject of annual collective bargaining, shunto.
64 In the early 1930s, large firms began using increasing numbers of temporary workers. 
Gordon (1985) attributes the use of temporary workers during these years to "the chaos of high 
labor turnover and pirating of skilled workers that accompanied the World War I boom as well as the 
subsequently bloated payrolls of the 1920s bust," all of which increased the tendency to designate 
many of the new employees "temporary," who received a yearly contract renewable at company 
discretion (pp. 135-36). Taira©s description resembles that often given for temporary workers in the 
postwar period. For example, he states that the temporary worker was "identical to the regular 
workers in all aspects of work on the shop floor, but he was considered a miscellaneous worker 
employed for a short fixed term, sometimes on a day-to-day basis, at rates of pay markedly inferior 
to those of the regular worker. Not only were temporary workers© deprived of fringe benefits within 
the firm, but they were not counted as factory ©operatives© protected by the Factory Law and related 
measures" (Taira 1970, 161-63).
65 See Taira (1970,164). It appears also that it took a while for the nenkojoretsu system of wage 
setting to take hold after World War II. Nakamura (1981, 166) observes that large firms showed a 
trend toward an increasingly steeper slope in their seniority wage curves during the late 1950s. A 
chapter by Ono in Nishikawa (1980) contains a related discussion of postwar changes in the 
Japanese wage system.
66 Recall also that the separation rates were rather high until the late 1950s, when the declining 
trend set in (figure 3.4). It is worth noting also that the famous kanban (just-in-time) system, 
pioneered by the Toyota Motor Company, began to be used in many manufacturing plants only in 
the late 1970s. Under this system, materials, parts, and components are produced and delivered just 
when they are needed. For an informative discussion of the kanban system, see Abegglen and Stalk 
(1985).
67 This argument doesn©t deny the role played by the reforms in legal and political framework 
introduced by the Occupation; rather, it focuses on the economic forces that made these reforms 
take effect.
68 This episode was conveyed to me during a private conversation with a Japanese manager, who 
operates factories in both Japan and the United States. Fucini and Fucini©s (1990) observation that 
"American workers balk at remaining at the office after five to wait for an important phone call, or 
refuse to come to the plant on weekends to work on a rush project..." (p. 131) is also indicative of 
high transaction-cost that must be incurred in coping with fluctuations in production plans.
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69 In fact, the ie system has been a point of controversy among anthropologists and others 
interested in Japanese society. An ongoing debate exists on the existence and importance of the 
economic basis in the ie system. According to Moore (1985), upstream areas in a northern Japanese 
village, having greater resources than downstream areas, had a higher rate of household formation 
during the 108-year period. He also discusses the controversy surrounding the ie system.

Evidence Bearing on the 
Theory©s Implications
This chapter begins with a test of the proposition that transaction costs 
are lower in Japan than in the United States. It will then look at some of 
the observed phenomena related to the implications of the theory dis 
cussed in chapter 2: the importance of bonus payments in Japan; the 
structure of compensation; and the differences between Japan and 
the United States in on-the-job human capital investments, and in the 
adjustments of employment, hours of work, and inventories to fluctua 
tions in product demand.
Is there evidence that transaction costs in fact are lower in Japan than 
in the United States? As discussed in chapter 2, this is not an easy 
question to answer, as transaction costs are not directly measurable. 
However, even with the paucity of data, it is possible to shed light on this 
issue by posing the question, if transaction costs in the labor market 
were lower in Japan than in the United States, what kinds of phenomena 
would one expect to observe? This question is addressed here by 
focusing on how the quit-dismissal distinction may be related to eco 
nomic conditions in the two countries.
Distinction Between Quits and Dismissals
Our theory suggests that the lower the transaction costs between 
employer and employees, the less clear the distinction between quits and 
dismissals will be. Indeed, if transaction costs were zero, such a distinc 
tion would be meaningless, as both employee and employer would make 
exactly the same, and efficient, separation decisions. In this case, it 
would be inconsequential whether a separation is labeled as a dismissal
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because the employer initiated it, or as a quit because the employee was 
the initiator. If transaction costs were positive, the employer©s separation 
decision would be different from the employee©s, and neither decision 
would be efficient. (See Hashimoto and Yu 1980 for an elaboration.) As 
a result, the efficiency implication of a separation would depend on who 
initiates the separation, and the quit-dismissal distinction would be 
clear. The higher the transaction costs, the lower the frequency of 
efficient separations relative to inefficient separations will be, and there 
fore the higher the likelihood that the quit-dismissal distinction is 
meaningful. Our theory posits transaction costs to be higher, and there 
fore the quit-layoff distinction to be more pronounced, in the United 
States than in Japan.
Whether or not the quit-layoff distinction is meaningful has been 
investigated recently by three labor economists in the United States 
(McLaughlin 1987; Peters 1986; Antel 1985). McLaughlin began by 
asserting that the distinction doesn©t matter, and claimed to have found 
evidence for his assertion for the U.S. labor market. However, the 
version of his paper made available to me did not spell out what one 
would expect to find if the distinction mattered. As a result, his study 
does not seem to be a direct test of how meaningful the distinction is.
Peters used a similar argument as the one underlying my previous 
model (Hashimoto 1981) and examined transaction costs in the U.S. 
divorce market. She concluded that divorce tends to occur when it is 
efficient, i.e., transaction costs in the divorce market are low. Finally, 
Antel developed a test of my earlier model (Hashimoto 1981), which he 
applied to the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey. His findings indicate 
that the quit-layoff distinction is meaningful in the U.S. labor market, 
thereby confirming that transaction costs are positive there. The reader 
is left to evaluate the relative merits of these studies; to my knowledge, 
there have been no studies on this issue using Japanese data.
It would be interesting to replicate Antel©s test using microdata for 
Japan, but unfortunately such data are unavailable. Instead, one must 
rely on aggregate data to investigate this issue. The hypothesis exam 
ined here is that the quit-dismissal distinction in Japan is less closely 
related to economic conditions than it is in the United States. One would
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expect that in Japan, where transaction costs are hypothesized to be low, 
it would be unclear as to which party initiated separation in a large 
number of the cases. As a result, the reported distinction in Japan would 
tend to be arbitrary and independent of economic conditions. In the 
United States, where transaction costs are hypothesized to be high, the 
employer and employee would make their own separation decisions in 
response to exogenous changes in labor demand, and their decisions 
would be reported either as layoffs or quits, depending on which party 
made them. One would expect, therefore, that the reported distinction 
between these separation categories would tend to be more random and 
less related to economic conditions in Japan than in the United States.
Before proceeding with the testing, a brief discussion is in order on 
the data sources. For the United States, two data sources reported in the 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, are used. One classifies the stock of unemployed persons by 
whether they are job-leavers or job-losers. The other source, though 
discontinued as of 1981, reports the flow of monthly labor turnover in 
manufacturing, broken down by quits and layoffs for previous years. For 
those years, I use the annual averages of the monthly series.
The Japanese situation is a little more complicated. One must first 
face the question of how to distinguish between quits and dismissals (or 
layoffs), as the Japanese data do not directly distinguish between the two 
categories. I use the data from two surveys, both reported in Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics (Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, 
Ministry of Labour, Sections B and C in various years). The Maigetsu 
Kinro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labor Survey) reports monthly labor 
turnover rates for some nine industries, but it does not break them down 
into quits and dismissals. The only published data source that can be 
used for our purpose is the Koyo Rodo Tokei (Survey on Employment 
Statistics), which reports on the annual number of separated persons 
grouped by reason for separation. Although this survey does not ex 
plicitly classify separations as quits or dismissals, the stated reasons for 
separations facilitate such classification.
In particular, I define quits to be those whose separations are due to 
employees© misdeeds, employees© conveniences, or marriage and con-
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finement, and dismissals to be separations due to termination of contract 
or to employer©s convenience. 1 The reader is cautioned that these data 
pertain only to regular employees, not to temporary employees or day 
laborers. As a result, our findings cannot be generalized to the labor 
turnover situation for the whole Japanese economy. However, since our 
theory is concerned with the turnover situation for regular, or similar, 
workers who invest in employment relations, our findings do offer valid 
evidence. 2
To test if the quit-dismissal distinction is meaningful in the two 
countries, I estimated the following regression for the quit and dismissal 
rates, and for the ratio of quit and dismissal rates:
Yt=a0+a lLGNP+a2Time, (1)
where Yt is quit or dismissal rate or the quit-dismissal ratio, LGNP is the 
deviation of the logarithm of the real gross national product from its 
trend, and Time is the time trend variable. 3 The regression estimates are 
reported in table 4.1.
The regression coefficient of immediate interest is a l . Our hypothesis 
predicts it to be less statistically significant in Japan than in the United 
States. As is clear in table 4.1, the estimates of a l are insignificant in all 
of the Japanese regressions, but are significant with predicted signs in all 
of the U.S. regressions except for the quit regression for all industry. 4
An eye-opener is the result for manufacturing, where the number of 
observations are identical for both countries. All of the estimates of a { 
for the United States are statistically significant at conventional levels, 
but none of the Japanese estimates are. The U.S. findings of statistically 
significant a l coefficients positive in the regressions for quit rates and 
the quit-layoff ratio and negative in the layoff regression reaffirm what 
is known already; namely, in the United States quit rates rise, and layoff 
rates fall, when economic conditions improve, and vice versa when they 
deteriorate. As a result, the ratio of quits to layoffs rises during upturns. 
No such pattern emerges in the Japanese regressions. The evidence 
presented in table 4.1 offers support of the proposition that transaction 
costs are lower in Japan, at least for regular workers, than in the United 
States, and that the U.S. labor market is characterized by what Hall and 
Lazear (1984) called an "excess sensitivity of layoffs and quits to 
demand" (PP-233-257).
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Table 4.1 Quit-Dismissal Distinction in Japan and the United States 
Intercept LGNP Time R 2
(f-values in parentheses) 
Japan
All Industry (1955-85)
(1) Quit 5.076 (4.1) 0.707 (0.5) 0.127 (1.9) 0.83
(2) Dismissal 1.082(12.6) 0.244 (0.9) 0.004 (0.9) 0.09
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2) 5.168 (3.9) -1.770 (-0.8) 0.080 (1.1) 0.53
Manufacturing (1955-85)
(1) Quit 11.138 (7.0) -1.379 (-0.8) -0.039 (-0.5) 0.76
(2) Dismissal 2.597 (9.6) 0.612 (0.8) -0.020 (-1.3) 0.16
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2) 5.145 (4.1) -2.597 (-1.3) -0.007 (-0.1) 0.45
United States
All Industry (1967-83)
(1) Quit 455.766 (6.6) -23.311 (-0.1) 28.178 (4.5) 0.93
(2) Layoff 478.483 (1.4) -28.597 (-4.1) 281.759 (8.3) 0.91
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2) 0.399(15.9) 2.299 (4.1) -0.012 (-5.1) 0.79
Manufacturing (1951-81)
(1) Quit 2.191 (7.8) 13.035 (5.0) -0.015 (-1.0) 0.69
(2) Layoff 1.892(17.0) -14.864 (-11.1) -0.018 (-3.1) 0.88
(3) RATIO:
(l)/(2) 1.243 (4.8) 20.113 (6.1) -0.008 (-0.5) 0.70
SOURCES: Japan Ministry of Labour, Yearbook of Labour Statistics; Japan Productivity Center, 
Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statistics) 1988,1989,1990; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1985.
NOTES: LGNP is the deviation of the logarithm of the real GNP from its trend. These regressions 
adjust for a first degree autoregression in the residuals. See text for discussions on the definitions of 
quits and layoffs.
Bonus Payments and the Compensation Structure
There is little doubt that the most distinguishing characteristic of the 
Japanese compensation system is the importance of the bonus in earn 
ings. Bonus payments are ubiquitous in Japan, being commonly made 
to both blue-collar and white-collar workers (Hashimoto 1979; Hashi- 
moto and Raisian 1987a,b; Freeman and Weitzman 1987). Bonuses are
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Table 4.2 Percent of Annual Total Cash Earnings Paid in Bonuses: 
_______________Japan (1951-1987)_______________
Workers in All Industries Workers in Manufacturing Industries
Size of Employment Size of Employment
5+ 5-29 30+ 5+ 5-29 30 +
1951
1955
1959
1963
1967
1971
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
na
na
16.5
19.9
20.9
23.1
23.8
23.9
23.1
23.1
23.0
na
na
11.0
14.4
15.3
17.4
18.4
17.7
17.0
17.4
17.8
13.6
14.4
18.0
21.3
22.4
24.8
26.1
26.4
25.5
25.4
25.2
na
na
15.8
19.0
20.1
22.9
23.1
23.5
22.8
22.6
22.1
na
na
7.3
11.4
12.7
15.2
15.8
15.2
14.2
14.0
13.5
12.5
12.6
17.5
20.6
21.5
24.5
25.0
25.5
24.8
24.7
24.2
SOURCES: Calculated from the Maigetsu Klnro Tokei Chosa (Monthly Labour Survey) as 
reported in Japan Policy Planning and Research Department, Ministry of Labour, the Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics, 1988.
NOTES: Bonus payments are based on the official data on special payments of which the bulk is 
bonus payments.
usually paid twice a year, once in July a gift-giving season coinciding 
with obon (the occasion when the spirits of the deceased are cele 
brated) and in December a time to prepare for the new year.
In previous work, I hypothesized that the Japanese bonus payment 
represents the worker©s share in the returns to the investment in firm- 
specific human capital, and presented the analysis of that hypothesis 
(Hashimoto 1979). Based on this argument, the greater bonus propor 
tions in Japan, as compared to those in the United States, can be viewed 
as reflecting the greater importance of firm-specific human capital in 
Japan. More recently, Freeman and Weitzman (1987) argued that the 
bonus is, at least in part, a profit-sharing payment to workers. Whether 
bonus payments reflect workers© shares in their firm-specific human 
capital (Hashimoto 1979) or an aspect of a shared economy (Weitzman 
1984), there is no question that an average Japanese worker counts on
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bonus payments as a dependable source of income year after year. 
During the bonus seasons, the public media are full of advertisements by 
banks and retailers attempting to attract bonus money. Table 4.2 indi 
cates that the bonus payment makes up a sizable share of the annual 
earnings of Japanese workers, that its relative importance is greater for 
workers in larger firms, and that its share tended to increase after 1951 
to at least the early 1980s. 5
The high proportion of bonus payments in worker compensation 
appears to be unique to Japan. 6 Table 4.3 summarizes compensation 
categories for production workers in manufacturing industries in Japan 
and the United States. The proportions of total compensation for direct, 
indirect, and legally required insurance differed little between the two 
countries. For example, in 1981, direct payments consisting of wages, 
salaries, and bonuses amounted to about 75 percent of total compensa 
tion in the United States and 77 percent in Japan. Indirect payments 
(nonmonetary benefits) consisting of paid leave, in-kind payments, and 
other nonpecuniary benefits amounted to about 17 percent in the United 
States and 15 percent in Japan, and legally required insurance, such as 
unemployment insurance, amounted to less than 8 percent in both 
countries. It is in the composition of direct payments, i.e., wages and 
salaries vs. bonuses, that one finds a sharp contrast between the two 
countries. Bonuses for production workers are extremely rare in the 
United States, amounting to less than 1 percent of total compensation, 
whereas in Japan they amounted to 21 percent of total compensation and 
more than 27 percent of direct compensation.
The importance of bonus payments appears to have increased in Japan 
over time, but in the United States, the trend appears, if anything, to be 
downward. 7 During the period examined in table 4.3, Japanese direct 
compensation declined in relative importance, but this decline was due 
solely to a declining proportion of wages and salaries (see rows (3) and 
(1)). The relative importance of the bonus in Japan increased between 
1965 and 1971, while it remained unchanged between 1971 and 1981. 
Note also that both nonmonetary benefits and legally required insurance 
grew in importance in Japan as well as in the United States during this 
period. Finally, Japanese bonus payments do not appear to be incentive
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Table 4.3 Structure of Compensation Costs for Production Workers
in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing Industries
(Percent)
Japan United States 
1965 1971 1981 1966 1972 1981
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Wages and Salaries
Bonuses
Sum of (1) and (2)
Nonmonetary Benefits
Pay for Leave Time
Pay In-Kind
Benefits
Legally Required
Insurance
Total
64.
18.
82.
12.
3.
4.
4.
4.
100
6
2
8
3
2
2
9
8
61.
21.
82.
12.
3.
4.
5.
5.
100
,2
,3
,5
,3
,2
,1
,0
,2
56
21,
77,
15
4
4,
6
7,
100
,1
.3
.4
.1
.5
.4
.2
.5
82.
0.
83.
11.
5.
-
5.
5.
100
4
6
0
4
6
8
5
79.0
0.5
79.5
14.4
6.2
-
8.2
6.2
100
74.1
0.4
74.5
17.5
6.7
-
10.8
7.9
100
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (1989), table 150. 
NOTES: Figures don©t always add up to the indicated totals because of rounding. Wages and 
salaries include basic time and piece rates, plus overtime premiums and shift differentials. Bonuses 
include all bonuses and premiums not paid monthly. Pay for leave time includes pay for vacation, 
holidays, and personal leave. Sick leave pay is included in benefits. Pay in-kind includes the cost to 
the employer of goods and services provided free or at reduced costs, such as food or housing, or 
cash allowances paid in lieu of pay in-kind. Benefits include private benefit plans. Japanese data 
refer to regular employees in establishments with 30 or more regular employees.
payments, as conditions for receiving bonuses are rarely stated in 
employment contracts. 8
I have argued elsewhere that bonus payments contribute to flexible 
wages in Japan (Hashimoto 1979; Hashimoto and Raisian 1987a). It 
should be noted, however, that flexibility is evident in all components of 
earnings. It is well-documented in the literature that the base wage in 
Japan is quite flexible, as it is renegotiated every spring at the time of 
shunto (spring offensive). 9 The greater wage flexibility in Japan, as 
compared to the United States, conforms to the prediction of the theory 
developed in chapter 2.
Earnings Profiles and Worker Investment in Human Capital
I have argued in chapter 2 that there is greater investment in human 
capital on the job in Japan than in the United States. The hypothesis is
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that this greater investment is the result of lower transaction costs, which 
encourage the investment in information reliability and/or a lower cost 
of investing in employees© technical skills.
On-the-job investment in human capital is ubiquitous in Japanese 
firms. It is more extensive in larger firms, but its existence among 
medium-sized and small companies should not be understated (Hashi- 
moto and Raisian 1985). It would be incorrect, though, to conclude that 
American workers have less human capital overall than Japanese work 
ers, as many U.S. workers receive training through formal channels, 
such as business schools, prior to entering the labor market. The point 
here is that on-the-job investment is more important, relative to total 
investment, in Japan than in the United States.
The following quotation (Hanami 1981) effectively conveys the im 
portance in Japan of investment in human capital on the job:
... most of the employees are recruited when they are fresh out of 
high school or college; the Japanese educational system as a whole is 
oriented more toward general education than toward vocational 
training. Therefore, an enterprise must train its labor force, either in 
its own training facilities or on the job. During their long career at 
the same enterprise, workers are likely to be transferred from one 
job to another. They are trained and retrained, especially after each 
move.. .(pp.28-29).
This description is in sharp contrast with the tendency for U.S. employ 
ers to want their new hires to "come in the door having the craft, not 
trying to learn the craft," and to expect them to "contribute to the bottom 
line immediately." 10
Earnings Profiles
Consistent with the claim that there is more investment in worker 
skills on the job in Japan than in the United States, Raisian and I found 
that earnings typically grow more rapidly with tenure for Japanese 
workers than for American workers (Hashimoto 1985). Also, firm- 
specific experience has a greater earnings-boost effect than other types 
of experience in Japan, the reverse of the U.S. pattern.
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Table 4.4 Importance of Firm-Specific Job Experience
in Earnings Profiles 
(Male Nonagricultural Workers in Japan and the United States)
Growth in Earnings to Peak Year Due to:
Firm- Ratio
Peak Total Specific 
Year Experience (%) Experience (%) (3)/(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Japan
Small Firms
Medium Firms
Large Firms
United States
Small Firms
Medium Firms
Large Firms
24
33
27
25
30
30
235.6
267.4
242.8
140.0
98.6
109.7
150.4
141.0
205.2
57.9
28.9
52.6
.638
.527
.845
.414
.293
.479
SOURCE: This table is based on Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), table 6.
NOTE: These magnitudes are calculated from regression estimates of earnings profiles, holding
constant schooling and union status (for the United States).
Table 4.4 documents these patterns. This table is excerpted from the 
findings reported in Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, table 6). We ran 
regressions of the logarithm of earnings on a number of variables, 
including years of tenure, total years of experience, and schooling. 
Using the estimated regression coefficients, we then constructed earn 
ings profiles for typical workers in Japan and the United States up to the 
years when the earnings reached their peaks. Interestingly, the peak 
years, reported in column (1), are not very different between the two 
countries.
Column (2) reports the percentage growth in earnings between the 
first year of employment and the peak year. The magnitudes in column 
(2) represent d(logY)/dj obtained as follows. Think of the logarithm of 
earnings, log Y, as being generated by a function/^©, ri), where./ is total 
years of experience and n is years of tenure. Then(dlog7)/d/ =
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d(\ogY)/dj+d(\QgY)/dn, since dnldj= 1 for a worker who stays with the 
firm until retirement. The terms on the right-hand side can be estimated 
as the regression coefficients b and c, respectively, in the regression: 
\ogY=a+bj+cn+ .... n A typical Japanese worker who continues to 
work in a small firm is estimated to experience an almost 236 percent 
growth in earnings. In contrast, earnings for an American counterpart 
are expected to grow by only 140 percent.
According to the human capital hypothesis, earnings grow with 
employment tenure because employees acquire both general and firm- 
specific experience. Columns (3) and (4) document the relative impor 
tance of firm-specific experience in the total earnings growth. The 
magnitudes in column (3) are calculated from d(logY)/dn in the above 
equation. Column (4), which reports the ratios of column (3) to column 
(2), indicates that for the typical Japanese worker in a small firm almost 
64 percent of the earnings growth a little over 150 of the 235.6 
percentage points is due to firm-specific experience. For a U.S. coun 
terpart, a little over 41 percent-about 58 of the 140 percentage-point 
growth in earnings  is attributable to firm-specific experience. Thus, 
firm-specific experience dominates general experience in raising earn 
ings in Japan, but the opposite pattern is true in the United States. The 
same Japanese-American contrast is observed for medium-sized and 
large firms as well. 12
Long-Term Employment
Investments in employment relationships result in long-term employ 
ment relationships. The so-called lifetime employment, shushin koyo, 
system in Japan exemplifies this connection. The term is obviously an 
exaggeration, as most workers do have to retire at a prespecified retire 
ment age that is early by the American standard. 13 The term is a useful 
one nevertheless, because it conveys the notion of the long-term employ 
ment relationship that exists in Japan. To be sure, long-term employ 
ment is observed outside Japan as well, but it seems indisputable that the 
average Japanese worker stays with the same employer for a longer 
period of time than an American counterpart. 14
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The fact that Japanese workers don©t change jobs as often as American 
workers was demonstrated in my earlier work with Raisian (Hashimoto 
and Raisian 1985, table 2). We found that in both countries job ac 
cumulations are concentrated in the early work years, but stabilize much 
sooner in Japan than in the United States. A typical Japanese male was 
estimated to hold slightly more than 4.9 jobs before retiring, in contrast 
to his American counterpart who was projected to hold about 11 jobs. 
For females, the comparable figures were a little over 5 for Japanese 
females and a little over 10 for American females. 15 These magnitudes 
indicate that job turnover over the life cycle is notably smaller in Japan 
than in the United States.
We reported another finding on the relative prevalence of long-term 
employment relationships. That evidence had to do with the proportion 
of workers who stayed with the same employers for 15 years 
(Hashimoto and Raisian 1985, table 1). We found that, of Japanese male 
workers who were 20-24 years old in 1962 and had worked five years or 
less by then, 45.1 percent were with the same employers 15 years later. 
The comparable magnitude for American male workers was 13 percent. 
Of those who had worked over five years by 1962, the proportion was 
more than 65 percent for Japanese males and about 30 percent for U.S. 
males. Similar contrasts were obtained for other age groups as well. 
Clearly, long-term employment has been more prevalent in Japan than in 
the United States. We also found that those with more than 10 years of 
tenure constituted a greater proportion of male employees in Japan than 
in the United States, for both small and large firms. In both countries, a 
greater proportion of employees was found to have long-term employ 
ment in larger companies. Also, long-term employment was found to 
prevail in Japan even among small firms, though to a smaller extent than 
in large establishments.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that job mobility in Japan has shown 
signs of increasing in recent years. As Aoki (1990) notes, some large 
Japanese firms, as well as foreign firms located in Japan, responded to 
the shortage of specialists and skilled workers by recruiting mid-career 
personnel. To what extent such a trend will spread to the overall labor
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market in Japan, possibly phasing out the long-term employment prac 
tice there, remains to be seen.
Worker Investment in Human Capital
How large are on-the-job investments in Japan and the United States? 
This question was addressed earlier (Hashimoto and Raisian 1988) by 
computing investment magnitudes for the two countries. Although this 
question is discussed in detail in our paper, it is worthwhile to bring 
together the evidence here, given its relevance to the present theory. Let 
me present the findings in as nontechnical a way as possible, leaving the 
technical procedure to the appendix to this chapter. A reader wishing to 
follow every step of the calculation procedure might find it useful to read 
the appendix first.
The computation procedure we used is based on Mincer©s (1974) 
model, which in turn was an extension of the original model by Becker 
(1962). I summarize briefly the main points of the procedure by refer 
ring to figure 4.1. In that figure, workers who decide not to invest in 
human capital are assumed to earn a competitive value of E0, or earnings 
without investment, throughout their careers. If they were to invest part 
of their potential earnings in any year, they would receive the values 
indicated by the schedule labeled "earnings with investment." The 
potential earnings in the y©th year of tenure is given by Yj+Cj. The 
overtaking year, j*, occurs when the earnings with and without invest 
ment are equal to each other. Earnings peak atj? for those who invest. 
Finally, the shaded area indicates the total amount invested in human 
capital. This amount is what was computed.
To perform the computation, it was necessary first to estimate 
earnings-tenure profiles, holding constant other determinants of earn 
ings. The earnings profiles were estimated by ordinary least squares 
using the following familiar specification:
In Y=a+bg + cg2 +dj+fj2 +hX+u, (2) 
where Y represents usual weekly wages for U.S. data and average
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Figure 4.1 Earnings Growth and Investment
Potential 
Earnings
Overtaking 
Year (/)
Earnings With 
Investment
Earnings Without 
Investment
Peak 
Year (/)
Tenure (y)
monthly earnings (including bonuses) for Japanese data; g is an estimate 
of years of previous experience (age minus education minus years of 
current job tenure minus six); j is years of tenure on current employ 
ment; Xis a vector of control variables; u is the error term, and a, b, c, 
d, f, and h are parameters to be estimated. 16 For Japan, X stands for 
dummy variables for schooling categories. For the United States, X 
includes a union-status variable along with schooling variables.
Table 4.5 presents a summary of the characteristics of earnings 
profiles we estimated along with the computed values of investment 
magnitudes. The underlying data for Japan are from the Chingin Kozo 
Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of Wage Structure) for 1980. These data are 
available as cell averages cross-classified by education, firm size, years 
of tenure, industry, age of worker, and occupation. Regression estimates 
were obtained by weighting each of the variables by the square root of 
the cell frequency. Data for the United States are from the May 1979 
Current Population Survey containing observations on individual work-
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ers. We restricted the sample to male workers in private nonagricultural 
industries for both countries.
As the chapter 4 appendix explains, the initial step in computing the 
investment magnitudes in table 4.5 is to select an appropriate overtaking 
year, which is when the current earnings of an investor become equal to 
those of a noninvestor. It was determined that five years is a plausible and 
theoretically consistent value (see the chapter appendix for this deter 
mination). Using this value for the overtaking year, earnings for a 
worker in a small Japanese firm in a nonagriculture sector are found to 
peak in the 13th year of tenure at a value of 293 thousand yen per month 
(column 1, table 4.5). The monetary value of investment is calculated to 
be 6.9 million yen, which is equivalent to 2.3 years© worth of time. The 
comparable investment magnitude for the United States is 1.3 years, a 
substantially smaller investment.
As for workers in large Japanese nonagricultural firms, the overtak 
ing year of seven was chosen, using the procedure outlined in the chapter 
appendix. Using this value, the earnings are found to peak in the 25th 
year at a monthly value of 444 thousand yen (column 2, table 4.5). The 
monetary investment amounts to 19.3 million yen, or 4.8 years© worth of 
time, much larger than for workers in small companies. The compara 
ble investment magnitude for the United States is 2.2 years. Thus, the 
firm-size difference in investment is larger in Japan than in the United 
States. The results for Japanese manufacturing firms generally conform 
to those for nonagricultural companies, but firm-size contrast in the 
United States is less clear for manufacturing than for the overall non- 
agricultural sector. 17 Evidently, workers in large U.S. manufacturing 
companies do not invest much more than those in small businesses.
It appears then that Japanese employees invest more in human capital 
than their counterparts in the United States. The investment in non- 
agricultural enterprises measured in years is almost 77 percent greater 
for small firms, and 118 percent larger for large companies, in Japan 
than in the United States. Interestingly, the rates of return were found to 
be rather similar for the two countries. 18 The investment magnitudes 
reported above refer to total investments. What is relevant to our theory, 
of course, is investment in firm-specific human capital. Under the
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Table 4.5 Summary of Earnings-Tenure Profiles in Japan and 
the United States by Firm Size
Nonagricultural
Industries 
Small Large 
Firms Firms
Manufacturing
Industries 
Small Large 
Firms Firms
Japan:
Overtaking Year 
Peak Year
Monthly Earnings in 
Overtaking Year
Monthly Earnings in 
Peak Year
Estimated Investments
 In Thousands of Yen 
 In Years
United States:
Overtaking Year 
Peak Year
Weekly Earnings in 
Overtaking Year
Weekly Earnings in 
Peak Year
Estimated Investments
 In Dollars 
 In Years
5 
13
213.41
292.84
6,942 
2.3
5 
20
275.98
338.22
19,209 
1.3
7 
25
241.11
444.20
19,313 
4.8
6 
30
322.12
445.38
41,564 
2.2
5 
13
194.93
278.10
7,269 
2.6
5 
25
268.91
360.12
25,807 
1.7
7 
30
223.83
480.05
22,271 
5.5
5 
31
312.84
418.43
28,838 
1.6
SOURCES: Summarized from Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b, 1988). The underlying data are: 
for Japan, the Basic Survey of Employment (1980); and for the United States, the Current 
Population Survey (May 1979).
NOTES: The dependent variables in the underlying regressions are the natural logarithms of 
monthly earnings (including bonus payments) measured in thousands of yen and usual weekly 
earnings measured in dollars for Japan and the United States, respectively. The explanatory 
variables include tenure, previous experience, schooling, and union status. The samples are for 
male workers. Small firms are those with 1-99, and large firms with 1,000 or more, regular 
employees.
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standard assumption that the amount of firm-specific human capital is 
positively associated with total investment, the above findings of greater 
worker investment in total human capital implies that there is greater 
worker investment in firm-specific human capital in Japan than in the 
United States. 19
Before leaving table 4.5, one limitation of the data used for the 
calculations should be noted. In particular, the above calculations use 
only the data on earnings and ignore payments to pension funds and to 
other fringe benefits. It is possible that the returns to investments accrue 
in these payments as well as in earnings. Unfortunately, the available 
data do not contain enough information on these payments to facilitate 
their inclusion in the calculation procedure. If the size of the shaded area 
in figure 4.1 is positively associated with these other payments, our 
Japanese-American and firm-size comparisons are valid. 20
The above results reinforce the evidence based on bonus payments, 
which were found to be more extensively used in Japan than in the 
United States (see table 4.3). Therefore, the investment magnitudes just 
discussed can be viewed, together with the greater prevalence of bonus 
payments in Japan than in the United States, as supporting the prediction 
of our theory that Japanese workers invest more in the employer- 
employee relationship than do their American counterparts.
Sensitivity of Labor Inputs to Output Changes
Temporary workers, day laborers, and female workers in Japan 
experience greater volatility in employment than male regular workers, 
providing cushions for demand fluctuations in the long-term employ 
ment environment for regular workers. Table 4.6 documents this ten 
dency, using the data for the manufacturing industry. 21 It reports the 
regression results relating year-to-year changes in employment to sim 
ilar changes in output, separately for regular workers and temporary 
workers and day laborers. The coefficients associated with output indi 
cate the extent of employment sensitivity in elasticity terms. For exam 
ple, the output coefficient for male regular workers of 0.3121 indicates
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Table 4.6 Employment Sensitivity to Changes in Output 
Japanese Manufacturing, 1959-88
Coefficient
Males
Output
Constant
R-Square
Females
Output
Constant
R-Square
Regular Temporary Workers 
Workers and Day Laborers
.3121 
(4.84)
-.0102
(-1.47)
.445
.5570 
(4.49)
-.0291
(-2.16)
.406
.6152 
(1.68)
-.0482
(-1.22)
.061
.9149 
(3.11)
-.0283
(-.89)
.236
SOURCES: Rodoryoku Chosa (Labor Force Survey) as reported in Japan Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics, 1988, 1989, 1990. The output data are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook 
of Labor Statistics (1989), table 146.
NOTES: Figures in parentheses are f-values. Coefficients are OLS estimates of a and b in Dy=a 
+bDz+e, where Dy and Dz are year-to-year changes in the logarithm of, respectively, the 
dependent variables and manufacturing output, and e is the regression error term.
that a 1 percent increase in the rate of output production is associated 
with a one-third percent increase in the employment of regular workers. 
It is clear that, for both sex groups, temporary workers and day 
laborers exhibit greater employment sensitivities to output changes than 
regular workers. Note also that the output coefficient for male regular 
workers is about 78 percent of the coefficient for female regular workers 
(0.3121 vs. 0.5570), is almost half the size of that for male temporary 
and day laborers (0.3121 vs. 0.6152), and one-third the size of that for 
female temporary and day workers (0.3121 vs. 0.9149). Evidently, 
female temporary workers and day laborers experience the most vol 
atility in employment of the four groups studied in table 4.6. A similar 
regression for U.S. manufacturing employment reveals an output sen-
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sitivity of 0.5802. 22 It is interesting that output sensitivities for male 
temporary workers and female regular workers in Japan are similar to 
the output sensitivity for the American workers as a whole. Male regular 
workers in Japan do experience the least employment sensitivity to 
changes in output.
The regression results in table 4.6 suggest that the lifetime employ 
ment of Japanese male regular workers is supported by the cushions 
provided by female workers and temporary and day workers. These 
regressions are rather simplistic, however. They do not distinguish 
employment responses to anticipated and unanticipated changes in the 
rate of production, for example. It is also desirable to incorporate the 
possible interdependence among employment, hours of work, and 
inventories.
We saw earlier that male manufacturing workers in Japan invest more 
in firm-specific human capital than do those in the United States. 23 If so, 
the sensitivity of labor inputs to changes in demand should differ 
systematically between the two countries. In particular, employment 
should be less responsive, and hours of work and inventories more 
responsive, to changes in the product demand for Japanese than for 
American workers. How does the pattern of sensitivity in labor input 
differ between the countries? Does it depend on whether changes in 
product demand are anticipated or unforeseen? Is there evidence that the 
Japanese response pattern changed after the slowdown in its economic 
growth in the early 1970s?
To investigate these questions, I adopt the labor demand model 
developed by Topel (1982), which is an extension of the interdepen 
dent factor demand model originally developed by Nadiri and Rosen 
(1973). 24
The model contains three equations corresponding to three endoge 
nous variables: employment, hours of work, and inventories. Invento 
ries are relevant for employment adjustments. 25 A firm has a choice of 
responding to fluctuations in its product demand by adjusting its current 
level of labor use, changing its inventories, or engaging in a combina 
tion of both. Also, faced with an increase in the forecasted future 
demand for its product, the firm may not want to wait for the increased
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demand to materialize before increasing its output. Instead, it may hire 
more workers now and/or ask the existing workers to work overtime to 
build up inventories. These considerations suggest that the exogenous 
variable in the model is the product demand, and it is represented here 
by forecasted values of shipments as well by the unforeseen deviations in 
the current shipments from its forecasted value.
The model consists of three interdependent demand equations as 
follows:
qt, Time Trend] (3) 
o 
T
Ht=fh[Et_ lt #,_!, /,_!, X,_ 15 e^ 2jqt+P qt , Time Trend] (4)
o
T
7,, Time
where/©s indicate that the left-hand side variables are functions of the 
variables appearing in the brackets; Et, Ht , and /, are employment, 
hours of work at time t (month), and inventories; Xt stands for invento 
ries of intermediate stocks and materials; e denotes the expected values; 
jS©s are the coefficients associated with the future values, qt+j, of 
shipments; and qt is unanticipated current demand. 26 All of the variables 
except the time trend variable are measured in natural logarithms.
The specification above is known as an interdependent stock- 
adjustment model of factor demand. The underlying theoretical model 
and the associated optimization problem are discussed in Topel (1982) 
and will not be repeated here. The expectation operator, e, refers to 
expectations formed by using the information available each month. The 
planning horizon, t, was specified alternatively as four months, six 
months, and nine months, but the findings differed little among those 
specifications. 27 As a result, only the findings based on the nine-month 
horizon are reported. The exogenous variable in the model is output 
demand as measured by. the forecasted shipments, qt , and by unforeseen 
deviations in the current shipments, qr Firms are assumed to choose the 
magnitudes of the endogenous variables by taking into account the
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forecasted current and future demand as well as unforeseen deviations in 
the current demand.
To construct the forecasted values of future shipments, it is assumed 
that they depend only on the past values of shipments and not on other 
endogenous variables. Since the underlying data are monthly, one must 
take account of seasonality. As a result, various seasonally differenced 
integrated-autoregressive-moving-average processes (ARIMA) were 
investigated, and the best ones were chosen to generate the forecasted 
values of shipment, eqt , which in turn are used as explanatory (ex 
ogenous) variables in estimating equations (3) through (5). 28
Before discussing the estimation of the model and the findings, let me 
address some problems in comparing data on employment, hours of 
work, and inventories between Japan and the United States. First, as 
noted in chapter 3, Japanese workers who are temporarily laid off (ichiji 
kyugyoshd) are counted as employed persons, but in the United States 
such persons would be counted as unemployed. 29 This difference is 
potentially troublesome for comparing the employment sensitivity to 
demand changes in the two countries. In particular, one would not detect 
in the Japanese data changes in employment due to temporary layoffs, as 
one would in the U.S. data. Thus, an estimate of employment sensitivity 
would be understated for Japan.
Although one should keep a healthy respect for this problem, it 
should be noted that temporary layoffs are rather rare in Japan. For 
example, those who are temporarily out of work for any reasons 
(kyugyoshd) amount to only about 2 percent of regular workers. 30 The 
ratio of male ichiji kyugyosha to male regular workers, if the data were 
available, almost surely would be much less than 2 percent. Therefore, I 
do not consider this issue to be serious enough to discourage a com 
parison of the employment sensitivity in the two countries as long as one 
bears in mind the potential for understating it for Japan. 31
The second issue concerns hours of work. Abraham and Houseman 
(1989) caution that the difference in the definition of hours of work 
between the two countries may distort a comparison of the hours 
coefficient: hours data refer to actual hours worked for Japan but to paid 
hours for the United States. For example, changes in the vacation
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schedule alter the actual hours of work while keeping paid hours 
unchanged. To the extent that this adjustment mode is used in both 
countries, the difference in the definition of hours of work would make 
the hours coefficient apparently smaller for the United States than for 
Japan even if, in fact, it were the same. 32
There is yet another difficulty with the hours data for Japan. As noted 
in chapter 2, typical Japanese regular workers spend a great deal of time 
with their colleagues and superiors after work hours talking about 
various aspects of work and personal lives over food and drinks, and 
generally investing in the employment relationship. 33 Such expendi 
tures of hours are unlikely to be reported in the data. Thus, the hours of 
work data for Japan tend to understate the true numbers of hours that 
typical workers spend in the marketplace, though perhaps the data 
accurately measure the actual hours directly spent on production. Total 
hours of work, including the informal time spent investing in the 
employment relationship, may respond less to changes in the demand 
for output than the hours spent on production.
TUrning to the third issue, it is generally agreed that Japanese firms are 
less vertically integrated than American firms, with the former relying 
on subcontractors to perform many of the production activities. As a 
result, some of the inventories, which would be counted as input 
inventories in U.S. firms, may be counted as output inventories in 
Japanese firms. 34 If the response of output inventory to output demand 
differs from that of input inventory to input demand, a comparison of 
inventory behavior for the two countries could be distorted, since the 
distinction between the two is ignored here.
Given the preceding difficulties in comparing data for the two coun 
tries, one needs to be cautious in interpreting the estimate of the model. 
If we were to find that the estimated employment sensitivity, which may 
be an underestimate of the true sensitivity in Japan, is greater in Japan 
than in the United States, we would have clear evidence refuting the 
prediction of our theory. However, if we were to find an opposite 
pattern namely, that employment sensitivity is smaller in Japan than in 
the United States we could not claim such findings to be conclusive. 
Instead, we could say only that the findings are consistent with the
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theory©s predictions. Similarly, our test can offer conclusive evidence 
only against, but not in support of, the prediction of the theory regard 
ing hours sensitivity: by finding that the estimated hours sensitivity, 
which may be an underestimate of the true value for the United States, is 
greater in the United States than in Japan, one would judge against the 
theory©s prediction.
The data used to estimate the model for both countries are monthly 
establishment data, seasonally unadjusted, for the manufacturing sec 
tor. Japanese data refer to regular workers for both sexes and U.S. data, 
to all workers. Unfortunately, the monthly U.S. data are not available by 
sex. The Japanese data are gathered from Japan Economic Planning 
Agency, Annual Report on Business Cycle Indicators, and the U.S. 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Statistics 1986, 
A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business and the Citibank 
Data File.
Of immediate interest are the coefficients associated with forecasted 
current shipments, those for forecasted future shipments (Ej8^, EjS^-, 
DjS3y, 7 = 1,2, ...), and those for unforeseen current demand shocks. 
The estimated coefficients are reported in table 4.7. It should be men 
tioned at the outset that the forecasting model estimate was less suc 
cessful for Japan than for the United States. 35 The causes for the poor 
Japanese results undoubtedly hidden in the data used could not be 
determined. The poor performance of the Japanese forecasting equation 
needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the findings.
Estimates of equations (3) through (5) were all statistically significant 
according to the F statistics (available upon request). In table 4.7, all 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. The coefficients associated 
with the short-run product-demand variables the forecasted current 
demand and unforeseen deviations in the current demand from its 
forecasted value are of direct interest. Although firms must have 
anticipated that there would be some deviations in the actual from the 
forecasted demand, the exact magnitude of the realized deviation is in 
fact unforeseen. As such, firms will respond by changing labor usage 
and the inventory level.
The theory predicts the coefficients for the labor input variables-
100 Evidence Bearing on the Theory©s Implications
Table 4.7 Adjustments of Labor Inputs to Demand
Japan United States
Employment Hours Inventories Employment Hours Inventories
(E) (#,) (/,) (£,) (Ht) (/,)
Forecasted Shipments
(1)
(2)
(3)
Unforeseen 
Deviations
Current
Future
0.0885 
(1.88)
0.0472 
(3.47)
-0.0555 
(1.89)
0.1200 
(1.57)
0.1423 
(1.88)
-0.0070 
(0.12)
-0.1073 
(-1-34)
-0.1811 
(7.80)
-0.0975 
(2.01)
0.2640 
(2.99)
0.1214 
(4.05)
-0.0745 
(1.50)
0.0950 
(2.55)
0.0053 
(0.41)
0.0891 
(4.18)
-0.0705 
(-1.89)
0.0049 
(0.37)
0.0247 
(1.16)
SOURCES: The magnitudes are based on author©s calculation using data from the following 
sources: Japan Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on Business Cycle Indicators (August 
1987); the computer data bank, Citibank Data File; U.S. Department of Commerce, The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Business Statistics 1986, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, 
1987.
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are f-values. The unforeseen deviations represent the difference 
between the actual shipment and the forecasted current shipment. The forecasted future shipment 
variables are based on nine-month forecasts, and the coefficients for future shipments are the sum of 
the coefficients for the eight months following the current month. The unanticipated shipment 
variable is the difference between the actual shipments and the current forecasted shipments.
employment and hours of work associated with the current demand 
variables to be positive and the coefficient for inventories to be negative. 
In other words, when the current product demand increases, employers 
increase both employment and hours of work, but reduce inventories, to 
meet the increased demand. As for coefficients associated with the 
forecasted future demand, or long-run changes in demand, the theory 
predicts coefficients for labor inputs and inventories to be all positive. 
Thus, when the future demand is expected to increase, firms begin 
building up inventories by increasing production now, and the increase 
in the current production entails increases in labor inputs. Also, to the 
extent that new employees need to be trained, companies may begin 
hiring in advance of future increases in demand. As will be seen, 
however, the findings associated with the forecasted future demand turn 
out to be weak and uninformative.
The results of direct interest for this study concern coefficient differ-
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ences between Japan and the United States and among the equations for 
employment, hours of work, and inventories. If there is a higher fixity of 
employment cost due to greater investments in firm-specific human 
capital in Japan than in the United States, one would predict the follow 
ing patterns of contrast in the coefficients for the unforeseen deviations 
in the current demand and for the current demand itself: (1) the coeffi 
cients for employment would be smaller in Japan; (2) the coefficients for 
hours of work and inventories would be greater in Japan; and (3) the 
coefficients for hours of work and inventories would be larger than those 
for employment in both countries. This last prediction follows from the 
usual premise that a higher fixed cost is associated with employment 
changes more than with changes in either hours of work or inventories.
The coefficients reported in table 4.7, rows (1) and (2) are consistent 
with the predictions except for the positive but statistically insignifi 
cant inventory coefficient in row (2) for the United States. The coeffi 
cients in row (1) indicate that employment responds much less to 
unforeseen deviations in the current demand in Japan (0.0885 and barely 
significant) than in the United States (0.2640 and significant). The same 
pattern of difference holds for the coefficient for the forecasted current 
demand (row (2)), with Japan having the coefficient of 0.0472 and the 
U.S.,0.1214, both statistically significant.
The weak employment response in Japan to short-run changes in 
product demand in contrast to the U.S. situation, in which employment 
responds significantly to these demand changes, is consistent with there 
being a greater fixity of employment in Japan than in the United States. 
Note also that for both unforeseen deviations and for the current de 
mand, the Japanese coefficients for hours of work and inventories are 
nominally (in absolute values) larger than for employment, but the 
opposite pattern is observed for U.S. coefficients. In fact, the U.S. 
coefficients for inventories are statistically insignificant. It appears, 
therefore, that Japanese manufacturing firms rely more on adjustments 
in hours of work and inventories relative to employment adjustment than 
their U.S. counterparts when faced with short-run changes in product 
demand. These findings are consistent with the proposition than in
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Japanese manufacturing high employment-cost fixity discourages the 
use of employment adjustments to short-run changes in demand.
According to table 4.7, in the hours equation the coefficient associ 
ated with unforeseen deviations in shipments is only slightly larger for 
Japan than for the United States (0.1200 and 0.0950). In the same 
equation, the coefficient for current demand is much larger for Japan 
than for the United States (0.1423 and 0.0053), but it is insignificant for 
both countries. In a recent paper, Abraham and Houseman (1989) 
concluded that the average hours in Japanese manufacturing adjust no 
more, and possibly less, than those in U.S. manufacturing. The findings 
in table 4.7 suggest that the average hours in Japanese manufacturing 
adjust slightly more than in U.S. manufacturing. The minor differences 
between their findings and mine, undoubtedly, are related to differences 
in the model specification and in the data used. 36
Given the difficulties of comparing the hours measure in the two 
countries, the extent of distortions in the comparison of the hours 
coefficient between the two is difficult to determine. What the findings in 
table 4.7 suggest, then, is that Japanese manufacturing relies relatively 
more on adjustments in inventory and in hours of work spent directly on 
production activities, while U.S. manufacturing relies relatively more 
on employment adjustment. It is noteworthy that the findings do not 
contradict the predictions of the theory. Given the problems associated 
with the employment and hours data noted earlier, however, the finding 
that the estimated employment and hours coefficients conform to the 
pattern predicted by our theory must be viewed with caution.
The coefficients for future shipments are mostly insignificant, and the 
signs for the coefficients are uninformative in row (3). Although our 
immediate interest is in the response coefficients to short-run changes in 
product demand, the rather ambiguous findings for the future shipment 
variable is disappointing. I have tried various equation specifications 
and forecasting mechanisms, but to no avail. These coefficients are 
based on a nine-month time horizon, but the coefficients based on three- 
and five-month horizons also were found to be insignificant. Taken 
literally, this finding suggests that the current level of input use, and 
particularly of employment, is not affected by forecasted future de-
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mand, a difficult proposition to accept. Moreover, the negative sign in 
the Japanese inventory equation is the opposite of the theoretical expec 
tation. 37 These anomalous findings are in contrast to the more sensible 
findings for short-run changes in product demand reported in rows (1) 
and (2). A plausible reason for the anomalies is that the estimated 
forecasting equation for Japan performs more poorly in forecasting 
future shipments than current shipments. If so, the forecasted future 
demand variables would contain an unknown number of measurement 
errors, and such errors would cause statistically insignificant estimates.
Japanese Experience in the Post-1975 Years
Japan experienced a rather drastic contraction in the growth rate of 
her economy after the first "oil shock," which began in late 1973. 38 As a 
result, many firms had to make major and sometimes painful-adjust 
ments in the utilization of labor. An important public policy response to 
this situation took place in 1975 in the form of the Employment Insur 
ance Law. This law shifted the emphasis away from the usual concept of 
an unemployment insurance subsidy directly provided to unemployed 
workers to a system in which subsidies are given to employers, who, in 
turn, provide compensation to workers on furlough. A noteworthy 
aspect of this law was that it enabled the furloughed workers to remain 
"employed" by the firm (Cole 1979; Taira and Levine 1985). Also, the 
law provided for subsidies in circumstances where employers wished to 
implement short-time schedules (Sorrentino 1976).
The changes that the Japanese economy experienced in the mid-1970s 
can be viewed as the emergence of cyclical labor markets. In the regime 
of high rates of economic growth such as those which prevailed in Japan 
before 1970, changes in output demand were likely to be viewed as 
reflecting long-run, or permanent, changes. After the mid-1970s, how 
ever, the rate of growth slowed substantially, and demand changes came 
to be viewed more as short-run business-cycle phenomena than perma 
nent changes. 39
To investigate if the interrelated factor demand functions shifted after 
mid-1970, I estimated the equations for employment, hours of work,
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Table 4.8 Adjustments of Inputs to Demand Shocks in Japan 
(Split Sample: January 1967-December 1974 and January 1975-December 1986)
Employment (£,)
Pre-1975 Post-1975 
Contrast
Hours (Ht)
Pre-1975 Post-1975 
Contrast
Inventories (/,)
Pre-1975 Post-1975 
Contrast
Forecasted Shipments
(1)
(2)
(3)
Unforeseen
Deviations
Current
Future
0.1663
(2.72)
0.0730
(3.71)
-0.0036
(0.10)
-0.1295
(-1.60)
-0.0423
(1.72)
-0.0853
(1.66)
-0.0623
(-0.71)
-0.1510
(1.38)
0.2726
(3.08)
0.1947
(2.07)
0.0955
(0.67)
-0.2342
(2.09)
-0.2294
(-1.93)
-0.2466
(6.44)
-0.0173
(0.23)
0.2372
(1.51)
0.0957
(2.00)
-0.1354
(1.36)
SOURCES: The magnitudes are based on author©s calculation using data from the following 
sources: Japan Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on Business Cycle Indicators (August 
1987).
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. The unforeseen deviations represent the difference 
between the actual shipment and the forecasted current shipment. The forecasted future shipment 
variables are based on nine-month forecasts, and the coefficients for future shipments are the sum of 
the coefficients for the eight months following the current month. The unanticipated shipment 
variable is the difference between the actual shipments and the current forecasted shipments.
and inventory (equations (3) through (5)) by splitting the sample as of 
December 1974, and allowing all the coefficients, except for the inter 
cept, to differ between the pre- and post-1975 years. The key coefficients 
are summarized in table 4.8. In this table, the columns labeled 
"post-1975 contrast" indicate the changes in the coefficients after Janu 
ary 1975. The F statistics for Chow test (not reported) indicate that 
the difference in the demand functions between the two periods is in 
deed statistically significant at conventional levels. Although not all 
of the coefficient differences are significant, some interesting patterns 
emerge.
If Japanese firms came to view demand changes more as cyclical and 
short-run phenomena rather than permanent phenomena after 1975, 
then one would expect the employment sensitivity to short-run demand 
changes to have decreased and the sensitivities of hours of work and 
inventories to have increased. Therefore, the coefficients of immediate
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interest are those for the post-1975 contrast. As table 4.8 shows, the 
signs for the coefficients for both the forecasted current demand and 
unforeseen deviations in the current demand agree with this proposition 
(rows (1) and (2)), though not all of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. 40
Taking the estimated coefficients at face value, employment appears 
to have become less sensitive to, and hours of work and inventories more 
sensitive to, short-run demand changes. On balance, therefore, the 
findings in rows (1) and (2) in table 4.8 point to the validity of the 
proposition in question, though the case is far from being watertight. As 
for the forecasted future demand reported in row (3), again the findings 
are as uninformative as those in table 4.7. The coefficients for hours 
of work and inventories have opposite signs to those which would 
be expected, and the coefficient for hours of work is statistically 
significant.
Summary
Our finding of greater ambiguity in Japan than in the United States for 
the distinction between quits and dismissals is indirect evidence for the 
proposition that transaction costs are lower in Japan. If so, theory posits 
that there is more investment in employment relationships in Japan 
than in the United States. The importance of bonus payments, the power 
of firm tenure in raising earnings, the prevalence of long-term em 
ployment, all point to the validity of this prediction. The investment 
magnitudes calculated from earnings-tenure profiles also agree with 
this prediction. In particular, Japanese male workers evidently invest 
more in the employer-employee relationship than do their American 
counterparts.
Consistent with the investment difference, Japanese employers seem 
to rely less on employment adjustments, and more on adjustments in 
hours of work and inventories, than U.S. employers when faced with 
changes in product demand. Indeed, employers in the United States 
appear to rely primarily on employment adjustments to address these
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changes. The greater reliance on employment adjustment in U.S. man 
ufacturing than in Japanese manufacturing undoubtedly contributes to 
the higher unemployment rates observed in the United States than 
in Japan, though the extent of such a contribution remains an open 
question.
Factor demand functions evidently shifted in Japan after the first oil 
shock of 1973. Although not overwhelming, the evidence by and large 
points to the conclusion that after 1975 changes in demand came to be 
viewed by the decisionmakers as temporary cyclical phenomena, 
whereas before 1975 such changes tended to be viewed as permanent.
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Chapter 4 Appendix 
Analytical Framework of Earnings Profiles
This appendix sketches the analytical framework and the procedure 
used in estimating the magnitudes reported in table 4.5. The following 
discussion is a review of the procedure discussed in greater detail in 
Hashimoto and Raisian (1988).
The slope of an earnings-tenure profile is frequently used as the sole 
measure to describe the profile. Comparisons based only on slope 
differences can be misleading, however. A greater slope does not neces 
sarily mean a greater investment in human capital. It is desirable, 
therefore, to examine a multitude of attributes to adequately describe the 
underlying properties of the wage-tenure profile. To account for the 
necessary attributes, Mincer©s model (1974) is adopted here.
Suppose a typical worker in the absence of human capital investment 
would earn a competitive wage of E0 throughout his or her career. This 
profile is depicted in figure 4. 1 . If the worker were to invest a portion of 
his or her earnings potential in any period, observed earnings for they©th 
year of tenure would amount to:
Y(j)=E0+ r(f)C(t)-C(j), (1) 
t = o
where r(t) and C(t) are, respectively, the rate of return and the amount of 
foregone earnings invested in year t. This relation is also displayed in 
figure 4. 1 , where Y(f) is referred to as earnings with investment. Figure 
4. 1 also indicates the potential earnings of the individual during they©th 
year of tenure, i.e., Yj+Cj. At the peak level of observed earnings, 
occurring atjp, investment in human capital ceases and C(/^)=0. It 
follows, assuming that r=r(t) for all t, that
(2)
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Total investment in monetary units is then given by:
jp j _
(3)
Total investment is depicted as the shaded area in figure 4.1, and 
depends on earnings in the peak year, earnings capacity without human 
capital accumulation, and the rate of return on investment.
Investments can also be measured in units of time. Defining the 
proportion of work time that an individual invests as k(j) = Cj/Ej with 
Ej=Yj+Cj, after some algebraic manipulations one obtains:
lnYj= lnE0+r ^ k(t) + ln[l -k(j)] (4) 
and
" *<*). (5)
The sum of the fractions of time invested is then given by: 
j"
and depends on the very same variables, transformed differently, as the 
monetary investments. Investments measured in monetary and time 
units, in (3) and (6) respectively, can be compared across countries as 
well as across firms of different sizes.
The estimation of the above model requires magnitudes that are not 
readily observable, namely, the alternative earning capacity, E0, and the 
rate of return on investments, r. To overcome this problem, we focus 
initially on Mincer©s (1974) concept of the overtaking year, j*, the year 
where observed earnings, Y(j*), are just equal to the earning capacity in 
the absence of investment, E0 (see figure 4.1). If Cj declines with tenure, 
as is expected theoretically, the overtaking year is bounded above by the 
following relationship:
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. (7)
For example, if the rate of return on investment is 10 percent, it will take 
less than 10 years for a worker who invests to overtake a similar worker 
who does not. To determine the rate of return, we solve for internal rates 
of return, i, by equating the present values of observed earnings with 
and without investments. This condition ensures the existence at the 
margin of both types of workers in equilibrium. The rate of return, r, is 
given by the relation:
where N is the last year of employment (see Blinder 1 976) . It is clear that 
r> i and as N becomes large, r approaches i.
Thus, our estimate begins by selecting an arbitrary overtaking year, 
7*, and then calculating the rate of return. A check is then performed to 
see whether the inequality in (7) is satisfied; if it is not, that overtaking 
year is discarded. Also, based on existing estimates of returns on post- 
school investments, we discard those overtaking years that imply a rate 
of return exceeding 30 percent. For an eligible overtaking year, esti 
mates of investments are obtained from (3) and (6).
There is another complication. Once we calculate total investments 
for a particular./* for, say, small firms, what values of/* should be used 
to calculate and compare the investment magnitudes for medium and 
large firms? We dealt with this question by selecting the overtaking years 
for medium and large firms by fixing the respective E0's so as to equalize 
rates of return across the firm-size groups. 41 Once E0 is established for 
either medium or large firms, the overtaking year can be inferred and the 
investment magnitudes calculated.
Although our empirical work specifies an earnings profile that rises in 
a quadratic pattern with tenure, we only use the information up to the 
peak of the profile. In other words, depreciation, which eventually 
brings down the wage profile, is not considered here.
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NOTES
1 Workers who separated for reasons of "own misdeed" are classified as quits, because in Japan 
they are likely to resign rather than be fired. Classifying those as dismissed does not change the 
qualitative findings reported here.
2 Recall that regular workers constitute the bulk of the employed workers in Japan (chapter 2).
3 The trend line for the real gross national product was estimated as a function of a time variable 
and its square term.
4 The reader is reminded that the all-industry data for the United States refer to the stock of 
unemployed workers grouped by reason for unemployment, and therefore are not directly com 
parable to other data, all of which refer to flow of separated persons.
5 Regression analyses reveal that the bonus-earnings ratio increases with the educational 
attainment of workers, firm size, and tenure in the firm. Regression estimates are remarkably stable 
for years 1967, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1981. For details of these analyses, see Hashimoto( 1979) 
and Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b).
6 Although bonus payments take place in other developed countries, Japanese bonus propor 
tions rank highest among the developed countries. For example, as of 1978, bonuses amounted to 
8 percent of total compensation and 12 percent of direct compensation in West Germany, and 
6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in France. The United Kingdom and Canada as well as the 
United States exhibited only small bonus payments. Korea also has bonus payments. According to 
the recent research by Ito and Kang (1989), Korean bonuses began to appear around 1971. The 
bonus-wage ratio is still low as compared to Japan, but it has been increasing since the early 1970s, 
and by the early 1980s, the Korean ratio stood at about half of the Japanese ratio.
7 At this writing, there is some indication that the U.S. trend may be reversing, as firms
increasingly try to tie wages to performance. (See, for example, "GM©s New Compensation Plan
Reflects General Trend Tying Pay to Performance," The Wall Street Journal, 26 January 1988.)
8 In contrast, bonuses in the early years of industrialization, i.e., during the turn of the
century, tended to be incentive payments. Recall the related discussion in chapter 3.
9 See Gordon (1982), Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b), and Taylor (1989). See chapter 3 for a 
discussion on shunto.
10 These quotes are from "Labor J^etter," The Wall Street Journal, 25 August 1987.
1 © Actually, the estimated regression includes j2 and n2 as well. Also, the magnitudes in table 4.4 
are corrected for the fact that a change in the logarithm of Y is not the same as the percentage change 
in K. For example, a percentage change from Y0 to 7, is given by (Y{ - YQ)/YO , which equals Y\IY0 
  1. A change in the logarithm of Y, d\ogY, is log(K,/y0), so that the correct measure of percentage 
change is exp(dlogy) -1.
12 Note that the relative importance of firm-specific experience is greater in large firms than in 
small firms, though the medium-sized companies tend to break this pattern for unknown reasons. 
The reader is also referred to a recent article by Mincer and Higuchi (1988), in which they find from 
microdata sets that upwards of two-thirds of the difference in turnover data between Japan and the 
United States is explained by the steepness of earnings-tenure profiles. Their analysis indicates that 
Japan©s rapid economic growth and rapid technical change, in particular-was a factor in the 
emphasis on human capital investments on the job.
13 As we saw in chapter 3, mandatory retirement used to occur at about 55 years of age, but the 
retirement age has been increasing for the past 15 years or so. Many firms now retire workers closer 
to age 60.
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14 For the extent of long-term employment in the United States, see Koike (1977, 1988), Hall 
(1982), and Hashimoto and Raisian (1985). It is usually thought that smaller firms have higher 
failure rates; if so, smaller businesses are expected to have shorter durations of employment on 
average. A potentially contrary piece of evidence should be kept in mind, however. Cole (1979, 
87-90) reports that the proportion of workers in Yokohama who are job-leavers due to involuntary 
discharge presumably including business failures tend to be highest in the largest companies 
and lowest in the smallest businesses. No information is available, however, on the proportion of 
those discharges due to business failures.
If failure rates were the predominant factor, competition would lead to higher wages in smaller 
firms. Since wages tend to be lower in smaller companies, there must be more to firm-size 
differences. As another factor, employees in larger firms have greater opportunities to change jobs 
without changing employers. Indeed, Cole (1979, 80-81) found that intrafirm mobility increases 
with firm size in both Yokohama and Detroit. Idson (1989) found that in the United States there is 
more intrafirm mobility in larger establishments.
15 Interestingly, the pattern of male-female difference appears opposite in the two countries. In 
the United States, males hold a greater number of jobs than females throughout their lives, but in 
Japan females hold more jobs. This pattern may reflect, in part, the fact that in Japan the lifetime 
employment practice applies mostly to males, and that females serve as a cushion for employment 
fluctuations.
16 The quadratic tenure and experience terms are consistent with the fraction of time, k(t), 
which declines linearly with t. See Mincer (1974).
17 In the original paper, we also reported the results for medium-sized firms with 100-999 
employees. The computed values of investments increased monotonically with firm size for 
nonagriculture enterprises in both countries and for manufacturing in Japan, but the pattern was 
mixed for U.S. manufacturing. There, the investment magnitude for medium-sized firms was the 
smallest (1.5 years) and, as shown in table 4.5, the contrast between small and large companies was 
weak.
18 Computed rates of return on investments were rather similar for the two countries: 13 percent 
for Japan and 16 percent for the United States in nonagriculture sectors, and 13 percent for Japan 
and 17 percent for the United States in manufacturing. Firm-size differences in rates of return could 
not be ascertained, because our procedure by construction equalizes the rates of return across firm- 
size groups.
19 However, see Hashimoto and Raisian (1988) for an attempt to decompose investment 
magnitudes into firm-specific and general components.
20 Japanese firms pay annuities, a lump-sum amount, or a combination of both. Raisian and I 
calculated pension values for nonagricultural workers in large firms (those with 1,000 employees 
or more) in Japan and the United States. We then added them to the estimated investments in human 
capital. The result still shows that Japanese workers have greater investments than their American 
counterparts. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for manufacturing. See Hashimoto 
and Raisian (1988).
21 Table 4.6 updates the regression estimates reported in Hashimoto and Raisian (1987a,b, 
1988).
22 The output coefficient for U.S. manufacturing isO.5802 (9.6), the constant is -0.0118(2.9), 
and the /J-square is 0.75. The values in parentheses are /-values.
23 According to Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), a similar difference exists for aggregate 
workers, not just manufacturing workers.
24 A major innovation introduced by Topel is in incorporating a sophisticated time-series
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analysis mechanism for forecasting current and future shipments. For technical details, see 
Hashimoto (1990c).
25 1 do not explore the implications of the inventory parameters for generating the inventory 
cycle in either country. For one such study for the Japanese wool textile industry, see Trivedi (1981).
26 The variable q, is calculated as the difference between the current shipment and the forecasted 
value of the current shipment, (q,-eq,).
27 Because of the Almon-type restrictions of a polynomial of the third degree that I impose on 
the pattern of /3,,©s, the four-month horizon is the shortest possible horizon. Computation costs 
dictated that the experiment be limited to three alternative horizons.
28 The "best" specifications turned out to be:
f1L©-fI1L"-fI3L©3-f16L©6-f19Li9)M/ (5a) 
for Japan, and
(1 -£3£3)U ~L)(l -L")q,=(l -6L©2)(1 -f,L-fuL" -f16L")M, (5b) 
for the United States,
where £ ©s and f ©s are coefficients. These specifications were chosen to make the series u, to be as 
purely white noise as possible. Also, it can be shown readily that d is unity for a fixed seasonally 
and zero for a completely nonstationary seasonality.
29 The term ichiji means temporary and kyugyosha means those not at work.
30 See, for example, Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo Rodo Tokei (Practical Labor Statis 
tics), 1990, 238.
3 © Another potential difficulty is that the labor supply elasticity is likely to differ between the two 
countries. The less elastic the labor supply, the less employment adjustment one is likely to observe. 
If so, an observation of a small employment adjustment may reflect an inelastic labor supply rather 
than the presence of firm-specific human capital. I owe this point to Todd Idson. There is an 
identification difficulty here. An investment in firm-specific human capital necessarily makes the 
labor supply inelastic at least in the short run. To the extent that this consideration is important, 
what may appear to be the labor supply effect is in fact the effect of firm-specific human capital.
32 Available evidence suggests that changing the vacation schedule is an important mode of 
employment adjustment in Japanese manufacturing firms (Hashimoto 1990c).
33 Also, the legal overtime premium is different between Japan and the United States. It is 25 
percent above the regular pay in Japan in contrast to 50 percent in the United States. It is unlikely 
that hours spent investing in the employment relations after regular work hours are counted as 
overtime hours.
34 I owe this point to Robert Topel.
33 For the Japanese data, after numerous experiments with the model specification, it was found 
that the best specification  judged by the correlogram, Akaike©s information criterion, and correla 
tions among the estimates - still did not reduce the residuals to white noise to the same extent that it 
did for U.S. data.
36 Their model uses the Almon lag specification without specifying the interrelatedness of 
factor demand or distinguishing between unforeseen and anticipated demand. Their independent 
variable is output, whereas mine is shipment.
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37 Note, however, that before 1975 hours of work in Japan evidently increased significantly in 
response to an increase in anticipated future demand. See table 4.8 for this result.
38 In 1974, Japan experienced the first postwar negative growth rate,  1.3 percent. Actually 
the double-digit growth rate of the Japanese economy in the 1960s lasted only until about 1970. 
However, the slowdown in the growth rate was most dramatic after the oil shock. See Nakamura 
(1982, 168).
39 I owe this hypothesis to Jacob Mincer.
40 Akiyama et al. (1984, 12) estimated a somewhat different model from mine, and found that 
both employment and hours of work adjustment became more sluggish after 1976. However, they 
do not interpret their findings in terms of the emergence of cyclical economy in Japan after 1976.
41 Raisian and I also used a method in which we determined E0 for medium and large firms by 
multiplying its value for small firms by an equalizing premium, calculated as the percent difference 
in the present value of observed earnings between small firms and medium-sized or large firms. 
Findings were generally similar between the two approaches. See Hashimoto and Raisian (1988) 
for details.

Summary and Policy Discussions
Summary
The goal of this book has been to develop a unified understanding of 
some of the notable labor market differences between Japan and the 
United States. In Japan, as compared to the United States, for example, 
levels of employment tenure are high, employer-employee attachments 
strong, and earnings-tenure profiles steeply sloped. Moreover, indus 
trial relations in Japan contain some unique institutions, such as joint 
consultation and consensus-based decisionmaking, and work organiza 
tion exhibits a great deal of flexibility.
Often overlooked is the significance of the commonly observed 
phenomenon of Japanese employers and employees spending a great 
deal of informal time together after work hours. 1 In my view, this 
expenditure of time, at least in part, is an investment in the employment 
relationship, reflecting the overall greater investment in firm-specific 
human capital in Japan than in the United States. This investment 
difference results in a stronger employer-employee attachment in Japan 
than in the United States, as evidenced by the considerably smaller 
number of days lost in labor disputes in Japan. Interestingly, the two 
countries seem to have been diverging in this respect. The days lost in 
Japan started to follow a downward trend around 1960, but in the United 
States the trend has been moderately upwards in most of the postwar 
years.
The two economies also differ in the ways that employment, hours of 
work, and inventories adjust over the business cycle. Layoffs seem to be 
used much less frequently in Japan than in the United States, with 
adjustments in hours of work and inventories assuming a greater impor 
tance. Workforce reductions tend to be achieved with less reliance on
115
116 Summary and Policy Discussions
outright dismissals in Japan than in the United States. The difference in 
the mode of workforce reduction undoubtedly is a factor behind the 
lower unemployment rates in Japan.
Many of the modern industrial relations practices that are sometimes 
considered unique for Japan are not simple carryovers from the feudal 
era. Instead, they appear to be relatively recent innovations whose 
evolution has been in response to changing labor market conditions 
induced by rapid economic growth. The developers of these institu 
tions employers, employees, policy makers were guided by the pro 
cess of rational economic decisionmaking. In that process, their deci 
sions inevitably had to take into account the constraints imposed by the 
transaction-cost environment. Put another way, the rapid pace of eco 
nomic growth was the primary mover and shaper of the institutional 
changes, with culture and tradition via the transaction-cost environment 
serving the roles of conditioning factors.
For example, the celebrated Japanese practices of lifetime employ 
ment, seniority wages, and bonus payments all first began to appear in 
some form during the primary phase of industrialization in the early 
1900s. Their appearance was the result of the need to stabilize the 
employment of skilled workers because, as the process of industrializa 
tion accelerated, acute labor shortages developed and labor turnover 
became high. Yet, the employment and wage systems, as we know them 
today, were by no means prevalent before World War II. In fact, it was 
not until 10 to 15 years after the end of the Second World War, with the 
advent of sustained rapid economic growth, that many of these features 
became widespread throughout the Japanese economy.
The reasons behind the labor market differences between Japan and 
the United States are complex. To make the investigation manageable, I 
began with a premise that many of the labor market differences between 
the two mirror the contrasts in the strength of employment relationships. 
Based on this premise, the theory was formulated in chapter 2 by 
incorporating transaction-cost considerations into human capital theory. 
Transaction costs in this analysis denote costs of communicating infor 
mation between the employer and the employee, as well as among the 
employees, including the costs of convincing the other party of the
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information©s veracity. This approach resulted in a simple analytical 
framework for investigating the manner in which economic growth 
interacts with the transaction-cost environment in shaping labor market 
institutions.
An innovation in the approach is the distinction drawn between two 
types of investment: investment in firm-specific technical skills, and 
investments in the reliability of information exchanged between em 
ployer and employees, and among employees. These investments taken 
together constitute what is referred to as firm-specific human capital, 
and they help shape many of the labor market institutions and practices. 
Note that the human capital literature has tended to focus on technical 
skills, but in my view an investment in the reliability of information is 
just as important, if not more so, in promoting a successful production 
team. It is this latter type of investment that takes place in the Japanese 
joint consultation system, quality control circles, consensus-based deci- 
sionmaking, and time spent outside the company environs with 
coworkers.
The following analytical results emerge from the theory. An autono 
mous increase in the investment in information reliability encourages 
the investment in technical skills. Similarly, an autonomous increase in 
the investment in technical skills stimulates the investment in informa 
tion reliability. I investigated how the interaction between the two types 
of investments affects the choice of contract type and the quality of 
industrial relations. For that purpose, contracts were characterized as 
ideal, fixed-wage, or flexible-wage. The results suggested that an in 
creased investment in information reliability is likely to be accompanied 
by flexible contractual arrangements.
The theory©s most significant message is that investments in both 
technical skills and in information reliability may be stimulated by 
technological change and that stimulation is greater the more elastic the 
cost functions underlying these investments. It was argued that the cost 
function associated with the investment in information reliability is 
more elastic in a lower transaction-cost environment. This result points 
to an interaction between technological progress and low transaction 
costs as an explanation of why the Japanese style of industrial relations
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became widespread in the country after the late 1950s. A plausible 
interpretation of the sequence of events that took place may be as 
follows.
The productivity enhancement campaign (seisansei undo) that began 
with the establishment of the Japan Productivity Center in 1955, encour 
aged rapid economic growth. The accompanying technological prog 
ress, which began to accelerate in the early 1960s, stimulated the 
investment in firm-specific technical skills. The increased investment in 
technical skills, in turn, encouraged the investment in information 
reliability, and this whole process was boosted by the low-transaction- 
cost environment that prevailed in Japan. The increased information 
reliability further stimulated the investment in technical skills. The 
result of this process was a strengthening of the employer-employee 
attachment, which became manifest in such labor market institutions as 
joint consultations, consensus-based decisionmaking, and enterprise 
unions, all of which became widespread in Japan after the late 1950s.
The transaction-cost-based explanation of the Japanese industrial 
relations system may facilitate an understanding of how the economy 
coped with the two oil shocks in the 1970s. The first crisis, in late 1973, 
dramatically reduced the rate of economic growth in the country. During 
the 1970-73 period, real GNP grew at 8.1 percent per year, but the 
growth rate fell to a mere 0.6 percent in the 1974-75 period. 2 At the 
same time, Japan became plagued with an accelerated rate of inflation. 
The rate of increase of the consumer price index rose from 9 percent in 
1972 to 25 percent in 1974. As is well-known by now, a substantial wage 
increase demanded by the unions after the first oil shock contributed to 
the decline of the economy in the 1974-75 period. Unions evidently 
realized that the wage-hike demand was a mistake, and no such demand 
was made during the second oil shock in the late 1970s. In fact, the rate 
of wage increase dropped from 6.4 percent in 1978 to 6.0 percent in 
1979, though the rate rose slightly to 6.3 percent in 1980. 3
The low transaction-cost environment contributed to the resilient 
performance of the Japanese economy during the two oil crises and 
afterwards. The key ingredients to the recovery were the effective cost- 
reducing effort, the low rate of labor disputes, productivity improve-
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ments, and labor market flexibility. As Onitsuka (1988) notes, "workers 
did not oppose the introduction of robots and other factory-office auto 
mation because the lifetime employment scheme guaranteed them job 
security. Other examples of labor-management cooperation, such as the 
©quality circle© and ©zero defect movements,© also tended to reduce costs 
and improve labor productivity..." (p. 21).
Finally, it is sometimes claimed that the racial and ethnic homogene 
ity of the Japanese population fosters harmonious industrial relations in 
that country. To the extent that population homogeneity leads to low 
transaction costs, this claim may have some validity. As will be noted 
later, however, it is not the population homogeneity per se that lowers 
transaction costs. Rather, the critical factors are homogeneity in the 
attitude toward work, the willingness to learn new skills, and the spirit of 
cooperation.
The theory developed in chapter 2 is not designed to yield explicit 
relationships among variables, with identifiable parameters that can be 
estimated. Instead, its purpose is to generate qualitative propositions 
and provide a framework to help develop a unified understanding of the 
various labor market institutions. In addition, transaction costs are not 
observable, so it is not possible to test directly the proposition that 
transaction costs are lower in Japan than in the United States. Instead, 
one must rely on indirect evidence. A skeptical reader may be inclined to 
discredit any such evidence put forth to support the theory. Faced with 
this prospect, it would be tempting to begin by asserting that transaction 
costs are lower in Japan than in the United States and then investigate the 
implications of such an assertion.
Although such an approach is defensible, an even simpler approach 
would be to start by asserting that the investment in firm-specific human 
capital is greater in Japan than in the United States. This approach could 
yield a unified understanding of the differences between the two coun 
tries in the shape of the earnings profile, wage flexibility, and labor 
turnover. In asking why Japanese investment in firm-specific human 
capital is greater and transaction cost lower, however, one may gain 
additional insights. For this reason, chapters 3 and 4 examine the 
influences that may bear on transaction costs, focusing on the factors
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that may help explain the difference in firm-specific human capital 
investment between the two countries.
In constructing a satisfactory test of any theory, one must ask what 
phenomena will be observed if the theory is to be refuted. To this end, 
the quit-dismissal distinction was investigated in chapter 4. Although 
the underlying data have some problems, I found the evidence by and 
large to support the theory. In particular, the prediction examined is that 
the quit-dismissal distinction in Japan is less closely related to economic 
conditions than it is in the United States. One would expect that in Japan, 
where transaction costs are hypothesized to be low, it would be unclear 
as to which party initiated separations in a large proportion of cases. As 
a result, one would expect the reported distinction in the Japanese data to 
tend to be arbitrary and independent of economic conditions.
In the United States, where transaction costs are hypothesized to be 
high, the employer and employee would make their own separation 
decisions in response to exogenous changes in labor demand. The 
resulting separations would be reported either as layoffs or quits, de 
pending on which party made the decision. Based on these considera 
tions, one would expect the reported distinction between the two separa 
tion categories to be more random and less related to economic 
conditions in Japan than in the United States. The regression analysis 
indicates that the quit-layoff distinction in manufacturing is statistically 
significant for the United States, but ambiguous for Japan, thus confirm 
ing the prediction based on the transaction-cost argument.
Needless to say, it would be useful to have more direct evidence on the 
magnitude of transaction costs in both countries. However, these costs 
are difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly, and one probably 
would have to rely on anecdotal evidence like the example in chapter 3 of 
the compliant Japanese worker in contrast to the resistant American 
worker. Much more evidence along this line is needed, however, before 
one could hope to fully document the transaction-cost differences. Also 
discussed were some of the institutions in Japanese industrial relations 
which, along with traditional and cultural factors, point to the existence 
of low transaction costs in Japan. It is hoped that these discussions help 
clarify my perspective in this study.
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Policy Discussions and Suggestions for Future Research
TUrning to the policy implications of this study for the United States, 
let me focus on the relationship between the employment system and the 
overall economic performance. This focus is appropriate, as the interna 
tional competitiveness of the American economy is a critical policy 
concern for the United States. The key ingredients for an internationally 
competitive economy are the abilities of its labor force to adapt flexibly 
in an environment of continual innovation and to produce quality prod 
ucts in a cost-effective manner. These abilities, I argue, are fostered by 
investment in the employment relationship, and they seem to charac 
terize Japan©s labor force. What lessons can one learn from the Japanese 
experience?
Since labor is the predominant input to production in the U.S. 
economy, an improvement in labor performance would seem to be a 
most direct way to deal with the sluggish productivity growth of that 
economy. Besides, such an improvement would in turn stimulate invest 
ments in technology and physical capital. Note that the emphasis of this 
study contrasts with that of Jorgenson et al. (1987), as discussed in 
chapter 3, who argue that Japan©s high rates of growth in capital and 
intermediate inputs were largely responsible for the rapid growth in 
Japan©s output between 1960 and 1979. Growth in physical capital 
undoubtedly played a role in Japan©s postwar economic performance, 
but this study emphasizes the importance of investments in industrial 
relations systems in making the machines run efficiently. 4
Labor productivity is realized at the firm level. Activities in a firm 
involve teamwork among its employees, as well as between the em 
ployer and the employees. The teamwork is supported by the firm©s 
industrial relations system. Therefore, the industrial relations system 
critically influences the performance of workers in the firm. The effec 
tiveness of that system, in turn, depends on the quantity and quality of 
investments made to maintain and improve it. The postwar Japanese 
experience seems to indicate that such investments help foster a strong 
sense of identification with and commitment to the company on the part
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of both the management and the worker. Cole (1979) summarized the 
Japanese industrial relations system this way:
At the heart of the distinctiveness of the Japanese approach is the 
attempt to maximize the harmonization of individual and organiza 
tional goals. Most of the key postwar personnel innovations can be 
understood in this light. Moreover, this attempt is made not only by 
providing incentives for workers to adopt management-defined or 
ganizational goals, but also by attempting to maximize the achieve 
ment of worker-defined goals so long as they do not conflict with 
high priority management goals (p. 253).
As discussed earlier, I have distinguished two kinds of investments for 
improving an industrial relations system: investments in technical skills 
and investments in information reliability. Japanese workers are trained 
not only in technical skills, but also in the skills they need to be effective 
team members, skills which promote information reliability. To main 
tain these skills, Japanese firms continuously train and retrain workers 
as required within their own organizations, and utilize skills in a flexible 
manner within their own or subsidiary organizations (see chapter 4). 
These practices constitute the central features of the Japanese private 
sector training, which has played a key role in human resource develop 
ment for Japan©s modern industry. In contrast, training in U.S. firms 
tends to focus on narrowly defined skills, and becoming effective team 
members has not been its main objective. 5
Private sector training was also instrumental in the development of a 
skilled workforce in the United States; thus, at first, the Japanese 
experience would seem to parallel the American experience. There are 
notable differences, however, between the two. Japan has relied pri 
marily on firm-level strategy rather than on government programs, 
public vocational schools, and training institutions for the promotion of 
private sector training. Japanese workers develop and accumulate skills 
useful in the specific firms in which they are employed rather than in the 
economy at large.
Laws and public policies have played important roles, while often 
leaving much room for private sector decisionmaking. Japanese public
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policies on training have focused on ensuring the availability of educated 
and trainable new workers to all industries, leaving the provision of 
industrial training up to the individual firms. 6 The foundation for the 
Japanese training strategy has been the educational system, which 
focuses on basic education and serves primarily to guide students to a 
sector of the economy rather than to specific tasks. Once employed, 
Japanese workers build on their solid basic education by acquiring firm- 
specific training. As a result, vocational and professional schools have 
been less common in Japan than in the United States. Training that 
American workers receive at vocational and professional schools is not 
firm-specific. As a result, these workers can change their place of 
employment without a loss of their earning power.
The cornerstone of Japanese private sector training is the employee 
rotation system, whereby an employee is rotated among different tasks 
on a regular basis. This practice fosters the formation of intrafirm 
general, though firm-specific, skills. Since these skills are useful in 
many divisions within the company, a decline in demand in one division 
does not necessarily lead to layoffs of affected workers. The resulting 
job security encourages employees to acquire firm-specific skills and 
welcome new technologies, and strengthens the employer-employee 
attachment.
In addition, joint consultation promotes the harmonization of indi 
vidual and organizational goals. The resulting bond between employees 
and their firm again increases the incentive to invest in firm-specific 
skills. This way, Japanese training practices contribute to the decrease in 
the job turnover of skilled workers. The open labor markets that exist are 
limited to older workers, farm workers who migrate to the cities on off- 
seasons, or unskilled and part-time workers, many of whom serve as 
buffers to the lifetime employees. In contrast, the U.S. approach to 
training has contributed to the high mobility of skilled workers among 
firms, and even among industries and occupations.
The Japanese training practice has had an obvious payoff in terms of 
the high quality of manufactured products. The connection between 
training and product quality has an obvious implication for the interna 
tional competitiveness of firms© products, as evidenced by the stream of
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successful Japanese products in recent years. The importance of pro 
moting high product quality is most visible in the operation of the 
celebrated just-in-time, or kanban, system. 7 The successful operation 
of the kanban system depends critically on the continuous flow of zero- 
defect parts and components. The supply of highly reliable components 
is assured when workers are trained and motivated to produce them. 
Such training and the nurturing of motivation seemingly rank very 
highly in the Japanese industrial relations system.
Are some of the Japanese practices importable to the United States? 
The analysis in chapter 2 suggests that many of the practices were 
endogenously determined, having evolved in response to the needs 
generated by rapid economic growth and as a reflection of Japan©s 
cultural values and tastes. Merely copying Japan©s endogenously deter 
mined institutions and practices, therefore, will not necessarily prove 
successful in the United States. Cultural values and tastes are among the 
exogenous variables which shape the cost function underlying the in 
vestment in information reliability. The key to a successful adaptation of 
the Japanese practices, therefore, is to ascertain how American ex 
ogenous variables differ from those of the Japanese and determine how 
they may be manipulated to bring about the desired outcomes. The 
question, therefore, is how to fashion an industrial relations system in 
the United States that would achieve results similar to those of the 
Japanese industrial relations system, but be conditioned by American 
cultural and traditional values.
Consider, for example, the frequently asked question, "Would greater 
wage and labor market flexibility raise productivity?" Our theory sug 
gests that this question is posed incorrectly. Wage flexibility, for exam 
ple, is endogenous, and it doesn©t make sense to ask if imposing greater 
flexibility would improve productivity. Costs of investments in the 
employment relationship investments in technical skills and informa 
tion reliability-are the exogenous variables. What this study shows is 
that a low transaction-cost environment for these investments promotes 
labor market flexibility and productivity. If an economy is in a high 
transaction-cost environment, a flexible-wage contract may not be effi 
cient, and forcing such a contract onto this economy will lower output.
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Another example relates to worker participation in decisionmaking. 
There is evidence indicating that, on balance, some forms of worker 
participation have helped increase productivity in American firms. 8 The 
question remains unanswered, however, as to what type of participation 
under what conditions is most likely to be effective. Here again, such 
forms of participation as joint consultation, quality control circles, and 
consensus-based decisionmaking are endogenous phenomena. They 
may have worked relatively well in Japan, but there is no guarantee that 
they will be equally effective in all American firms. Imposing worker 
participation in a high transaction-cost environment is likely to result in 
friction and conflict that waste time and other resources for everyone 
involved.
It is clear, therefore, that a rush to borrow the "Japanese system" in the 
United States or elsewhere will not always be successful. Robert Hayes 
(1981) describes the American tendency for rushing-to-borrow in the 
late 1970s as follows:
. . .U.S. businesses found themselves increasingly displaced in 
international markets and, more recently, in their home markets as 
well. This sudden weakness has come as a shock to many American 
managers who, in searching belatedly for causes and explanations, 
have often looked for dramatic, easily imitated or purchased solu 
tions: quality circles, government assistance, and the use of intel 
ligent robots.... There are no magic formulas just steady pro 
gress in small steps and focusing attention on manufacturing 
fundamentals. This is why their [Japanese] example will be so hard 
for American companies and American managers to emulate 
(p. 65).
Not surprisingly, therefore, attempts to adopt quality control circles 
in the United States appear to have met with mixed results. 9 The data 
could not be found that would indicate the exact extent of success with 
QC circles in the country, but the available literature suggests that they 
have not always been successful. 10 To be sure, QC circles in Japan 
haven©t always been successful either, but it seems safe to infer from the 
literature that the probability of success has been higher in Japan than in
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the United States. The strong attitude of individualism, distrust between 
employees and management, management©s failure to involve unions in 
setting up QC circles, middle management©s fear of being bypassed in 
decisionmaking processes, all are said to have contributed to the failure 
of QC circles in some American firms.
This book has argued that Japan©s low transaction-cost environment 
was the key factor in the successful implementation of many of the 
Japanese-style practices. It is also asserted that racial and ethnic homo 
geneity, as well as cultural and traditional influences, have contributed to 
this environment. It doesn©t follow, however, that there is no possibility 
of creating a similar environment in the United States. To the contrary, 
the experiences at some of the Japanese transplant companies suggest 
that it is possible to do so. In particular, the experiences at NUMMI 
(New United Motor Manufacturing), Honda of America Manufactur 
ing, Diamond-Star Motors, Subaru-Isuzu Automotive do suggest that 
the productivity of American workers can be boosted if an effort is made 
to create a low transaction-cost environment. 11
A major thrust at these and other operations has been to develop a 
sense of teamwork by involving workers in decisionmaking and by 
improving employer-employee relations. 12 Most have also adopted an 
elaborate screening of job applicants. My investigation of some of the 
Japanese automobile transplants makes it clear that they have devoted, at 
least initially, far more resources to screening and assessing employees 
than their parent companies do. 13 The large expenditure of resources in 
these activities is understandable given the Japanese firms© desire to 
assemble homogeneous workforces from the highly varied American 
labor force. In the case of Diamond-Star Motors and Subaru-Isuzu 
Automotive, their respective state employment agencies performed 
initial screenings before the surviving applicants were put through 
company assessment procedures. To approximate the Japanese work 
force characteristics, these transplants hired consulting firms to develop 
their assessment procedures. Representatives of a consulting firm re 
tained by Diamond-Star Motors spent about a month and a half in Japan 
observing Japanese worker characteristics, and subsequently developed 
procedures to identify key characteristics in American applicants that
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would be conducive to implementing the Japanese approaches to train 
ing and labor relations. Assessment procedures usually involve a multi- 
step testing of the applicant©s general ability, the ability to work effec 
tively with others, problemsolving skills, manual dexterity, diligence, 
and other qualities. A Japanese manager at Diamond-Star Motors indi 
cated that one of the key qualities that the Japanese parent company, 
Mitsubishi Motors, looked for was the willingness to accept flexible job 
assignments. The process is evidently quite selective. Only about 10 
percent survived the screening and the assessment procedures at Dia 
mond-Star Motors and Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, which also employed 
a consulting firm to develop its assessment procedure. Some U.S. 
workers who were hired at Honda, Ohio, reportedly were surprised at 
being asked numerous questions seemingly unrelated to work, as well as 
at the long duration of their interviews, which were attended by com 
pany executives and vice presidents. 14 As noted in chapter 2, careful 
screening of job applicants is a device for creating an environment of 
low transaction costs on the shop floor.
Once hired, these workers reported attending frequent meetings with 
management concerning production matters. These meetings are an 
important part of training. 15 The frequency of such meetings at the 
Honda plant in Ohio is indicated by the new slogan, "let©s Y-gaya," which 
means in fractured Japanese, "let©s have a bull-session." 16 In the Japanese 
transplants, the management and workers share the same table for 
lunch, thereby creating an informal setting for reliable information 
exchange. This way, workers on the shop floor hopefully develop an 
increased sense of participation in the firm©s decisionmaking process. It 
is noteworthy also that layoffs and dismissals have been rare in these 
operations.
Productivity at NUMMI after only one year of operation was re 
ported to have increased by 48.5 percent over what it was at the old 
Fremont plant under General Motors (GM) management. 17 Absen 
teeism and drug use, which had plagued the plant, dropped dramatically 
after NUMMI took over. 18 NUMMI©s efforts at productivity enhance 
ment continue with the slogan "let©s kaizen" or "let©s improve." 19 Also, 
in contrast to the old Fremont plant, the quality of the automobiles
128 Summary and Policy Discussions
produced at NUMMI has been highly rated. 20 What little evidence there 
is on productivity at NUMMI indicates that, in the first year of opera 
tion, NUMMI ranked in productivity somewhere between the Fremont 
plant and a Toyota plant in Japan. 21
Honda©s operation in Ohio is another interesting example. Honda in 
Japan is known for its emphasis on nurturing the sense of teamwork 
among its workers. This emphasis was imported to the Ohio operation. 
At the Ohio plant, employees, referred to as associates, are encouraged 
to acquire skills and training by continually interacting with one another 
on the shop floor rather than through formal training sessions. 22 Clearly, 
such learning by interaction is more effective the lower the transaction 
costs among co-workers. A lowering of transaction costs is achieved, in 
turn, by an elaborate screening of new hires mentioned earlier. Produc 
tivity at the plant reportedly approaches that of Honda©s plants in Japan, 
and the quality of the automobiles produced in Ohio is said to equal that 
of Japanese-made Hondas.
This and other newly emerging evidence suggest that some of the 
practices of Japanese industrial relations may be imported success 
fully. 23 It is too early to tell, however, what the effective way to do so is. 
Also, while the screening of job applicants initially was quite intensive 
in these transplants, the intensity appears to have lessened for subse 
quent hiring. A question arises as to how these firms will maintain a low 
transaction-cost environment as their workforce compositions change 
with turnover. As is clear by now, a low transaction-cost environment 
encourages investments in the employment relationship. The resulting 
long-term commitment to and identification with the employment rela 
tionship promote productive behaviors. It is only after a low transaction- 
cost environment is created that firms can achieve "harmony" between 
the goals of the worker and the goals of the organization.
Interestingly, these considerations suggest an agenda for future re 
search on the use of subcontractors. Japanese manufacturers are said to 
use subcontracting to a greater extent than their American counter 
parts Japanese firms are less vertically integrated than U.S. firms. A 
hypothesis worth investigating is that Japanese firms have opted to lower 
transaction costs on the shop floor by limiting the scope of operations
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within the firm. One way of limiting the scope of operations is to rely on 
subcontractors to perform some of the production activities. 24
As a strategy to create low transaction-cost environments, most of the 
Japanese transplants have chosen to locate near rural towns in the 
Midwest and Canada, where the available workforce is more homoge 
neous than in urban areas. They have also shied away from hiring 
workers with previous experience in automobile industries, choosing 
instead to train young workers and workers with little industrial experi 
ence. They have employed extensive screening of job applicants. As 
noted earlier, Japanese transplants have taken steps to instill in the 
workers a sense of participation in the decisionmaking process by 
creating informal settings in which to hold frequent discussions with co- 
workers and supervisors alike.
An effort to emulate the Japanese workplace cannot proceed without 
regard to other social goals, however. For example, an attempt to 
homogenize the workforce may conflict with the laws and policies for 
promoting equal employment opportunities. In fact, Honda in Ohio 
ended up facing a job discrimination charge brought about by the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 25 Racial and ethnic ho 
mogeneity are not the necessary condition for lowering transaction 
costs. What is needed is to "homogenize" the workforce in certain 
characteristics that are the keys to creating a low transaction-cost en 
vironment, such as pride in producing quality products, willingness to 
learn new skills, and a spirit of cooperation with co-workers (as opposed 
to homogeneity strictly along racial and ethnic lines). Such an approach 
is unlikely to run afoul of the equal employment goal. Public policies on 
education obviously have some role to play in instilling these charac 
teristics in the future workforce.
Clearly, borrowing Japanese practices must be done in a very selec 
tive way in order to fit American needs and circumstances. That is 
exactly what the Japanese have done borrow from the United States 
and Western Europe to fit Japanese needs and circumstances in mod 
ernizing their economy after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, and during 
the critical postwar years with the productivity enhancement campaign.
Finally, the role of economic growth must not be overlooked. In
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particular, recall the earlier argument that the rapid pace of economic 
growth and the accompanying technological change were the prime 
movers in developing many of the successful Japanese industrial rela 
tions practices. As discussed in chapter 2, an outlook for sustained 
economic growth stimulates the incentive to invest in human capital just 
as it encourages the investments in physical capital. An important goal 
of macroeconomic policies is to generate such an outlook. Thus, the 
present study has revealed a link between macroeconomic policies and 
the goal of increasing worker performance, a link that has not been 
stressed in policy discussions.
Let me end this book with a discussion on future research. It would be 
illuminating to evaluate the applicability of the Japanese training and 
labor relations approaches to the U.S. labor force by studying the 
Japanese transplants in the United States. The preceding discussions 
suggest that the Japanese automobile transplants may be of particular 
interest. One of them, the Honda Motor Company of Ohio, is now 
exporting automobiles to Japan, and others will soon follow suit. These 
companies appear poised, therefore, to demonstrate the feasibility of 
importing Japanese employment practices to the United States. How are 
these transplants succeeding in implementing their parent companies© 
employment practices in the different environment of the American 
labor force and employment practices? What modifications are neces 
sary in these practices to ensure their success in U.S. firms? What 
characteristics of the American labor force are likely to enhance the 
effectiveness of Japanese practices in the United States?
In trying to answer these questions, I would propose the following 
hypotheses: (A) transplants invest more in screening new hires than 
their parent companies do, given the heterogeneity of the American 
labor force; (B) transplants invest less in the employment relationship 
than their parent companies do because of the high investment costs and 
high propensity for mobility associated with U.S. workers; and (C) in 
trying to import their parent companies© practices, these transplants 
must have taken steps to adjust to the characteristics of the American 
labor force and labor market practices.
Some of the issues, then, that must be clarified include the following:
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1. To what extent are these firms succeeding in adapting their Jap 
anese approaches to new-employee screening, employee training, em 
ployee rotation, joint consultation, the kanban system, quality control 
circles, the compensation system (do they give as substantial bonus 
payments as their parent companies do?), and the employment system 
(given that layoffs are rarely used, how do they utilize workers when 
demand is low?).
2. What steps are being taken to deal with such features of the U.S. 
labor force as the high propensity for mobility, the heterogeneity, the 
level of basic skills, and attitudes toward work?
3. To what extent is the trainability of U.S. workers a factor in 
selecting a site?
4. How much time and money are spent on screening and training 
new employees?
5. What are employees© perceptions of the manner in which the 
Japanese approach affects their motivation and productivity?
6. Which characteristics of U.S. labor practices might enhance the 
effectiveness of Japanese practices when applied to the American labor 
force?
7. What aspects of the Japanese practices would be counterproduc 
tive if adopted without modification in the United States? 
As noted earlier, I have begun an investigation along the lines discussed 
above.
NOTES
1 This phenomenon implies that the conventionally measured hourly productivity is overstated 
for Japanese workers. I calculated elsewhere that taking into account the extra hours that Japanese 
workers spend with one another after work increases the average Japanese hours of work by 10.4 
percent and that this increase, in turn, implies a widening of the productivity gap between Japan and 
the United States to somewhere between 58 and 67 percent in favor of the United States. See 
Hashimoto (1990a). Such a calculation, however, must be interpreted with caution. In particular, it 
is inappropriate to conclude that Japanese workers are low productivity workers. There is ob 
viously the issue of how to measure productivity. Clearly, the time expenditure by Japanese workers 
has paid off in terms of their increased competitiveness in international markets. What is not clear is 
whether Japanese workers have been over-investing their time.
2 The factual discussion on this experience draws heavily on Onitsuka (1988), which contains
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an informative discussion on the macroeconomic performance of the Japanese economy during the 
oil crisis.
3 Also at work was the expansion of the money supply. The first oil shock took place against the 
background of the easy-money policy that preceded it, but when the second oil shock arrived 
policymakers responded swiftly with anti-inflationary measures. See Onitsuka (1988).
4 It is interesting to recall the observation by Hayes (1981) that Japanese machines are not that 
much newer than those in the U.S., but that they just run newer.
5 The cross-training practice at Japanese automobile transplants appears to have created some 
problems for American workers who came in with specific skills. For example, tool and die makers 
at the Mazda plant in Flat Rock, Michigan reportedly were insulted by the requirement that they 
learn lesser jobs, such as operating a crane (Fucini and Fucini 1990, 92-93).
6 See Levine and Kawada (1980) for an informative discussion on the role of industrial training 
in Japanese economic development.
7 As noted in chapter 3 (note 66), the kanban system was pioneered by the Toyota Motor 
Company in the 1950s, and became widely adopted by other Japanese manufacturers after the late 
1970s. Under this system, materials, parts, and components are produced and delivered only when 
they are needed.
8 Levine and Tyson (1990) found that of the 29 studies found in the literature only two 
concluded that participation hurts productivity. Fourteen studies found that participation increases 
productivity and the remaining 13 were inconclusive.
9 See chapter 3 for a discussion on quality control circles in Japan. The first quality control 
circle in the United States was implemented in 1974 at Lockheed Missile and Space Company, with 
subsequent success. Quality circles grew rapidly afterwards, and as of the early 1980s there were 
over 3,000 circles in American firms (Blair and Ramsing 1983). See Cole (1979, 1980) for a list of 
U.S. firms adopting quality control circles, as well as a discussion of their motives.
10 See, for example, Blair and Ramsing (1983). Drucker (1990) argues that many QC circles 
failed in American plants because they were established without statistical quality control, the main 
benefit of which is to provide rigorous and reliable feedback between production and workers 
involved.
11 To be sure, such a suggestion must be interpreted with caution, since it is unclear if the 
successful experiences so far will survive the test of time. NUMMI was established in 1984 as a 
joint venture between General Motors (GM) and Toyota. Honda of America Manufacturing in 
Marysville, Ohio started production in 1978. Diamond Star Motors is a joint venture between 
Mitsubishi and Chrysler, and production started in 1988. Its plant in Normal, Illinois with over 470 
robots is said to be the world©s most technologically advanced. (See "Shaking Up Detroit," Business 
Week, 14 August 1989.) Subaru-Isuzu Automotive in Lafayette, Indiana began production in 1989. 
As NUMMI inherited the old Fremont plant operated by GM and employed many of the former GM 
workers, its experience seems particularly useful for ascertaining the effects of Japanese-style 
operations in the United States.
12 In the ensuing discussion, I rely on the informative book by Shimada (1988), as well as on my 
own research in progress, for the facts regarding the U.S. operations of Japanese automobile 
manufacturers.
13 A Japanese manager at Subaru-Isuzu Automotive stated that if their parent companies in 
Japan were to engage in such extensive screening and assessing, they would quickly lose their 
applicants to other firms.
14 See "How Does Japan Inc. Pick Its American Workers?", Business Week, 3 October 1988, for
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similar evidence on the intensive screening at Mazda Motor Mfg. in Michigan as well as at 
Diamond-Star Motors. According to a survey of 83 Japanese transplants and 41 U.S. manufactur 
ing plants, in 1985 a Japanese transplant spent an average of $759, and an American plant $411, to 
hire a new worker (Higuchi 1987). These figures do not include the value of time spent on 
recruitment.
15 Based on the same survey mentioned in note 14, Higuchi (1987) reports that in 1985 Japanese 
transplants spent an average of $967, and American automobile manufacturers, an average of $306, 
to train a new hire. These figures are only indicative as they do not include the value of time of 
trainers and trainees.
16 The term Y-gaya evidently was invented at Honda. It is made up from the Japanese 
onomatopoeia wai-wai and gaya-gaya which convey the noise level in a typical "bull session."
17 What is noteworthy is the fact that the productivity improvement occurred in spite of the fact 
that the plant and equipment were largely inherited from the old Fremont operation and that many 
of the workers were the same as those who worked at that plant. (See Shimada 1988, 32.)
18 The absenteeism at the old GM plant was reported to be 20 percent, but it now stands at 
2 percent. See "Shaking Up Detroit," Business Week, 14 August 1989.
19 Kaizen also underlies the approaches at Honda, Diamond-Star, Subaru-Isuzu as well as at 
Mazda in Flat Rock, Michigan. See "How Does Japan Inc. Pick Its American Workers?", Business 
Week, 3 October 1988.
20 According to Shimada (1988, 42), Consumer Reports in 1986 rated the Novas produced at 
NUMMI somewhere between 3.6 and 3.8 out of the maximum attainable of 5.0, while other 
American-made automobiles averaged 2.0 to 3.0.
21 In terms of hours of labor, including production and nonproduction workers, it took 29.1 
hours at the GM Fremont plant (1978), 19.6 hours at NUMMI (1986), and 18.0 hours at a Toyota 
plant in Japan to produce an automobile (Shimada 1988, table 1). This type of comparison 
obviously must be interpreted with caution, because, for example, automobile models differ among 
plants.
22 In Honda©s Associate Development Center, located adjacent to the main automobile plant in 
Marysville, there are seven classrooms and additional instruction facilities, some with computer 
equipment and others with laboratories attached (to teach welding techniques, for example).
23 The recent failure of the United Auto Workers (UAW) to organize Nissan workers at its 
Tennessee plant is another indication that some Japanese practices can work successfully in the 
United States. Had these practices not been working well at Nissan, one would have expected a 
much stronger support for unionization than was realized at the election. (The UAW bid was 
defeated solidly by more than a 2-1 margin.) The only issue that the UAW could find to rally pro- 
union sentiment was the alleged lack of safety associated with the rapid pace of work. Evidently, 
however, it was not a convincing issue to the workers at large. Several years earlier, the UAW also 
tried to organize the Honda plant in Ohio, but withdrew its effort and an election was never held. It 
should be noted that both Diamond-Star Motors and Mazda Motor Manufacturing are UAW- 
organized. The fact that they are both joint ventures-with Chrysler and Ford, respectively  
obviously is the main reason for their unionization. Mazda©s experience with its UAW workforce has 
been turbulent, according to Fucini and Fucini (1990). Diamond-Star doesn©t appear to have 
experienced major problems with its union, perhaps because its workforce, unlike the one at 
Mazda, consists largely of those with nonautomotive backgrounds.
134 Summary and Policy Discussions
24 See Aoki (1990) for discussions on the Japanese firms and their use of subsidiaries and 
outside suppliers.
25 Honda was accused of giving high preference in hiring to workers from the Marysville area to 
the exclusion of the more racially mixed labor pool available in Columbus. It paid $6 million to 
about 370 blacks and women to settle the case.
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